Surprisingly little historical and systematic work has been done on the early reception of Hume's philosophy in Germany. Although there are quite a number of papers and books devoted to discussing Kant's relation to Hume, these are, for the most part, thoroughly uninformed by the historical background of Kant's reception of Hume. The question of what Kant actually knew of Hume is raised over and over again, but, in the absence of new evidence, does not seem to admit of any satisfactory answer.

These two circumstances, namely, the lack of historical work on Hume's reception in eighteenth-century Germany, and the seeming futility of discussions concerning Kant's knowledge of Hume, are closely related. For, given the relative sparsity of Kant's remarks on Hume, new light on the Kant-Hume relation will have to come from the general background of Kant's thinking and writing. Once we know that works of Hume were known in Germany, how they were seen, and how they figured, if they did, in the thought of Kant's contemporaries, we will perhaps be able to make more sense of Kant's sometimes cryptic remarks about Hume. But I believe it would be a serious mistake to look at Hume's reception in Germany from an exclusively Kantian point of view. Quite independent of the Kant-Hume relation -- philosophically important as it obviously is -- it should prove interesting to see how Hume was received by his contemporaries in Germany, and whether their view of him reveals interesting aspects of his thought that were seen neither in Britain nor in France.

It is clear, however, that the discussion of the reception of Hume in eighteenth-century Germany
is far too large an undertaking to be attempted in one article. Therefore I shall attempt to trace, by means of a descriptive bibliography, the rough outline of the history of his reception in just one German publication: the Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen (GGA). This journal seems to me a particularly good place to start an account of Hume's German Rezeptionsgeschichte because, first, it covers the entire period during which Hume could have influenced German thought. For the GGA began appearing in 1739, the very year in which Hume's Treatise was first published, and it is still being published today. Thus it can supply us with a continuous series of documents from 1739 to the present. Second, since the GGA was begun when Hannover, and thus Gottingen, were closely linked to Britain because of the Personalunion, it had a greater interest in British thought than most other German journals. Thus it reported British developments more quickly than did other German journals. Third, and partially as a result of the British connection, the GGA very soon became one of the most prestigious German journals. What was being said in its reviews carried greater weight, or, at the very least, must be assumed to have been more widely read, than what was put forward in many other German publications.

It is useful to divide Hume's early German influence into roughly four different periods. The first period lasted from 1739 to the early seventies. This period saw the translation of most of Hume's works into French and German, and it may be characterized as the time of Hume's first reception. The second period began in the early seventies and lasted to the early eighties. During this time, Hume's Scottish critics Reid, Oswald and Beattie, as
well as their and Hume's critic, Joseph Priestley, became better known in Germany, and thus changed the German view of Hume. But this change appears also to have been connected with the more thorough discussion of Hume in Germany itself, and with the reception of Hume's posthumously published writings. The third period I see beginning with the appearance of Kant's first Critique (1781) and the Prolegomena (1783), which, at first, were seen by him as well as by his contemporaries as a continuation of the Humean enterprise. This clearly had significant effects on the way in which Hume was seen in Germany. The final period may be seen as having lasted from the early eighties until about 1800. During it, Kant's school and Hume came to be seen as being opposed to each other. And the most important question of this period seems to have been whether Kant had answered Hume.

However, I will not follow this division very closely. The order of appearance of reviews cannot be expected to reflect clearly all the developments relevant for understanding Hume's German influence. I will concentrate on the first two periods, and give them separate treatment. The last two periods, which did not see the appearance of new works by Hume, will be treated together in section 3. There I shall say something about a very narrow selection of books, immediately relevant to the further fate of Hume's thought in Germany.

1: The First Reception: 1739-1770

Given Hume's pronouncement that the Treatise fell "dead-born" from the press, it may be surprising to find that the Göttingische Anzeigen mentions the work twice in 1739, and publishes what, by its standards, amounts to a quite extensive review of
The work was first simply listed in what seems to be the "books received" section as "A Treatise of Human Nature. 8 [vo]. 2 voll. 10 S[hillings]." The second notice is more interesting. Though it is still short, it is very much to the point, showing even some understanding of Hume's project. I shall therefore give it in full:

An unknown author has worked up A Treatise of Human Nature. In it he attempts to introduce a way of basing morality more upon sensation and experience than has been customary until now. He has dealt with the understanding and the passions in the work. But it is only the beginning of a larger one. Though the author has much in common with Mr. Hutchinson, he also has not a few thoughts of his own [2].

It is curious, perhaps, that the author of this review sees Hume primarily as making a contribution to moral philosophy, even though he clearly cannot have seen the third volume yet, and even though Book I especially does not seem to have a great deal of connection with Francis Hutcheson, here referred to, as he often was, as Hutchinson.

The review of 1740 [3] is still more interesting. It begins by again calling attention to Hume's empiricism and sensationalism in morals, and the reviewer finds that the Treatise "can, among general writings, maintain such a high rank that we cannot avoid to give some idea of the work's main purpose by announcing some of the most characteristic [sonderbarsten, which could also mean "most peculiar"] thoughts of the author, even though we will get to the main purpose only in the future." So the reviewer very clearly regards the Treatise as one of the more important publications of the year, and
he reviews the first volume, in spite of his belief that the main purpose of the entire work is to be found only in parts yet to come.

What is new, and therefore clearly most important to the reviewer, is not the author's general sensationalist approach, but the particular way in which he develops it. This is Hume's theory of ideas. The reviewer concentrates especially on the account of general ideas given in the *Treatise*. He finds its author is of the same opinion as Dr. Berkeley, believing, moreover, that he has irrefutably proved the latter's view that all supposedly general ideas are only particular ones, connected with certain words which give them a wider meaning, and which allow one, when the occasion arises, to represent another but similar one. If the reader is able to form just as good an opinion of the author's proofs as he has himself, he must be unfailingly convinced; in any other case, we doubt that this will happen [3, pp. 10f].

After mentioning Hume's discussion of space, with which the reviewer does not seem to be able to do much, he goes on to say:

Of certainty and probability he [the author] has peculiar thoughts and a great gift for making obscure [dunkel zu machen] that which others may perhaps have said clearly. As clear as the experience, that whatever begins to exist must have had a cause is, so hidden [versteckt] is the proof which he assembles for it. The necessity between the two, for him, is only in thought, not in the object itself. Likewise, then, all necessity of causes and effects consists only of the determination of the soul to think of objects as being always together. [This is] peculiar enough! And we shall not even mention the corresponding [gleichmassigen] con-
But the reviewer does note, among other things, that the fourth part of the Treatise, on the sceptical and other philosophical doctrines, is as extraordinary as the former ones. If one listens to him [the author of the Treatise, that is], everything is only probable, nothing is certain. His ideas concerning the proofs of the existence of objects are in thoroughness equal to those on the former subjects.

The review ends with the claim that this "will be enough to enable one to get a preliminary idea of the other volume." Mossner reads this and the introductory remark as promising a review of the second volume. But it is more naturally read as referring to the additional volumes promised in the advertisement. Indeed, the entire review is much more ambiguous, or perhaps better, ironical, than Mossner's translation and commentary suggest. Whether or not he is correct in speculating that "Hume's heat would have been intense" if he had come across this review, I do not know, but it is not entirely negative. Its ironical detachment suggests puzzlement and perhaps even a hint of admiration.

However that may be, one must agree with Mossner that this review and the two notes not mentioned by him do indeed open up "the possibility of an early diffusion and influence of Hume's thought ... in the decade before the publication of the two Enquiries." Germans could have known of the existence of this early work by Hume, and thus could have allowed themselves to be influenced by him -- albeit without knowing that it was Hume. However, this is, at best, a mere possibility. It is doubtful that such a thing actually happened in Germany. For
one thing, when the next work by Hume was reviewed in the *Göttingische Anzeigen* in 1749 -- the *Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, which also appeared anonymously -- the reviewer seems to be entirely unaware of the earlier work that put forward the same ideas ([7] 432).

This review consists mainly of a translation of the essay titles, interspersed with a few comments. The reviewer pays special attention to Hume's division between abstruse and easy philosophy, pointing out that Hume believes metaphysics is an effect of human vanity, and that abstruse metaphysics provides a shelter to superstition. In the essay on the association of ideas he finds "a variety of beautiful observations for rhetoricians and poets." And, calling attention to Hume's discussion of causality, he says: "The following proposition is peculiar. The relation of cause and effect can never be known a priori, but only from experience." But, on the whole, his judgment seems to be somewhat negative. He finds in the book "much impudence [*Dreistigkeit*] and peculiarity [*Sonderbarkeit*] which has been beautifully clothed by the author's wit."

Just as the reviewer of 1749 is unaware that the *Essays* are connected with the earlier *Treatise*, so the author of a 1753 review ([8]), which concerns the second edition of this work -- the first to be published under Hume's own name -- is unaware of the earlier discussion of the same book. He begins by excusing himself for reviewing the book so late. The reason he gives is that he has received a copy of this very "peculiar" or "memorable" (depending on how one translates "*merkwürdig*") book only now. But this review is much more extensive than the earlier one. Its author has something to say about most matters Hume discusses. Thus he mentions the opposition of
easy and abstruse philosophy, observing that, while Hume seems to be in favour of the first, he is dealing almost exclusively with the second; the reviewer calls attention to the "odious picture" Hume paints of "the only religion that has the honour that its defenders may dare to connect it with philosophy," spends some time on characterizing and discussing Hume's example of the missing shade of blue, and then gives a rather extensive discussion of Hume's analysis of causality.

"The most objectionable is the tenth essay, of miracles." Though the reviewer agrees that we have a right to doubt all miraculous stories, he thinks Hume goes too far. Almost half of the review is given over to an attempt to address Hume's objections. Yet, the only memorable part of these objections is his suggestion that Hume is inconsistent in first trying to show the weakness of experiential inferences and then using experience to rule out miracles absolutely.

Given this opposition to Hume's views on miracles, it is peculiar that the author spends so little time and effort on the eleventh essay, "Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Religion." For he does say that he could not understand it "in any other way than as denying rewards and punishments in an eternal life; indeed, on pp. 232f., even the existence of God is being made the subject of doubt." But, while Hume's theological views are clearly emphasized and marked out for refutation, the reviewer himself does not attempt such a refutation in all cases.

Two months later the GGA published a review of the Political Discourses ([9]). It begins:

As little as we agree in all particulars with Hume, we must still give witness to its
being acutely, and for the most part, correctly thought out. His book will be read with interest and profit by the profound philosopher as well as by the statesman, and both will get an education that they will call useful.

The remainder of the discussion is taken up by a detailed summary, and no further comment on Hume's importance is made. But there is another review, published a little more than a week later ([36]). It is of A Dissertation on the Number of Mankind, a work that has an appendix responding to some claims made by Hume in the Political Discourses. Yet, the Dissertation is introduced as having been written against Hume, and is discussed entirely in terms of whether the author's objections to Hume are valid -- which they are found not to be -- showing, at least indirectly, how important Hume had become. Perhaps it can be said that 1753 marks the emergence of a new name among the philosophical writers that were being followed by the Göttingische Anzeigen. David Hume seems to be no longer an unknown figure for the editors and reviewers of this journal, but has come to be considered as an established writer, whose publications need to be closely watched.

If he was not such a figure in 1753, he certainly was a year later. In 1754 the GGA reviewed "rather late than never" another "memorable and well-written volume which already appeared in 1751" ([12]). This book was Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. It had come to the reviewer's attention because -- as he tells us -- there was a dispute about it. Two other works that he had to review were written exclusively for the refutation of Hume's moral theory ([37], [38]); and they could not be understood without some indication of the position that they opposed.
So it was clearly the controversial character of Hume that made him better known in Germany as well. In any case, by February 22, 1755 (in [39]) David Hume is referred to as "well-known" [bekannt]. And in December of the same year, at the occasion of a review of the first volume of the History of Great Britain ([15]), it is said that the name of the author is well enough known, and it promises beforehand a work which is different from those of the common run. We have read the book with great pleasure -- and this not just because of the effective style of writing of which it can serve as a model. That Mr. Hume knows the world and is used to consider its customs seriously is already known; but here we [also] find the very rare ability to employ this knowledge of human beings for the enlightenment and improvement of history.

Since Hume's works also began to appear in German and French translations during this time, he probably was discussed a great deal in Germany. At least this is suggested by the review of the French translation of the Philosophical Essays in 1758 ([13]) which begins:

It is not necessary for us to say much about the now very well-known content of Hume's philosophical essays on the human understanding -- not Hueme's, as we often find him called, contrary to the English pronunciation, in German writings. Furthermore, we have already talked about the contents when we reviewed the first English edition in 1753 (p. 540f., emphasis mine).

It appears that, almost as soon as Hume lifts the veil of his anonymity, he becomes known in Germany, and soon gains a reputation as an elegant and witty philosophical writer. Thus we may assume that by the time the German translations of his works appear he is already a well-known figure. And this
explains perhaps why the first Enquiry, as soon as it came out in German, was, as Mendelssohn said, "in everybody's hands." 12

During the later fifties and into the sixties, the GGA followed Hume rather closely. It published reviews of his History of Great Britain ([16]-[23]), and gave considerable attention to his quarrel with Rousseau ([43]-[46]). It also reviewed a number of the books written in opposition to Hume, such as John Leland's A View of the Principal Deistical Writers (the second volume of which deals extensively with Hume; see [40]), George Campbell's Dissertation on Miracles ([42]), and James Oswald's Appeal ([47]). 13 So by the end of the sixties every regular reader of the GGA, even if he did not follow other journals or acquaint himself with the German translations of Hume's works, must be supposed to have had some idea about Hume.

This idea would have been one of a philosopher, who, even though he was explicitly writing about moral, political, and epistemological matters, really had mainly religious concerns. Hume was a "freethinker." This charge is explicitly made in the review of the French translation of the History of England. Objecting to the translator's classification of Hume as a "Protestant," the reviewer asks how she can call a Protestant a writer "who has in his own book proved that miracles are impossible, who is obviously a freethinker, and who has been as harsh towards the Protestant as he has ever been towards the Catholic church, since he mentions the ministers of the Protestant church always with visible hate" [21]. The review of the French translation of the Philosophical Essays ends by noting that Hume seems to have no doubts about the non-existence of God and the impossibility of an
eternal life, saying that "in this regard the scepticus seems to be partisan, and to desire, against his own character, to assume an opinion as certain" [13].

However, it is interesting to note that this does not entail a complete rejection of Hume's doctrines. The reviewer's response is more complex than that. Though Hume is clearly seen as a skeptic, a "freethinker," and as being "an enemy of revealed religion," and though all the reviewers are clearly theists who accept revealed religion, they are, on the whole, willing to overlook the differences, and to concentrate on what they take to be Hume's constructive aspects. Thus they almost never simply side with those who attack Hume. The reviewer of Some late opinions concerning the Foundations of Morality ([37]) notes that, even though he agrees with some of the objections raised against Hume's theory, the author of this pamphlet seems to him to be only a "mediocre writer and philosopher." Furthermore, he thinks that Hume need not necessarily be an atheist. The moral sense of which he speaks may well have been implanted in us by a God. "Perhaps this is what Hume also thought, for a writer does not necessarily deny what he does not write."

The reviewer of the Four Dissertations judges in a similar way:

One has sought to find the dislike of revealed religion in this otherwise excellent author also in this history [of natural religion]. We do not want to deny either, that a writer for whom the Bible counts as the word of God, at times, would have reminded us that religion originated differently. ...But we do not make judgments about concealed intentions; and if one is looking for nothing but the natural history of religion, the book contains rare and beautiful insights
which can also be used by the friend of revelation. Naturally, superstition and polytheism must precede religion and the adoration of a single God, just as a poor [elende] hut must precede a palace [Hume's metaphor].

So Hume's atheism, in so far as it was acknowledged at all, clearly did not stand in the way of the reception of his philosophy. On the whole, the Germans writing for this particular journal seem to be more tolerant than most of Hume's Scottish compatriots.

2. Second Thoughts: 1770-1783

During the early seventies, when Reid, Oswald, Beattie and Priestley were becoming better known in Germany, and were being reviewed in the GGA ([49]-[55]), the "secondary" literature on Hume gains predominance. The discussion of these philosophers' objections to Hume makes it necessary for the reviewers to clarify their own positions with regard to Hume and his enemies. But the reviewers of the Göttingische Anzeigen refuse to choose sides, as it were. Though they are in many ways closer to Hume's opponents than to Hume himself, they do object to the tone of the objections as well as to many of the criticisms advanced, clearly believing that the truth lay somewhere in the middle between the two camps.

This approach seems to hold not only for the reviews of Hume's Scottish critics, but also for those of most German publications addressing themselves to Hume. Thus the review of Johann Nicolaus Tetens's Versuche ([55], see also [54]) contains almost two pages of discussion that are specifically concerned with Tetens's criticism of Hume. After noting that Tetens analyzes the
"foundations for the most important relational concepts [Verhältnisbegriffe]," and that Tetens thinks "their ultimate reasons are always found in the laws of thought," the reviewer points out that the concept of causality gets an especially extensive treatment; [this is] against Hume and others who agree with him -- or, at least which seemed to the author [Tetens] to think like him. (Hume really has not indicated completely enough the reasons [Gründe] of our concepts and judgments of the causal connection; but it easily happens that, at the discovery of a new and important side, one completely forgets, as a result, the other.) Our author makes several excellent remarks against Hume; he opposes him hereby with deserved respect, and he contradicts him with such caution that, at the end, it is not clearly determined just how far he gives in to Hume. Yet, it still seems to us that the author makes some objections, which, if somewhat more deeply investigated, are not completely to the point, and which could still be well explained in the Humean way.

Feder, who wrote the review, tries to show how this can be done. He admits that often enough our judgments concerning causal relations are not based on previous experiences of exactly identical relations; but this, he argues, doe not mean that their basis is independent of an "analogy" [Analogie] with previous cases, as Tetens suggests. However, Feder's defense of Hume against Tetens should not be taken to mean that Feder is closer to Hume than to his German contemporary. For he praises Tetens for going "the middle way between the easy but highly insecure philosophy of common sense, which assumes so many immediately certain ways of thinking and basic truths, and the one-sided,
over-refined [subtilisierenden] and debilitating skepticism." It is no exaggeration to say that this also characterizes Feder's own philosophical approach, and gives us an insight into the only alternatives that seemed to be open for most German philosophers of the period: a via media between Reid, Oswald and Beattie, on the one hand, and Hume, on the other.

During the second half of the seventies Hume's posthumous works, the Dialogues, and the Two Essays appeared. They were, of course, also reviewed in the Göttingische Anzeigen, and it appears that these publications to some extent changed Feder's and Meiners's view of Hume -- at least, this is what they tell us. Thus Meiners's review of Hume's Dialogues is rather more negative than some of his earlier discussions. He claims that it "hurt him that a man of such great wisdom," a man of whose talents and "noble character" he is an "honest admirer," has amassed so many doubts against views which, "even if he did not consider them true himself, he could not help but see to be wholesome [heilsam]." For Hume had to see that they might be harmful for the young, and he should not have acted as if universal doubt was "the most secure guide to piety or true faith." Hume has soiled the otherwise "beautiful painting of his character." 16 Feder considers the Essays [on suicide and the immortality of the soul] to be rather mediocre. Indeed, he thinks so little of them that he prefers to doubt their authenticity as Humean works: "If these essays are indeed by Hume, he, at least, did not write them during his best skeptical hours. Especially the second, in which the immortality of the soul is denied, is almost completely unworthy of this acute dialectician" ([35]).
The closing passage of Meiners's review of Priestley's *Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever* ([55]) seems to me to sum up his ambivalent position with regard to Hume:

> We would have to spend too much time, if we wanted to present all the reasons why we judge differently about Hume as a human being, a writer and a historian. Furthermore, this does not really seem necessary to us. *For it is always less dangerous to underestimate, rather than to overestimate Hume* (emphasis mine).

So it can perhaps be said that, at the beginning of the eighties, when all the works published under Hume's name were available in Germany, the GGA projected a somewhat more negative view of Hume than it did at the beginning of the seventies, and that this negative view is due both to the reception of the works of Hume's philosophical enemies in Scotland and England, and to the publication of his posthumous works.

3. Hume and Kant: 1783-1800

During the eighties and nineties of the eighteenth century, the GGA had few occasions to review works by Hume. Since Hume was dead, and no new books by him were published during this time, the reviews had to be restricted to translations and new editions of books already discussed before. And these might appear to be rather uninteresting. But this is not entirely true.

Especially Hume's epistemology retained a great interest for a while. Indeed, until the end of the eighteenth century -- until, that is, the works of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel began to change the intellectual climate in such a way that "Hume's problem" had to appear like a pseudo-problem -- he
was one of the most vigorously discussed philosophers in Germany. This interest and fascination are not so much the direct result of Hume's writings, as they are the indirect result of Hume's influence on the writings of Immanuel Kant. Interestingly, the *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Prolegomena* were seen at the beginning of this period as continuations of Hume's enterprise. Thus the review of the *Critique* in the GGA contains an implicit comparison of Kant, and Hume the skeptic (see [57]). And since the reviewer does not find in the *Critique* any explicit attempt to steer toward a "middle way," he is not as positive as he was about Tetens.

Furthermore, Kant accepted this attempt to assimilate his approach to that of Hume. Accordingly, it became a rather common practice during the eighties to identify Hume and Kant's positions, and to criticize them in identical ways. Jacobi's *David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus* is basically in this tradition as well. For he claims in this work that Kant radicalized Hume's approach, and thus pushed it to its very limits. However, the GGA reviewer does not discuss the relevance of this book for the Kant-Hume relation, and calls attention only to the Humean dimension of Jacobi's theory of faith.

In 1790 appeared the first volume of the German translation of Hume's *Treatise*. Feder, who reviewed it, placed it at once in the proper context, saying that the

Humean philosophy will long remain a fitting object for sharpening philosophical thought; and the attention which several among our famous philosophers have paid to it in their works -- especially Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* -- had, without doubt, to create since that
time the wish for a German translation of the whole system.

The book contained as an appendix "Critical Essays towards the Estimation of this Work" by Ludwig Heinrich Jakob, the translator and an early follower of Kant. And the review is devoted almost entirely to discussing this appendix. This is understandable. For Jakob's Essays accentuate a trend that had been building for some time already, namely a tendency, among Kant's followers, to dissociate Kant and Hume, and to argue that these two thinkers were not only not close to each other, but that Kant had provided a decisive answer to Hume and his skepticism. Feder, of course, takes due note of this. Jakob is "erecting a dogmatic doctrine [Lehrgebäude] against the skeptics, on Kantian foundations," he finds. but, though Feder finds himself in agreement with much that the author has to say, he does not really think that Jakob delivers what he promises. Jakob begs Hume's question -- or so Feder tells the readers of the GGA.

He gets support in this view from the author of Aenesidemus oder Über die Fundamente der ... Elementarphilosophie. This work appeared in 1792 and was almost immediately reviewed by Feder in the GGA. He begins by noting the radical new departure of this book:

Until now, all enemies of the Kantian philosophy known to the reviewer have, in disputing it, intended, at the same time, to defend a more dogmatic philosophy than critical philosophy will recognize as justified. Though several of its enemies have also tried to show that the foundations of critical philosophy are leading farther into skepticism than their believers want to admit and appear to wish. Yet, they did not really want to justify skepticism, but rather the common and
natural way of representation against both. However, if it is indeed true that a number of main principles and kinds of inference with which the Kantian philosophy attacks the more common philosophy are in complete agreement with skepticism, then the party of skepticism -- which always has great advantages when one intends to raise difficulties for one's enemy -- would also be most advantageous against this most recent dogmatic system. And it is certain that the author is not at all unworthy of the name of the famous old skeptic Aenesidemus. That he knows to take up, in this way, the party of skepticism against the Kant-Reinholdian philosophy ... gives all enemies of the latter reason to rejoice about this ally. ... The author seeks to show extensively that the Kantian philosophy cannot boast of any victory over Humean skepticism.

The work reviewed by Feder here was extremely successful. Furthermore, it did become one of the decisive factors in the demise of Kantian philosophy and the rise of the type of philosophy exemplified by Fichte and Hegel. But this, of course, did not mean that Feder and likeminded philosophers had reason to rejoice. For, together with the discreditation of Kantian philosophy, went an even more thorough discreditation of their "more common," say common-sense, philosophy that was meant to steer the middle way between Hume and Reid. Historically, the success of the skeptical objection to Kant meant the end of this way of doing philosophy in Germany. Together with it, Hume, and to some extent also Kant, ceased to be live options for German thinkers during the early nineteenth century.

Manfred Kuehn
Purdue University
4. Reviews and Notes

A. Works by Hume

London 1739 [Jessop, 13, 1739]
[3] 1740, Nr. 2 (January 7), pp. 9-12

1790-92 [Jessop, 14, 1790-2]
[4] 1790, Nr. 144 (September 9), pp. 1441-1448

[7] 1749, Nr. 54 (June 2), pp. 431-32

[D] Philosophical Essays ... Understanding. By David Hume, Esq.; The second edition. With additions and corrections. 1751 [Jessop, 20, 1751]
[8] 1753, Nr. 59 (May 14), pp. 540-44

[9] 1753, Nr. 100 (August 18), pp. 906-12
By David Hume, Esq. London, 1751 [Jessop, 22, 1751]
[12] 1754, Nr. 38 (March 30), pp. 313-8

[G] Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects.
London. 4 vols. 1753-6 [Jessop, 5, 1753-6]
[13] 1758, Nr. 125 (October 19), pp. 1177-81
[actually a note of vols. I & II of Oeuvres philosophiques de Mr. D. Hume.
Amsterdam, 1758-60, Essais philosophiques sur l'entendement humain ... Avec les Quatres Philosophes ... (Jessop, 10, 1758)]

[H] The History of Great Britain. 1754-7 [Jessop, 27-33]
[15] 1755, Nr. 147 (December 8), pp. 1350-4
[vol. I; Jessop 28, 1754]
[16] 1765, Nr. 7 (January 17), pp. 50-4 [vol. I & II]
[17] 1765, Nr. 7 (January 17), pp. 59ff. [vol. III]
[18] 1794, Nr. 139 (August 30), p. 1795
French Translation [Jessop, 31, 1760]
[19] 1763, Nr. 2 (January 13), pp. 9-15
French Translation [Jessop, 32, 1763]
[21] 1764, Nr. 4 (January 9), pp. 25-32
[22] 1764, Nr. 4 (January 9), pp. 50-55
[23] 1764, Nr. 112 (September 17), pp. 911-12
Reprint Basel [not in Jessop]
[25] 1789, Nr. 208 (December 28), p. 2088
[26] 1790, Nr. 23 (May 8), p. 736
[I] Four Dissertations. London, 1757 [Jessop, 33, 1757]
[27] 1758, Nr. 42 (April 8), pp. 401-3
[29] 1759, Nr. 4 (January 8), pp. 38-9 [German translation -- Jessop, 36, 1755, (sic in Jessop), actually 1759]

[J] Translation of Manstein's *Memoirs of Russia*
[Jessop 39, 1770]

[31] 1778, Zugabe Nr. 1 (January 3), p. 1

[L] Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 1779
[Jessop, 40-42]
[33] 1779, Zugabe Nr. 48 (November 27), pp. 753-63
[34] 1782, Zugabe Nr. 18 (February 11). [German translation -- Jessop, 41, 1781]


B. Some Works By Others, Relevant For Hume

[36] 1753, Nr. 104 (August 27), pp. 943-4: [Robert Wallace] A Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind ... and some Remarks on
Mr. Hume's Political Discourse. Edinburgh, 1753 [Jessop, 52, 1753]

[37] 1754, Nr. 39 (April 1), pp. 325-7: Some Late Opinions Concerning the Foundations of Morality Examined, in a Letter to a Friend [Jessop]

[38] 1754, Nr. 44 (April 13), pp. 369-373: A Delineation of the Nature and Obligation of Morality, with Reflexions upon Mr. Hume's Book Intitled an Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edinburgh, 1753 [Jessop, 54, 1753]

[39] 1755, Nr. 23 (February 22), pp. 195ff.: Essays and Observations Physical and Literary Read Before a Society in Edinburgh. 1754 [Jessop, 38, 1754]

[40] 1757, Nr. 14 (January 31), pp. 122-25 [John Leland, German translation of vol. II of A view of the Principal Deistical Writers -- compare Jessop, 54, 1755]

[41] 1760, Nr. 96 (August 11), p. 832: Le café ou l'Ecossoise, comédie par Mr. Hume, traduite en française [Voltaire -- Jessop, 42, 1760]


[43] 1767, Nr. 5 (January 10), pp. 35-8: Exposé succinct de la contestation qui s'est élevée contre M. Hume et M. Rousseau. London, 1767 [Jessop, 36, 1766]

[44] 1767, Nr. 24 (February 23), pp. 191f.: Exposé succinct ... 2nd ed.

[45] 1767, Nr. 53 (May 2), pp. 423f.: Etrennes aux découvertes ou lettre d'un Quaker à ses frères et un grand docteur [not in Jessop]
[46] 1767, Nr. 140 (November 21), p. 1120: Etrennes ...

[47] 1769, Nr. 28 (March 6), pp. 265-75: James Oswald, Appeal, vol. I [Jessop, 161, 1766]


[50] 1773, Nr. 44 (April 12), pp. 370-1: Oswald, Appeal, vol. II

[51] 1774, Nr. 97 (August 13), pp. 834-8: German translation of Oswald, Appeal

[52] 1775, Nr. 8 (January 19), pp. 60-61: German translation of Oswald, Appeal

[53] 1775, Nr. 92 (August 17), pp. 777-83: Joseph Priestley, An Examination of Dr. Reid's Enquiry ... Dr. Beattie's Essay ... and Dr. Oswald's Appeal [Jessop, 161, 1774]

[54] 1777, Nr. 2 (January 4), pp. 15-6: Johann Nicolaus Tetens, Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie, 1775 [not in Jessop]


[56] 1781, Zugabe Nr. 26 (June 30), pp. 405-414: Joseph Priestley, Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever [Jessop, 55, 1780]

[57] 1782, Zugabe, Nr. 3 (January 19), pp. 40-8: Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781 [not in Jessop]
I would like to thank the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh, for the support given in form of an IPSE Fellowship that enabled me to complete this paper. I am also most grateful to Professor David Fate Norton for prodding me to get started on it, as well as for his helpful suggestions and criticisms.

1. I say "relatively" few remarks because actually Kant mentions Hume's name more often than those of most other philosophers.

2. In any case, there is also the question whether we can understand, in any strict sense, "the Kantian perspective" without first having understood how he saw Hume. And his way of seeing Hume must surely -- be it negatively and/or positively -- have been, to some extent, determined by his contemporaries. And this leads us right back to our starting point.

3. Some of the other journals, like the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek were reviewing only books that appeared in German. It is therefore effectively restricted to reviews of translations (and even translations did not
always receive the same attention as originally German texts).

4. The other side of the coin is, however, that it therefore does not always review the translations of works it has reviewed in the original, and, if it does, it usually says little about the content. This is why the first years of Hume's reception are more extensively discussed here than are the later years. A similar account of other journals would probably say more about the later years, and thus complement and modify what is said here.


6. See also note 4 above.


8. Mossner's translation is not always felicitous. Thus he translates, for instance: "The author agrees with Dr. Berkeley, whose theories he considers irrefutable in all respects...." This minimizes the novelty of the project the reviewer ascribes to the Treatise. Hume is not seen as simply following Berkeley, but as having wanted to give a new proof of Berkeley's view. See Mossner, Hume, 1st ed., p. 124 [2nd ed. p. 125], "Reception," p. 41.

9. Again, Mossner does not translate quite faithfully, making, for instance, the reviewer impute ineptness, where he actually may be alluding to the skeptical tendency of the author of the Treatise.

10. The statements seem to favour the latter interpretation. For the reviewer -- especially if we assume that the short note and the translation are written by the same person -- clearly considers the work to be one of moral
philosophy, and therefore is looking for the moral implications of the first book.


12. See Kuehn, "Kant's Conception of 'Hume's Problem'" for more information. Norman Kemp Smith's claim that Hume was not much discussed before 1764 and 1772, or before his Scottish critics Reid, Oswald and Beattie became known, is wrong. It is not true, with regard to Germany at least, that "Hume's Enquiries ... met with but little response, and almost solely in connexion with his attack on miracles." See Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (MacMillan & Co., 1941), p. 521; see also p. 520.

13. Almost the entire review of the second volume of Leland's book deals with the objections to Hume's doubts about miracles.

14. I shall not say anything about the reviews of books by Reid, Oswald and Beattie in this context, as I have discussed them elsewhere. See especially Manfred Kuehn, "The Early Reception of Reid, Oswald and Beattie in Germany," Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1983), pp. 479-95.

15. Most of the reviews of philosophical books during this period were written by either Johann Georg Heinrich Feder or Christian Meiners.

16. But it is important to remember here that the Göttingische Anzeigen is a public journal, and that Meiners makes a clear distinction between esoteric and exoteric philosophy, claiming that in the latter one cannot be as open as in the former. So he may well be objecting to Hume because he is treating popularly of things that should not be treated so, and not because of purely philosophical reasons.

17. To tell the whole story of this would go far beyond the limits of this bibliographical account. So I shall restrict myself to its most salient points. This should not be taken as an account of Hume's role in post-Kantian philosophy, nor even as an account of all reviews in the GGA in which Hume's name is mentioned.