Hume on Memory and Causation
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In the first part of this paper I shall argue that an examination of Hume's second criterion for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination shows that Hume's ideas of the memory are relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the general form, "the complex impression that is the (original) cause of a particular positive idea $m$ and which exactly (or closely) resembles $m'$, where '$m'$ is a variable ranging over positive ideas (mental images)." I shall show that if this is correct, there is a clear basis for distinguishing ideas of the memory both from ideas of the imagination and from beliefs regarding spatially and temporally located objects that are not based upon the memory. But since there is often a significant temporal distance between the impression remembered and the positive component of one's relative idea of the memory, it is incumbent upon me to explain how the remembered impression and the positive idea can be causally related even though they are not temporally contiguous. In the second part of the paper I shall argue that, contrary to his "definitions" of causation in the *Treatise*, Hume took neither spatial nor temporal contiguity to be essential to causation.

In Book I, Part I, Section 3 and again in Book I, Part III, Section 5 of his *Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume provides two criteria for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination. I shall refer to these two criteria as "the phenomenal criterion" and "the formal criterion". In this section I shall show that while the phenomenal criterion
expresses the means one actually employs in distinguishing an idea of the memory from an idea of the imagination, the formal criterion provides one with insight into the complex structure of an idea of the memory, and therefore allows one to distinguish ideas of the memory from both ideas of the imagination and from other ideas of and beliefs regarding spatially and temporally located objects.

In Book I, Part I, Section 3 of the *Treatise*, Hume introduces the phenomenal criterion as follows:

We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION. 'Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are employ'd by the latter. When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv'd by the mind steadly and uniform for any considerable time. Here then is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another. (T 8-9; cf. T 85)

It is clear that Hume took this to be a phenomenal criterion, i.e., to specify a sensible characteristic by which one can distinguish an idea of the memory from an idea of the imagination. Not only does he state that he has found "a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another" (T 9), in the parallel
passage in Part III, Section 5 he claims to "search for the characteristic [of the idea], which distinguishes the memory from the imagination" (T 85, Hume's emphasis). The characteristic that allows one to "distinguish them in their operation" (T 85) is the difference in the force and vivacity of the ideas involved. Ideas of the memory are "much more lively and strong than those of the imagination," "the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours", and ideas of the memory flow "in upon the mind in a forcible manner" compared to those of the imagination (T 9). As Kemp Smith and Noxon have acknowledged, Hume's appeal to force and vivacity indicates that the ideas of the memory are believed, while those of the imagination are not believed.4

Although it is clear that Hume took the phenomenal cum doxastic criterion to provide a fairly reliable basis for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination, he did not take it to be entirely reliable. On the one hand, memories fade over time (they lose their force and vivacity), and, on the other hand, ideas of the imagination can become so forceful and vivacious that they are taken to be ideas of the memory (T 86). Furthermore, insofar as the phenomenal criterion can be restated as a doxastic criterion, it provides no guidance for distinguishing ideas of the memory from beliefs regarding temporally located objects that are not based upon the memory (nonmnemonic beliefs). Hence, if Hume provided a criterion for distinguishing ideas of the memory from both ideas of the imagination and from ideas that ground nonmnemonic beliefs, it is his second criterion that does this. It is to this criterion that we shall now turn.

Hume's second criterion is stated in terms of the form and order of ideas. As he wrote:
There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no less evident, namely that tho' neither the ideas of the memory nor imagination, neither the lively nor faint ideas can make their appearance in the mind, unless their correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them, yet the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner ty'd down in that respect, without any power of variation.

'Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty.... The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. (T 9; cf. T 85).

What might be called the "formal" criterion is based upon the flexibility of the imagination and the inflexibility of the memory with regard to the "form and order" of its ideas. Notice that ideas of the memory and the imagination are complex (T 85). Now insofar as complex ideas are composed of simple ideas and "all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from [caused by] simple impressions" (T 41, Hume's emphasis), ideas of the memory and of the imagination are on a par: both types of ideas can trace their ancestries back to simple impressions. The difference between them is found in the "form and order" or "order and position" of the simple ideas that compose a complex idea. While the simple ideas composing a complex idea of the imagination might originally have been caused by any number of simple and temporally separated impressions, the causal history of a complex idea of the memory must be traceable back to a single complex impression which exactly (or closely)
resembles that idea. The formal criterion is basically a causal thesis: if a particular positive idea (mental image) is a genuine idea of the memory, then at some point in the past there was a complex impression that was the cause (or the original cause) of and exactly (or closely) resembles that positive idea as an idea. But the formal criterion is not merely a causal thesis. It also reflects the fact that one conceives of a particular positive idea as representing a particular complex impression. Since Hume took ideas of the memory to be representational, it is reasonable to take ideas of the memory to be relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the following general form, "the impression that is the (original) cause of and exactly (or closely) resembles m," where 'm' denotes a particular positive idea.

Now four points should be noticed with respect to the formal criterion and the analysis of ideas of the memory in terms of relative ideas. (1) The formal criterion provides an adequate basis for distinguishing ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination. (2) The adequacy of the formal criterion is compatible with scepticism with regard to the memory. (3) Even though the phenomenal cum doxastic criterion cannot distinguish an idea of the memory from a nonmnemonic belief in the existence of a spatially or temporally located object, the formal criterion does provide a basis for drawing such a distinction. Finally, (4) if Hume's analysis of memory involves relative ideas of the kind I have suggested, then what Don Garrett took to be the problem Hume found in his own account of personal identity is not Hume's problem. Let us now consider each of these points in some detail.

(1) The formal criterion provides an adequate basis for distinguishing ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination. A positive idea is a complex idea
of the memory if and only if, as a complex idea, it was caused by and resembles a particular complex impression. In the case of an idea of the imagination, on the other hand, there is no presumption that the simple ideas composing such a complex idea have a common causal ancestry. Indeed, in the case of ideas of the imagination the presumption is that not all the simple ideas composing a particular positive idea of the imagination can trace their ancestries back to simple impressions that were once the components of a single complex impression. Further, even if, by chance, all the simple ideas composing a complex idea of the imagination were caused by the simple components of a particular complex impression, and even if the form and order of those simple impressions were the same as in the complex idea of the imagination, nonetheless, if my account of relative ideas of the memory is correct, the structure of the ideas of the memory differs from that of the ideas of the imagination. In the case of an idea of the memory, the complex relative idea would single out the impression that was the cause of its positive component, while the idea of the imagination would either be a purely positive idea, i.e., a mental image with no temporal reference, or, if there were a temporal reference, there would still be no reference to the cause of the complex positive idea, and it is fundamentally this causal reference that formally distinguishes an idea of the memory from an idea of the imagination.

(2) The adequacy of the formal criterion is compatible with scepticism with regard to the memory. It is clear that Hume was sceptical with regard to the memory, i.e., he held that one can never establish that what one takes to be an idea of the memory on the basis of the phenomenal criterion represents a past impression. As he wrote:
For tho' it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them as it pleases; yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their operation, or make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recall the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. (T 85)

Ideas of the memory, like relative ideas in Hume's "philosophical" theory of perception, single out the objects they represent on the basis of the presumption that there is a causal relation between an impression (memory) or an object (perception) and the positive element of one's relative idea. In the case of his "philosophical" theory of perception, Hume's scepticism rests upon the impossibility of knowing that a causal relation obtains between a perception and something outside the realm of perceptions. In the case of the memory, Hume's scepticism rests upon the impossibility of knowing that a relation of resemblance obtains between the positive component of one's idea of the memory and a particular complex perception. Although the formal criterion specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for an idea to be an idea of the memory, and therefore conditions under which such an idea is "true" (cf. T 448 and T 458), one is never in a position to know that one's ideas of the memory are "true". 7

(3) Even though the phenomenal cum doxastic criterion cannot distinguish an idea of the memory from a nonmnemonic belief in the existence of a spatially or temporally located object, the formal criterion does provide the basis for drawing such a distinction. Although the formal criterion indicates that all the simple components of the positive idea that grounds a
relative idea of the memory are caused by a particular complex impression, and that the complex positive idea resembles the complex impression that causes it, this causal thesis does not obtain in the case of nonmnemonic beliefs. Consequently, the positive ideas involved in nonmnemonic beliefs must be like ideas of the imagination insofar as they are constructed from simple ideas of diverse ancestries and differ from pure positive ideas of the imagination only insofar as they engender belief (are accepted as "true"). Indeed, in Book I, Part III, Section 9 of the Treatise, Hume suggests that it is on the basis of judgments regarding various kinds of causal relations that the mind projects reality beyond the domain of one's immediate perceptions and memory. There he wrote:

'Tis this latter principle [judgment], which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory. By means of it I paint the universe in my imagination, and fix my attention on any part of it I please. I form the idea of Rome, which I neither see nor remember; but which is connected with such impressions as I remember to have received from the conversation and books of travellers and historians. This idea of Rome I place in a certain situation on the idea of an object, which I call the globe. I join to it the conception of a particular government, and religion, and manners. I look backward and consider its first foundation; its several revolutions, successes, and misfortunes. All this, and every thing else, which I believe, are nothing but ideas; tho' by their force and settled order, arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves from the other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination. (T 108)
Here Hume is discussing the formation of beliefs regarding things with which we are not acquainted by the senses or the memory. Such beliefs are rooted in the imagination. It is on the basis of the principles of the imagination that one constructs the positive ideas (images) that provide the basis for these beliefs. The construction of such an idea is guided by "such impressions as I remember to have received from the conversations and books of travellers and historians," i.e., one forms one's positive ideas on the basis of the testimony of others. One conceives of these positive ideas as representing events or states of affairs that are located at particular points in space and time. Now since Hume construed representation in terms of resemblance (T 233), this together with the conception of the thing represented as being located at a particular place in space and time suggests that these ideas are also relative, and, with the appropriate spatial and temporal references, they correspond to definite descriptions of the following general form: "the state of affairs that is not a perception, that resembles \( i \), that is located at \( p \) and/or that occurs at \( t \)," where \( i \) is a positive idea, \( p \) is a place, and \( t \) is a time (or temporal property). One must allow that the positive idea that grounds such a relative idea might be an abstract idea, since in some cases one has a belief that a certain kind of thing existed in the past or will exist in the future. Further, since one's beliefs vary in specificity, the temporal predicates in the definite description corresponding to one's relative idea might range from "occurred on 21 August 1942" to "was before (or will be after) the present". Indeed, in some cases there might be no temporal reference at all. In believing that the city of Rome is part of reality, the belief might be based upon an abstract idea of a city that is conceived
as being located at a particular place without any conception of the time of its existence (cf. T 108).

If this is correct, it shows that ideas of the memory differ from nonmnemonic beliefs in two fundamental ways. First, in the case of an idea of the memory, it is an impression that is remembered. If memory provides one with beliefs regarding states of affairs other than impressions, it does so only insofar as the impression remembered is taken to represent such states of affairs. Secondly, in the case of a complex idea of the memory, there is a conception of a causal relation between a particular (past) complex impression and the positive idea that grounds one's relative idea of the memory. On the other hand, in the case of nonmnemonic beliefs, the positive ideas involved are constructed and there is no conception of a causal relation between that idea and a particular complex impression.

(4) If Hume's analysis of memory involves relative ideas of the kind I have suggested, then what Don Garrett took to be the problem Hume found in his own account of personal identity is not Hume's problem. Garrett writes:

This may seem a fairly long list of propositions, but Hume's problem is simple. Any two qualitatively identical perceptions must share exactly the same resemblance relations with other objects, and, granted (A) [All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences] and (B) [The mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences], they can be assigned different causal relations only in virtue of their different spatial and temporal locations. Yet many such perceptions have no spatial location, and so cannot differ in that respect; and perceptions of the kind mentioned in (F) [It is possible that two qualitatively identical perceptions of any kind, including those that are
"no where," should occur in different minds at the same time] will share the same temporal location as well. A pair of perceptions, accordingly, cannot be distinguished either by their relations of resemblance or by their relations of causation. Hence, either both of them will belong to a given bundle of perceptions or neither of them will.8

When two similar perceptions, $P_1$ and $P_2$, occur at a given time, and a later idea, $P_3$ of the same kind occurs with the force and vivacity appropriate to memories, it simply remains indeterminate whether $P_3$ is a memory of $P_1$ or $P_2$. We cannot say, therefore, that one rather than the other has been collected into the same bundle as $P_3$.9

Garrett suggests that if there are two qualitatively identical perceptions occurring at some time $t$ and one remembers one of these perceptions at time $t+n$, it is indeterminate which of the two perceptions one remembers. But if I am correct in suggesting that an idea of the memory is a relative idea, then the idea of the memory will single out the relevant impression -- whichever one happens to be causally related to the positive component of one's relative idea of the memory -- and Hume has no problem of the sort Garrett suggests.10

But if my account of Hume's ideas of the memory is correct, then we are confronted with another and more fundamental problem, viz., the notion of causation I have employed in my account of relative ideas of the memory is inconsistent with the "definitions" of causation in the Treatise (T 170-172; cf. T 173, and Abstract, T 649). There are two sides to this problem. First, if a cause must be spatially contiguous with its effect and some perceptions are nonspatial (T 235-237), it follows that such nonspatial perceptions can function neither as causes nor as effects. Hence, it would seem that if my account of Hume's ideas of the
memory is correct, one can have no memories of sounds, odors, and savors. Secondly, if a cause must be temporally contiguous with its effect and the positive ideas that ground one's relative ideas of the memory are often far removed in time from the impressions that cause them, it follows that one can have few, if any, memories. What I hope to show in the remainder of this paper is that, contrary to his "definitions" in the Treatise, there is good reason to believe that Hume took neither the spatial nor the temporal contiguity of a cause to its effect to be "essential" to causation.

II

Although both the "definitions" of causation Hume advanced in the Treatise and his "Rules by which to Judge of Causes and Effects" suggest that Hume took the spatial and temporal contiguity of a cause to its effect to be necessary conditions for the correctness of a causal judgment, if one examines the passage in which Hume initially introduced the claim that the spatial and temporal contiguity of a cause to its effect are "essential" to causation, one finds that the status of contiguity is far weaker than that of necessary connection (or constant conjunction). In Book I, Part III, Section 2 of the Treatise, Hume wrote:

The idea, then, of causation must be deriv'd from some relation among objects; and that relation we must now endeavour to discover. I find in the first place, that whatever objects are consider'd as causes or effects, are contiguous; and that nothing can operate in a time or place, which is ever so little remov'd from those of its existence. Tho' distant objects may sometimes seem productive of each other, they are commonly found upon examination to be link'd by a chain of
causes, which are contiguous among themselves, and to the distant objects; and when in any particular instance we cannot discover this connexion, we still presume it to exist. We may therefore consider the relation of CONTIGUITY as essential to that of causation; at least may suppose it such, according to the general opinion, till we find a more ... proper occasion to clear up this matter, by examining what objects are or are not susceptible of juxtaposition and conjunction. (T 75)

In this passage Hume first suggests that the contiguity in space and time of a cause to its effect is a necessary condition for the correctness of a causal judgment, but in the last sentence he seems to withdraw that claim. In claiming that we may merely suppose contiguity to be essential to causation, "according to the general opinion," Hume seems to be giving little more than an enumeration of the common assumptions regarding causation. Further, his suggestion that some objects susceptible to causal relations "are not susceptible to juxtaposition and conjunction" seems to indicate that he did not take the spatial contiguity of objects to be a necessary condition for objects to be causally related. We shall return to this latter point shortly.

There is some further evidence that in this section of the Treatise Hume was primarily concerned with enumerating the ordinary assumptions regarding causation, rather than with giving an analysis of the necessary conditions for a causal judgment. First, after providing an argument for the claim that a cause must be temporally prior to its effect, Hume wrote the following:

If this argument appear satisfactory, 'tis well. If not, I beg the reader to allow me the same liberty, which I have us'd in the preceding case [contiguity], of supposing it such. For he
shall find, that the affair is of no great importance. (T 76)

Noting that he had "discover'd or suppos'd the two relations of contiguity and succession to be essential to causes and effects" (T 76), Hume proceeded to consider a third, viz., necessary connection. As he wrote:

There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention'd. (T 77)

Now there are several curious things going on in these passages. First, if Hume took temporal priority to be essential to causation, rather than merely supposing it such, it is difficult to explain his cavalier attitude regarding the argument that was set forth to show that a cause must be temporally prior to its effect. Secondly, if Hume actually took contiguity and temporal priority to be "essential" to causation, his claim that "a NECESSARY CONNEXION ... is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention'd [relations]" is nonsensical. If each of these three elements is essential to causation, then in the absence of any one of the three elements there would be no causal relation (a causal judgment could not be justified). It is contrary to the notion of essentiality to suggest that one of three essential elements is more important than another. But here Hume claimed that necessary connection is of greater importance to the causal relation than either contiguity or the temporal priority of a cause to its effect, and even after analyzing necessary connection in terms of constant conjunction, he wrote of constant conjunction, "'Tis chiefly this quality, that constitutes the [causal] relation" (T 173). These claims suggest that Hume took constant conjunction alone to be essential to
causation and that he "suppos'd" contiguity and the temporal priority of cause to effect to be essential only "according to the general opinion".\textsuperscript{12}

Hume's initial discussion of the "essentiality" of contiguity to causation provides further evidence that he did not, in fact, hold that the spatial contiguity of objects is a necessary condition for the correctness of a causal judgment. Remember, he wrote that we may suppose contiguity as essential to causation, "according to the general opinion, till we can find a more\textsuperscript{1} proper occasion to clear up this matter, by examining what objects are or are not susceptible of juxtaposition and conjunction" (T 75). The footnote is to "Part IV, sect. 5", and in that section Hume argued that not all entities are spatial. In his words:

'Twill not be surprizing after this, if I deliver a maxim, which is condemn'd by several metaphysicians, and is esteem'd contrary to the most certain principles of human reason. This maxim is that an object may exist, and yet be no where: and I assert, that this is not only possible, but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner. An object may be said to be no where, when its parts are not so situated with respect to each other, as to form any figure or quantity; nor the whole with respect to other bodies so as to answer to our notions of contiguity or distance. Now this is evidently the case with all our perceptions and objects, except those of the sight and feeling. (T 235-236)

Now if some -- indeed, most -- perceptions are nonspatial entities, and if the spatial contiguity of a cause to its effect were essential to causation, it would be impossible for such perceptions to enter into causal relations. But it is obvious that Hume allowed that causal relations obtain among such entities, for he contended that all simple ideas are caused by
"deriv'd from") simple impressions (T 4) and that one has ideas of such nonspatial entities as savors (T 5). Hence, if Hume took contiguity to be essential to causation, this must be limited to temporal contiguity. But, even apart from my account of Hume's theory of memory, there is some textual evidence that Hume did not take temporal contiguity to be essential to causation.

First, in his discussion "Of Personal Identity," he wrote this:

The only question, therefore, which remains, is, by what relations this uninterrupted progress of our thought is produc'd, when we consider the successive existence of a mind or thinking person. And here 'tis evident we must confine ourselves to resemblance and causation, and must drop contiguity, which has little or no influence in the present case. (T 260)

Now this passage might be open to several interpretations, since it is an open question whether Hume's intent in "Of Personal Identity" was to explain one's belief that the mind is perfectly identical through time or to elucidate the nature of the mind and the notion of identity that pertains to the mind. In either case, however, if contiguity is essential to causation, it is peculiar to claim that one can be concerned with causation without being concerned with contiguity. Now since Hume took some of the components of the mind to be nonspatial entities, it is possible that his concerns with "contiguity" were limited to spatial contiguity. But the fact that Hume held that the mind is a temporally discontinuous entity (T 252) together with my earlier discussion of memory suggests that he considered both spatial and temporal contiguity to have "little or no influence in the present case", a fact that tends to support my claim that he took
neither spatial nor temporal contiguity to be essential to causation.

Secondly, although Hume's "definitions" of causation in the Treatise suggest that the spatial and temporal contiguity of a cause to its effect are necessary conditions for the correct causal judgment, no appeal is made to contiguity in the "definitions" in the first Enquiry. There Hume wrote:

Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second (E 76)....

We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition of cause, and call it, an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other. (E 77)

Notice that these "definitions" claim that the cause must be temporally prior to its effect, but they appeal to neither spatial nor temporal contiguity. Since there is no suggestion at any other place in the first Enquiry that contiguity is essential to causation, and since Hume officially maintained that one should accept the Enquiries, rather than the Treatise, as stating his considered position, this would seem to provide grounds for contending that Hume took neither spatial nor temporal contiguity to be essential to causation.

Finally, in his letter to Gilbert Elliot of 10 March 1751, Hume suggested that only constant conjunction is essential to causation. There he wrote:

You ask me, If the Idea of Cause & Effect is nothing but Vicinity, (You should have said constant Vicinity, or regular Conjunction), I woud gladly know whence is that farther Idea of Causation against which you argue? This Question is pertinent; but I hope I have answer'd it. We feel, after the constant Conjunction, an easy Transi-
tion from one Idea to the other, or a Connexion in the Imagination. And as it is usual for us to transfer our own Feelings to the Objects on which they are dependent, we attach the internal Sentiment to the external Objects. If no single Instances of Cause & Effect appear to have any Connexion, but only repeated similar ones, you will find yourself oblig'd to have Recourse to this Theory.14

Notice that although the reference to "vicinity" (Elliot's term) suggests spatial proximity, Hume's preferred term is "constant conjunction". It is only the constant conjunction of objects together with certain habits of the imagination that are essential to causation. There is no reference to the temporal contiguity of cause to effect. Since we have already seen that the theory of mind Hume advanced in the Treatise is inconsistent with the contention that spatial contiguity is essential to causation -- a point Hume took into account -- the fact that this letter makes no suggestion that temporal contiguity is essential to causation tends to support my claim that Hume took neither spatial nor temporal contiguity to be essential to causation.

If the arguments I have advanced are sound, I have shown that it is doubtful that Hume took either the spatial or the temporal contiguity of objects to be a necessary condition for a correct causal judgment. If this is correct, this tends to support my earlier thesis that an idea of the memory is a relative idea corresponding to a definite description of the general form, "the impression that (originally) caused and exactly (or closely) resembles m," where 'm' is a variable ranging over positive ideas. On the other hand, if Hume did take both the spatial and temporal contiguity of objects to be necessary conditions for the correctness of a causal judgment, my discussion
shows that since some ideas are either nonspatial or are temporally separated from the impressions that caused them, Hume's copy theory of ideas and his accounts of the nature of memory and the mind are inconsistent with his theory of causation.\(^{15}\)

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3. James Noxon has called the second criterion "the epistemic criterion" (see James Noxon, "Remembering and Imagining the Past," in David Hume: A Re-evaluation, ed. Donald W. Livingston and James T. King [New York: Fordham University Press, 1976], pp. 270-295). Although Noxon is certainly correct in suggesting that the second criterion specifies the conditions for judging the truth value of an idea of the memory, there are three reasons why I prefer to call it "the formal criterion." (1) Hume claimed that one is never in a position to determine whether or not an idea of the memory is "true" (T 85-86). (2) It is on the basis of the "form and order" of the simple ideas in a complex positive idea of the memory and of the simple impressions in the remembered complex
impression that the second criterion distinguishes an idea of the memory from an idea of the imagination. (3) I shall argue that the second criterion provides clues regarding the "form" or structure of an idea of the memory.


6. There are two distinctions one might do well to keep in mind. First, one should distinguish between the cause of an idea as an idea, and the cause of a memory. The cause of an idea as an idea is an impression that resembles that idea (cf. T 4). The cause of a memory, on the other hand, need not be a resembling impression, i.e., the "circumstance ... that touches the memory" (T 628) might not resemble the positive idea that grounds one's resultant idea of the memory. Secondly, one might need to distinguish between the cause of an idea as an idea and the original cause of an idea. Since Hume emphasizes that an impression is the cause of a simple idea in its first appearance (T 4), he seems to have allowed that ideas can be the causes of other ideas after their first appearance. But since the ancestry of any simple idea can be traced back to an impression, I shall use the locution "the cause of an idea" to refer to the original cause of an idea.

7. Although Hume raised sceptical arguments with respect to the "philosophical" theory of perception, I do not take this to imply that he rejected that theory. To defend this thesis, however, goes beyond the scope of the present paper.


10. This is not to say that Hume has no problem. If the idea of the memory occurring at time \( t+n \) is to single out the relevant impression, it must be "true", i.e., it must be a genuine idea of the memory. Given Hume's scepticism with regard to the memory, however, one may never be able to know that an idea of the memory is "true". But this problem differs in kind from that raised by Garrett.

11. T 170-172, T 173, cf. Abstract, T 649-650. I take this to be the minimum claim Hume made in his analysis of causation. The question of whether or not he intended his analysis to be something more than this, e.g., a metaphysical or an ontological analysis of the nature of causation, is beyond the scope of the present paper.

12. I shall not pursue Hume's views on the essentiality of the temporal priority of a cause to its effect since, as we shall see, the textual evidence on this issue is inconclusive.


15. I wish to thank Herbert Hochberg and Ronald J. Glass for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.