

### Conclusion

We have argued in these two papers that the Aristotelian tradition conceived of volition, especially intention, as a particular form of knowledge, practical knowledge, which Aquinas distinguished from theoretical knowledge as the cause of its own object, i.e., of the agent's final cause or goal. This insight, which goes back to Aristotle's notion of the autonomy of the practical syllogism, was obscured by the hostility of empiricism, especially in Hume's radical version, towards the concept of final causation. That hostility has since hardened into prejudice, but the insight itself has also suffered from its formulation in the unfashionable terminology of Thomist rational psychology.

In recent philosophy Wittgenstein rediscovered the epistemic aspect of volition, which he thought of as a criterion in the language-game in which intentions are attributed: we speak of intentions precisely where the agent knows, without observation or induction, what s/he is doing or shall do because the deed or its result is his or her goal. In working out the details of this insight Anscombe has shown its fundamental identity, in spite of different starting points and methods, with the positions of Aristotle and St. Thomas. One important upshot of her work has been three decades of fascinating and lively debate in contemporary philosophy of human action.