Metaphysics without Metaphysics: Projection, Representation, and Hume's
Repudiation of Metaphysics

At the beginning of the first Enquiry, Hume says that we "must cultivate
true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and
adulterate." But when he explains what "true metaphysics" is, it turns
out not to be metaphysics at all.  Understanding how and why Hume
repudiates metaphysics will help us to better understand the shape of his
philosophical project.  This in turn will help us resolve several
currently debated questions about it, including: the nature of, and the
proper relation between, his naturalism, scepticism, and empiricism; the
relation between the negative and positive aspects of his project; the
relation between the Treatise and the Enquiry; and his "Newtonianism." 

But whatever advantages this way of looking at Hume's project might
provide, it is tempting to regard Hume's hostility to metaphysics as so
obvious as to be hardly worth pointing out.  However, a cursory scan of
the recent Hume literature reveals that contemporary Hume scholars have
attributed at least 20 (not necessarily consistent!) metaphysical
positions to him.  I illustrate this tendency by looking at some recent
work by two noted Hume scholars, one (Barry Stroud) who criticizes Hume
for failing to make certain metaphysical commitments, and another (Don
Garrett) who attributes a metaphysical thesis to him.

William Edward Morris
Illinois Wesleyan University