Hume, Henry More and the Design Argument
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HUME, HENRY MORE AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT*

This paper is a contribution to research on the sources of Hume's statement of the design argument, whose analysis is the great subject of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. My surmise is that Hume's statement is probably his own. It is not a direct quotation from any source, but more likely a fabrication drawn from several sources which presents the strongest statement Hume could devise. My aim here is to demonstrate that one of Hume's sources is the works of Henry More (1614-1687). By a comparison of their language I mean to show the extent to which Hume drew on More for his formulation of the design argument. One of More's works, Divine Dialogues (1688), could have been Hume's modern example for treating the design argument in a dialogue. It could have given Hume pointers for the organization, tone and characters of his own Dialogues.

I

On a large view, the whole of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, with their artful match of position and counter-position, can be seen as a statement of the design argument. But on a close view, we can distinguish specific elements in Hume's statement; and for three of these elements we can show a close parallelism between Hume and More. The elements in Hume's statement to be considered here are:

(1) Cleanthes' introduction of the design argument in Part II, paragraph 5; (D 143)
(2) "instances of design" offered by Cleanthes; (D 154, 185) and
(3) completing Hume's exposition of the design argument, Parts X and XI of the Dialogues, with their questions about the implications of human misery and the ill-workings of the world for the wisdom and benevolence of the universe maker (D 193-213).

In addition to parallelisms between Hume and More at these points, there are a few straws in the wind that are worthy of mention. To pave the way for these comparisons, let me set out More's statements of the design argument. There are three of them.

(1) More's first statement of the design argument occurs in An Antidote against Atheisme, (1652). The second of this work's three books is devoted to the design argument. Here is one of the earliest statements of the design argument in English; and it may be its first statement in an English work that is philosophical, rather than devotional or theological, and intended to convince solely on the basis of reasonable arguments. More sets out of the argument in three parts. First, there is the introductory remark: "...I would have my atheist walk with me awhile in the wide theater of this outward world, and diligently to attend to those many and most manifest marks and signs that I shall point to in this outward frame of things, that naturally signify unto us that there is a God" (AA 37-38). The 'walk' covers the next sixty pages, wherein More lists feature after feature of the world that he finds to instance divine design. At the end of this extensive catalogue, More then draws his conclusion:

Wherefore the whole creation in general and every part thereof being so ordered as if the most exquisite reason and knowledge had contrived
them, it is natural to conclude that all this is the work of a wise God, as at first sight to acknowledge that those inscribed urns and coins digged out of the earth were not the products of unknowing nature, but the artifice of man (AA 97).

(2) More's second statement of the design argument is in The Immortality of the Soul (1659). More establishes to his satisfaction that matter is in motion, because "...when God created it, he superadded an impress of Motion upon it...." That conclusion paves the way for the following paragraph:

We have discovered out of the simple phenomenon of motion, the necessity of the existence of some incorporeal essence distinct from matter: but there is a further assurance of this truth, from the consideration of the order and admirable effect of this motion in the world. Suppose matter could move itself, would mere matter, with self-motion, amount to that admirable wise contrivance of things which we see in the world? Can a blind impetus produce such effects, with that accuracy and constancy, that the more wise a man is, the more he will be assured that no wisdom can add, take away, or alter any thing in the works of nature, whereby they may be bettered? How can that therefore that has not so much as sense, arise to the effects of the highest pitch of reason and intellect? But of this I have spoke so fully and convincingly in the second book of my Antidote, that it will be but a needless repetition to proceed any further in this subject.

(3) More's third statement of the design argument is in Divine Dialogues. Three stages can be distinguished in More's presentation. The first is a general statement of the argument. The second is a catalogue of instances of design in the world to fill out the argument. The third stage is a consideration
of evil in the world to determine whether it counts against claims for God's providence. I reproduce the first stage below. It is an exchange between Philotheus, the teaching figure in *Divine Dialogues*, and Hylobares, who doubts the existence of God.

**Philotheus:** It is a great wonder to me that a person so ingenious as Hylobares, and so much conversant in philosophy, should at all doubt of the existence of the Deity, any more than he does of Philopolis's existence [Philopolis is another character in the dialogue] or my own; for we cannot so audibly or intelligibly converse with him as God doth with a philosopher in the ordinary phenomena of nature. For tell me, O Hylobares, whether if so brief a treatise as that of Archimedes de Sphaera & Cylindro had been found by chance, with the delineations of all the figures suitable for the design, and short characters (such as they now use in Specious Arithmetic and Algebra) for the setting down of demonstrations of the orderly disposed propositions, could you or any else imagine that the delineating and fitting these things together was by chance, and not from a knowing and designing principle, I mean from a power intellectual?

**Hylobares:** I must confess, I think it in a manner impossible that anyone that understood demonstrations should doubt, but that the description of them was by some intelligent being.

**Philotheus:** But why do you think so, Hylobares?

**Hylobares:** Because it is the property of that which is intelligent to lay several things together orderly and advantageously for a proposed design. Which is done so constantly and repeatedly in the treatise, and so methodically, that it is impossible to doubt but that it
is the effect of some intellectual agent.

**Philoteus:** Wherefore wherever we find frequent and repeated indications of pursuing skillfully a design, we must acknowledge some intelligent being the cause thereof.

**Hylobares:** We must so.

**Philoteus:** But what a small scroll and how few instances of pursuing a design is there in that treatise of Archimedes, in comparison of the whole volume of nature, wherein, as in Archimedes, every demonstration leading to the main upshot of all (which is the proportion betwixt the sphere and the cylinder) is a pledge of the wit and reason of the mathematician, so the several subordinate natures in the world (which are in a manner infinite) bear conspicuously in them a design for the best, and are a cloud of witnesses that there is a divine and intellectual principle under all (DD 11-12).

II

I turn now to the first element in Hume's presentation of the design argument, Cleanthes' general statement, in order to compare Hume and More at this point. To begin with let me note what I take to be the nub of Cleanthes' statement: "The Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man" (D 143). That is, the Cleanthean statement is not simply the claim that the universe exhibits signs of design, so there must be a designer; but it makes explicit that our understanding of 'design' and 'designer' here turns on our making an analogy between the human mind and God's mind. Hume makes the point sharply, the better to set up the argument for close
examination. But anyone who just wants the argument to be understood and accepted should try for a sharp expression of the point as well; the human mind is the bridge to the mind of God. From my presently incomplete survey of early statements of the design argument, More is notable for making this point sharply. He does so in his first statement of the argument, where he explicitly compares "the work of a wise God" with "the artifice of man," and again in his third statement where he compares the author of a book with "the divine and intellectual principle under all." I submit that More's explicit grasp of the analogy that underlies the design argument would be a reason for Hume's interest in More.

Let us go to a comparison of expressions in Hume's Cleanthean statement and in More.

(a) Hume begins Cleanthes' statement with these injunctions:

Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it... (D 143).

More prefaces his first statement of the design argument with these words:

...I would have my atheist walk with me awhile in the wide theater of this outward world, and diligently to attend those many and manifest marks and signs that I shall point him to in the outward frame of things....

When he gets to the statement of the argument itself, More opens with these words:

Wherefore the whole creation in general and every part thereof....

(b) The next part of the Cleanthean statement is:

You will find [the world] to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions, to a degree beyond what
human senses and faculties can trace and explain (D 143).

More too uses the word "machine" (or "machina") in two passages in Divine Dialogues. He is responding to the claim that God ought to forestall or remedy "ill-accidents" happening to his creatures. Here are the passages.

...God has made the world as a complete automaton, a Machina, that is to move on its own spring and wheels, without the frequent recourse of the artificer; for that were but a bungle (DD 117).

God intends the world should be an automaton, a self-moving machine or engine, that he will not perpetually tamper with by his absolute power, but leave things to run on according to that course which he has put in nature (DD 150).

Other key words in the Cleanthean sentence under consideration are "subdivided" and "subdivision." There is no direct parallel in More here; but if we allow a similarity between "subdivided" and "subordinate," we may note from More's third statement of the design argument the phrase

...the several subordinate natures in the world (which are in a manner infinite)....

(c) Hume's Cleanthean statement continues

All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy, which ravishes into admiration all men, who have ever contemplated them (D 143).

Two sets of similar passages from More can be produced here. (i) The first set has to do with "accuracy." In his second statement of the design argument, More asks

Can a blind impetus produce such effects with that accuracy and constancy....
Then in *Divine Dialogues*, in summing up instances that support the design argument, More says,

> All which things and infinite more, do plainly argue the accuracy of design in their forming.

(ii) The second set of similar passages from More have to do with that adjustment of parts "which ravishes into admiration, all men." In More's second statement of the design argument, he speaks of the order and admirable effect of this motion in the world and that admirable and wise contrivance that we see in the world.

A little later we have:

> ...the more wise a man is, the more he will be assured That no wisdom can add, take away, or alter anything in the works of nature, whereby they may be bettered.

(d) Hume continues the Cleanthean statement:

> The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence (D 143).

In his third statement of the design argument, More too notes the proportionality of human and divine design:

> But what a small scroll and how few instances of pursuing a design is there in that treatise of Archimedes, in comparison of the whole volume of nature....

(e) Finally in the Cleanthean statement, note the phrase,

> By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone... (D 143).
More too has a view of the logical character of his arguments to prove the existence of God, a view that stems from his clear notion of the difference between necessary and probable arguments. In An Antidote, he prefaces his presentation of both the ontological argument and the design argument with this remark:

...when I say that I will demonstrate That there is a God, I do not promise that I will always produce such arguments, that the reader shall acknowledge so strong, as he shall be forced to confess that it is utterly impossible that it should be otherwise: but they shall be such as shall deserve full assent from any unprejudiced mind.

More's position here has a Cleanthean ring to it. Demea warns Cleanthes: "...surely by this affected candour, you give advantage to atheists..." (D 143-144). More is on guard against that possibility:

...if the Atheist shall contrariwise pervert my candour and fair dealing, and phansie that he has got some advantage upon my free confession, that the arguments that I shall use are not so convictive but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise; let him but compute his supposed gains, by adding the limitation of this possibility, (viz. that it is no more possible than that the clearest mathematical evidence may be false, (which is impossible, if our faculties be true) or in the second place, [than] that the Roman urns and coins ["that have been dug up"] ... may prove to be the works of nature, not the artifice of man; which our faculties admit to be so little probable, that it is impossible for them not to fully assent to the contrary): and when he has cast up his account, it will be evident that it can be nothing but his gross ignorance in this kind of arithmetic that shall embolden him to write himself down gainer, and not me.\]
III

So much for the similarities between Hume's Cleanthean statement and More's work. I turn now to the advancing of instances. Cleanthes' citings of instances of design occur in two widely separated places. His first citations do not immediately follow his general statement of the argument as one might expect. Considerations of its logic intervene; and in fact, the citations of instances, when given, are mixed with comments on the logic of the argument. In More's *Divine Dialogues*, the instances follow immediately on the general statement of the argument. As Hylobaires says of it, "This is better understood by instances..." (DD 12). In *An Antidote*, the instances precede the general statement of the design argument. In More's works, the instances offered are wide ranging, drawn as they are from cosmology, geography, biology, and human physiology. In Hume's *Dialogues*, the instances are much, much fewer and drawn from anatomy -- as though we have here the reprise of an old vaudeville act whose main presentation is vastly familiar to the audience. Cleanthes notes that

The anatomy of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the perusal of LIVY or TACITUS... (D 154).

In More's *Divine Dialogues*, we have

...the inward anatomy and use of parts in many thousand kinds of animals are as sure a demonstration of a very curiously contrived design in each of these animal bodies, as the several figures and demonstrations in the above named book of Archimedes are of the writer's purpose of concluding the truth of each proposition to which they appertain (DD between pp. 12-15).
The first specific instance of design offered by Cleanthes is the eye:

Consider, anatomize the eye: Survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation (D 154).

In More's Divine Dialogues, we are told of design, "That in a man's body is notorious." The first instance given is the eye.

The fabric of the eye, its safe and useful situation, the super-addition of muscles, and the admirable contrivance of the flesh of the whole body in a manner into that useful organization... (DD between pp. 12-15).

Cleanthes' other specific instance of design is "the male and female of each species":

Who can behold the male and female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions and whole course of life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that the propagation of the species is intended by nature? (D 154)

In Divine Dialogues, in the course of More's remarking that animals' "...external shapes are notoriously accommodated to that law or guise of life that nature has designed them...," we get:

Besides what also is very general, that contrivance of male and female for propagation (DD between pp. 12-15).

There is another statement by More in An Antidote, where in touching upon animals' "...birth or manner of propagation," he says,

...here I appeal to any man, whether the contrivance of male and female in living creatures, be not a genuine effect of wisdom and counsel; for it
is notoriously obvious that these are made one for the other, and both for the continuation of the species (AA 65).

Finally, in Hume's **Dialogues**, Cleanthes cuts short his first recitation of examples with,

"Millions and millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the universe (D 154)."

In **Divine Dialogues**, the ante is not quite as high, when at the end of his list of instances, More appeals to

"...the fabric of these, and apparently designed use of them, and of a thousand more... (DD between pp. 12-15)."

Cleanthes' second listing of instances comes in Part VIII, when he notes "the many conveniences and advantages which men and animals possess." His list includes this item:

"...horses, dogs, cows, sheep, and those innumerable fruits and products which serve to our satisfaction and enjoyment (D 185)."

A comparable instance is cited in More. On the way to speaking of design in animals, More mentions in passing

"...the usefulness of some of them especially and more appropriately to mankind, ... (the dog and horse for services, and the oxen and sheep for his food)... (DD between pp. 12-15)."

**IV**

I turn now to the question of whether human miseries in particular, and the woes that befall animal life in general, count against divine benevolence. The question is considered in Parts X and XI of Hume's **Dialogues**. The same question is also considered in More's **Divine Dialogues**, Books II
and III. There are certain parallels in their considerations that I want to notice. But let me begin by spelling out the importance of the question. Both Hume and More accept the premise that a Christian monotheist expects the deity to be not only intellectually responsible for the world, but morally responsible as well. This is a special burden taken on by Christians who adopt the design argument as the mainstay of their natural theology. Their sole deity must necessarily be the ultimate source of all aspects of the world. More is clear about this when he makes the claim that not only is God the designer of the world, but he has made the best possible world. Cleanthes is not initially made to be that explicit; but in Parts X and XI of *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, he must attend an inquest on the moral consequences of his position.

With regard to this aspect of the design argument, the first parallel between Hume and More to be noticed is in the cataloguing of miseries and woes, human and animal. In Hume's *Dialogues*, practically without preamble, Demea and Philo launch into a list of human miseries which also touches on misarrangements that affect all animals. Philo's aim at least, in this "catalogue of woes," is to put in doubt divine benevolence. Cleanthes sees the ultimate object of the thrust: "For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain?" (D 199)

I find a generality and a scrappiness in the catalogue that Demea and Philo put forth here as though they need only set out the headings of the brief, and the reader will be reminded of the full statement from which they draw their outline. A possible source of that full statement is More's *Divine Dialogues*, with its notices of human miseries
amply supplemented by woes affecting other animals as well. More's catalogue is drawn to give an account of "The evils that are in the world" (DD 89), so it may be decided, "Whether the measure of God's providence be his goodness" (DD 91).

(1) In Hume's Dialogues, Cleanthes breaks in on Demea and Philo, to say among other things:

The only method of supporting divine benevolence (and it is what I willingly embrace) is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of man. Your representatives are exaggerated (D 200).

In More's Divine Dialogues, Philotheus (the proponent of the design argument) breaks in on the recital of miseries and woes, to say that he will endeavor to relieve any doubts that have been raised in the mind of Hylobares (the character whom Philotheus wants to convince)

...by showing that the world may not be so enormously ill as Hylobares's melancholy surmises it... (DD 225).

(2) There is a curious parallelism of expression in forming opposing points to be noticed here. In More's Divine Dialogues, in the course of defending divine benevolence, one of the characters remarks,

...this terrestrial globe is the very dregs of the world, and the most proper region of evil; and that therefore to judge of the full benignity of Divine Providence by what we find here, were to measure the happiness of some famously flourishing and excellently well-ordered city by the condition of them that live in hospitals and [jails] (DD 233-234).

In Hume's Dialogues, Demea in making up the catalogue of woes puts in this bit:
Were a stranger to drop, in a sudden, into this world, I would show him, as a specimen of its ills, an hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded with malefactors and debtors... (D 196).

(3) The last parallel between Hume and More that I want to note in this area has to do with parts of Philo's "...four circumstances, on which depend all, or the greater part of the ills, that molest sensible creatures..." (D 205). The second and fourth circumstances appear to be framed, at least to some extent, as answers to a certain passage in More's Divine Dialogues: Philotheus (advocate of the design argument) is responding to the mention "Of ill-accidents happening to brute creatures whereby their lives become miserable":

...God has made the world as a complete automaton, a Machina, that is to move on its own spring and wheels, without the frequent recourse of the artificer; for that were but a bungle. Wherefore that the divine art or skill incorporate into matter might be manifest, absolute power does not interpose, but the condition of everything is according to the best contrivance this terrene matter is capable of. Wherefore these ill accidents that happen to living creatures testify that there is nothing but the ordinary divine artifice modifying the matter that keeps up the creature in its natural condition and happiness. Whereby the wisdom of God is more clearly and wonderfully set out to us; that notwithstanding the frailty of matter, yet the careful organization of the parts of a creature does so defend it from mischief, that it very seldom happens that it falls into such harms and casualties that you specify. But if an immediate extraordinary and absolute power did always interpose for the safety of the creature, the efficacy of that intellectual contrivance of the
matter into such organs and parts would be necessarily hid from our knowledge, and the greatest pleasure of natural philosophy come to nothing (DD 117).

(a) Part of Philo's "second circumstance" looks to be a response to More at this point. The circumstance is "the conducting the world by general laws..." (D 206). Or as More puts it "without the frequent recourse or artificer." Philo's comment on this circumstance is that

...this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is true; if every thing were conducted by particular volitions, the course of nature would be perpetually broken, and no man could employ his reason in the conduct of life. But might not other particular volitions remedy this inconvenience? In short, might not the Deity exterminate all ill, wherever it were to be found; and produce all good, without any preparation or long progress of causes and effects? (D 206)

Philo is saying, in effect, that there is another way of conceiving of the operations of divine benevolence -- a way different from More's. Who is to say that a deity that operates on "particular volitions" might not produce more benevolence than one who operates the world by general laws?

(b) In the "fourth circumstance," we find Hume opposing More directly. That circumstance is "...the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles of the great machine of nature" (D 209). Philo offers an impressive catalogue of "inaccurate adjustments," to challenge More's claim that "the condition of everything is according to the best contrivance this terrene matter is capable of." Note here Philo's saying,
On the mixture and secretion of the humours and juices of the body depend the health and prosperity of the animal: But the parts perform not regularly their proper function (D 210).

That remark cuts directly across More's affirmation of

...the careful organization of the parts of a creature....

and

...the efficacy of that intellectual contrivance of the matter into ... organs and parts....

V

There remain a few straws to be added to the scales. Each one is not much in itself; but taken together, and combined with what has gone before, they strengthen the claim that Hume read More closely. (1) Hume names his principle character "Philo." That name, it has been noted, links Hume's Dialogues with Cicero's De Natura Deorum. But the name sets up other echoes as well. The principle character in More's Divine Dialogues is Philotheus; and in Berkeley's Three Dialogues, Philonous. When these modern precedents are remembered, giving a principle character the name "Philo" is already to take a stand.

(2) In Hume's Dialogues, speaking of properly conceiving the Deity, Demea says

...we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that he is cloathed with a human body, as the ANTHROPOMORPHITES asserted... (D 142).

In More's Divine Dialogues, one of the characters who is endeavoring to put an opinion that has been disparaged into a more favorable perspective, remarks
...that they conceit God to have a wife and children, is more extravagant, and yet not much more than that opinion of the Anthropomorphites who fancy God in the form of a man (DD 196).

More did not invent the term 'anthropomorphite.' I merely mean to remark on the coincidence of its use by Hume and More.

(3) In Hume's Dialogues, Cleanthes speaks of "the religious hypothesis" (D 138). In More's Divine Dialogues, one of the characters, Hylobares, speaking of the design argument, asks to have "the truth of the hypothesis" affirmed (DD 259).

A little later, in Divine Dialogues, Philotheus (More's proponent of the design argument), commenting on Hylobares's request, says,

...it were in itself, Hylobares, a solid argument, supposing providence cannot well otherwise be salved: as it is for the Copernican hypothesis that nothing else can give a tolerable account of the motion of the planets (DD 261).

Hume's proponent of the design argument, Cleanthes, defends the use of reason in natural theology by a comparison with cosmology:

And what would you say to one, who having nothing particular to object to the arguments of COPERNICUS and GALILEO for the motion of the earth, should withhold his assent, on that general principle, that these subjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow and fallacious reason of mankind? (D 136)

These uses of Copernican allusions by Hume and More go along with another bit of similarity between them. At one point Cleanthes describes someone who is challenging the Copernican system:
"Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move?" Philo responds:

Yes! ... we have other earths. Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus another earth...?.... All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the sun? (D 150)

In More's Divine Dialogues, one of the characters remarks that

The Pythagoreans did expressly call the moon our ... opposite earth.

and also

The rest of the planets are so many earths (DD 269).

(4) Finally, the veriest scrap: when Philo is listing topics "beyond human affairs and the properties of surrounding bodies," he puts in "...the existence and properties of spirits; the powers and operations of one universal spirit, existing without beginning and without end..." (D 135). Since 'spirit' is one of the Cambridge Platonists' signal terms, this bit of Philo's list is undoubtedly a reference to them. As Tulloch, their chief historian, says of them in general and More in particular, "More's great aim, and the aim throughout Cambridge philosophy, was the vindication of a true sphere of spiritual being."¹³

VI

If these instances of close similarities and narrow resemblances between Hume's Dialogues and the works of More are persuasive, then it will be worth our while to mention some large parallels between Hume's Dialogues and More's Divine Dialogues. In the first place, both Hume and More devote a large part of their attention to the design argument. Both
present it in the same way: first a general statement, followed by illustrating instances. Both see that a monotheistic proponent of the design argument is necessarily required to make a case for divine benevolence. Both see that the claim for design in the world is debatable; and both set out appropriate debates at considerable length. I regret that I have not space to represent More in detail on this point. He sees the strongest opposition to the design argument as coming from materialism and mechanism; and he gives these viewpoints full statements, as well as attractive representatives. Hylobares, the materialist, and Cucophron, the mechanist, are his best drawn characters. By comparison, Philotheus, the proponent of the design argument, is a tedious sobersides.

Two of the most heartening and attractive aspects of the Divine Dialogues for Hume could have been (1) More's English-language example of a free discussion of natural theology, in which the author makes a genuine effort to balance the opposing views, and (2) More's humor. I must forebear quotations to illustrate that balance and humor. But I assure the reader that they are there. Hume might also have noticed that along with More's care with the content of his Divine Dialogues, there is his intention for that work to provide a model for the amiable discussion of theological issues, something that seventeenth-century England sorely needed. In the Divine Dialogues under the list of characters, More gives the following "General Character" for his cast of speakers: "All free spirits, mutually permitting one another the liberty of philosophizing, without any break of friendship." Hume may sometimes have longed for that sort of thing himself.
In comparing the literary styles of More and Hume, it must be said that More is unpolished and of the seventeenth century. But for all that, there are a good many lively stretches and mineable nuggets in *Divine Dialogues*.

Reading More's *Divine Dialogues*, Hume could have found a challenge there. In the prefatory letter, entitled "The Publisher to the Reader," whose composition is ascribed to More, there is the following paragraph:

"In [the author's] adjusting the Phenomena of the Universe to the Divine Goodness, it is considerable that he has declined no difficulties the wit of man can imagine or invent, but brought them all into view, or at least the hardest of all, and such specimena of all kinds, that in all likelihood, whatever new instances may occur to men, or they may on set purpose excogitate, will be easily satisfied by the solution of these forgoing examples."

We can imagine Hume saying to himself that he could very well excogitate a few new instances. Suppose too that these new instances were put into the mouth of a character like Hylobares, who is described by More as "A young, witty and well-moralized Materialist" (DD list of characters). What if this invigorated Hylobares answered Philotheus's proponency of the design argument with energetic thoroughness?

One virtue in considering these ties between Hume and Henry More is that we have yet more illumination on the connection between *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* and the preceding course of British philosophy. That should surely contribute to our better understanding of this complex, subtle, and important work. I see, at the end of this paper, that I have been fashioning an extended analogy
designed to show that the mind of Hume was somewhat similar to the mind of Henry More, "though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed."

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1. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, edited by Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947. Page references will be cited as 'D' followed by the relevant page number(s).


4. Note that Divine Dialogues was reprinted in Glasgow as late as 1743.

5. Henry More, An Antidote against Atheisme, or an Appeal to the Natural Faculties of the Minde of Man, whether there be not a God; London, 1652. Fourth ed., corrected and enlarged, London, 1712. Page references will be cited as 'AA' followed by the relevant page number(s).

6. In a source that I cannot now locate, I have seen earlier statements of the design argument attributed to Lord Herbert of Cherbury, De Veritate (1624), and to William Chillingworth, The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way (1637).


9. Ibid., pp. 102-103.

10. Ibid., p. 5.

11. Ibid., p. 7.

12. And see p. 199: Philo, speaking to Cleanthes, asks, "How then does the divine benevolence display itself, in the sense of you anthropomorphites?"


Other works of interest:
