Hume’s Use of Illicit Substances
Alan Hausman and David Hausman

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Now as every perception is distinguishable from another, and may be consider'd as separately existent; it evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which constitute a thinking being.¹

1. The Problem

Hume is often classified as an 'atomist'.² He is alleged to hold that every simple perception (impression and idea) is 'independent': to say that a simple perception P exists does not entail the existence of any other entity.³ As the passage above makes clear, part of this atomism is a neutral monism. That is, no perception is intrinsically mental, or material. Yet, he is also claimed to adhere staunchly to the so-called theory of ideas. Indeed, Stroud devotes the entire second chapter of his book Hume to discussion of Hume's adaptation of it. Now we shall argue that any plausible reading of the theory of ideas identifies that which is directly perceived -- in Hume's case, (at least) simple perceptions -- as intrinsically mental. This means either that every perception P must be in some mind, thus violating one tenet of atomism, or that perceptions themselves are intrinsically mental, thus compromising their neutrality. Can Hume escape this apparent dilemma?

The answer seems reasonably clear if one knows Hume. He claims that the mind is a bundle of perceptions. As a member of the bundle, a perception is mental. However, this notion of the mental is genuinely contextual; that is, no perception is, despite
appearances, intrinsically mental, due to some non-relational quality it has.¹ To say the same thing differently, Hume holds merely that perceptions must, as a matter of fact, be 'in' minds in order to exist. Why he thinks this, according to Stroud (and others), is probably at least a function of the reasons other members of the way of ideas tradition classify the directly perceived as mental. More accurately, the following two propositions are considered to be merely contingent, i.e., non-necessary truths for Hume; one can imagine their contradictories:

(1) In order to exist, a perception must be 'in' a mind, i.e., some mind or other.

(2) If a person has a perception P, then P is 'in' S, in the sense that P is a member of a collection of perceptions that constitute S.⁵ Thus, if a perception exists, it must as a matter of fact be in some mind or other, but it is not connected necessarily to any mind. Hence perceptions are mental, yet independent i.e., neither necessarily in the collections they are in fact in, nor necessarily in any collections at all.⁶

Given (1) and (2), the existence of a perception entails the existence of a mind only in a contingent, not a logical, sense. As the reader shall see, this defense of Hume comes in the end to classifying him as some sort of phenomenalist, who reconstructs the notions of mental and physical from a given data base.⁷

We are not satisfied with this answer.⁸ Indeed, we think it quite inadequate. To begin to show that, let us turn to a set of passages in the Treatise that set the problem we have been trying to outline. Hume himself speculates, in an infamous passage in the Appendix, that something is radically wrong with his claims about the self, that somewhere
in his system there is a contradiction and, indeed, he senses that the contradiction has something to do with his atomism (T 633ff). We think he is right. Our thesis is as follows. The contradiction Hume senses is that he both holds and disavows the claim that perceptions are mind dependent in an intrinsic sense. Thus, though a given perception is (perhaps) not necessarily in a given mind, it must either be in some mind or other in a logical sense of "must," or intrinsically mental in the sense of being intentional. As we explain in detail in section 2, the argument from perceptual variation, a cornerstone of the theory of ideas, leads inevitably to the view that there are intentional entities. Not only is this the only sense we can make of claiming, as Stroud does (correctly, we believe), that Hume adheres to the theory of ideas, but it makes sense of Hume's problems in the Appendix, by showing the contradiction he fears: it is between acceptance of the theory of ideas, and the claim that all perceptions are independent. In that Appendix passage, Hume claims, for example, that if our perceptions inhere in mental substances, "there would be no difficulty in the case." What he means is that the theory of the self would be obvious; but it also means that he would have to give up atomism. So Hume sees that if there are mental substances, he cannot maintain the principles of atomism which he in fact does maintain. What Stroud does not see is that the very theory of ideas that he claims Hume embraces entails either the existence of such substances or intentional entities.

Here is another way of thinking about our thesis in this paper. Stroud, and most everybody else, takes Hume in the tradition of the theory of
ideas. The practitioners of that tradition before Hume have in common an adherence to a doctrine of mental substance or intentional entities. We do not believe that one can be in that tradition without that adherence. The theory of ideas only makes sense against the background of a set of assumptions and arguments all of which invoke entities that exist independently of any ideas, as well as necessary connections between these entities and their qualities.

That Hume is a Berkeleyian idealist or that he has intentional entities is certainly not obvious. Yet a few moments' reflection must certainly at least raise the possibility. Hume is alleged by many to be in the empiricist tradition, following Locke and Berkeley. They both hold that what is before the mind when one perceives is an idea, and ideas are surely mental entities. Locke metaphysically retains physical substances and is a representative realist. Berkeley, who eschews them, retains mental substances and is an idealist. Hume gets rid of mental substances. Does idealism go with them? Why? How? Is Hume in effect a direct realist?

The answers to these questions are so imbedded in traditional Hume scholarship and interpretation that they are no longer even raised. Hume, it is often alleged, is a phenomenalist who constructs both the categories of the physical and the mental, and what is in them, from the data of direct experience. This is what Berkeley ought to have done but does not do. Had he done so he would have seen that he need not hold that what is directly perceived must, in a logical sense of "must," be perceived in order to exist. Seeing this clearly, as Hume is said to do,
also shows the way toward getting rid of the metaphysically unintelligible notion of substance. We note, in passing, that there is a strong implication in this traditional view which usually goes unnoticed, namely that there is a connection between Berkeley's idealism and his view that there are mental substances, i.e., that the mind is not a bundle of qualities.11

In order to assess these claims, we must turn for guidance to twentieth-century versions of phenomenalism, which shed considerable light on what is often considered their eighteenth-century role models. Although a lengthy discussion is of course beyond the scope of this paper, we can discern two important, distinct strands in the recent phenomenalistic tradition.

First. The neutral phenomenalism to which we have several times alluded is exemplified in the work of Goodman.12 Beginning with Carnap's Aufbau as his inspiration, he carefully disavows what he calls the issue of epistemological priority which often occupies Carnap. What does this come to? Goodman's goal is to construct the world on the basis of a few qualities of and relations between individuals, i.e., qualia—phenomenal colors, sounds, etc. He does not, in this undertaking, use commonsense as a guide, but only as a check.13 For example, his constructions with Carnap's apparatus yield as quality classes just those which we want them to yield, that is, what we know presystematically about which individuals have which colors.14 The constructions are done on the basis of systematic data: one is given only a list of atomic formulae stating similarity relations between individuals, and the logical apparatus of the constructional
system. The rather astonishing formal result is the production of an isomorph of what we presystematically know to be true, e.g., about the color spots in our visual field. What is crucial to understand here is that our knowledge of such phenomena as the causes of perception by the interaction of the physical world with our sense organs, etc., and the facts of perceptual variation, play no role whatever in the constructions. The mental and the physical group themselves according to the properties which the given individuals have and the relations in which they stand. There is no reason whatever to think, indeed every reason not to think, that the physical and mental will consist of the same entities differently grouped. The mind and the body will not be two ways of looking at the same set of entities.\(^{15}\)

Yet it seems unquestionable that Hume believes that all perceptions, whether impressions or ideas, are mental; Hume gives this argument when attempting to show that the vulgar's belief in the existence of unperceived perceptions is unfounded. He notoriously builds minds and bodies from the same perceptions, so that literally a perception may be a member of a bundle which is a mind and a member of a bundle which is a body. We therefore do not believe that Hume is a neutral phenomenalist, but rather embraces a second sort of phenomenalism, as we shall presently explain.

Before doing that, however, we wish to point out that Goodman's system may be described (though certainly not by him) as being constructed from what we shall call the first-person viewpoint, i.e., from the point of view of a person examining 'experience' without importation of knowledge of physical laws, psychology, etc. It is this point of view that one
finds Moore, for example, exploring in his attempts to describe the data before him when, commonsensically, he is seeing a hand. The so-called argument from illusion (we shall refer to it as perceptual variation, in deference to Austin's just remarks about illusion) plays a role in the production of this description merely heuristically. That is, one is asked to 'describe what one sees', and reminded, if she is tempted to say "a penny," that it looks oval and not, as it 'should', circular, so that the descriptions must reflect only what she is sure of at the moment. Though Goodman would surely object to the characterization of being sure of the momentary, and what it is that one is sure of, the idea that there is momentary experience and that it can be described apart from knowledge of nonmomentary entities, is explored by him and other, less careful, first-person theorists as well.

Second. The first-person point of view sharply contrasts with what we shall call the third-person point of view. Here, instead of a perceiver P describing her own experience, an observer O describes what P must be experiencing given O's knowledge of physical laws, the interaction between mind and body (as scientifically described) etc. It is this third-person point of view, we submit, that characterizes the beginning of what ends in Hume's phenomenalism. One excellent example of such a view in twentieth-century philosophy is Russell's in The Problems of Philosophy. The progression of ideas here is simple and, from the point of view of metaphysics, deadly. One begins with the full knowledge of the properties of physical bodies as characterized by commonsense and science, and then considers two
sorts of 'evidence' concerning the state of P when P perceives: (a) the facts of the causal connection between, say, physical tree, sense organ, and brain involved in seeing the tree, and (b) the facts involved when there is perceptual variation, illusion, etc. Both (a) and (b) are alleged to lead to the view that P does not directly see the physical world, but something that stands between her and it. Russell, and many before and after, unhesitatingly classify these items as mind dependent. Hume almost certainly makes these moves. We wish to explore what, if anything, justifies them within the context of seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century adherence to the way of ideas.

2. The Meaning of 'Mental'
A. Mental Substance, Intentionality and the Argument from Perceptual Variation

Hume seems explicitly to provide, and he is certainly most often interpreted to accept, a solely extrinsic account of the mental. Thus, no entity is in and of itself mental, but only comes to be identified as such due to certain external relationships into which it enters. This is a considerable departure from the practice of his predecessors.

Of those modern philosophers normally thought to be Hume's precursors, all maintain in one form or another a commitment to the intrinsically mental. The logic which guides their choices seems to center around two doctrines. First, there is adherence to the doctrine of mental substance. For those who are so committed, mental substance becomes the basis of the mind or self; it is the bearer of mental properties and the subject or possessor of thoughts and
experience. Indeed (see below) one might hold that certain entities are classified as ideas precisely because they have a special connection to intrinsically mental substance. Berkeley is a well-known advocate of this ontology. Interestingly, however, there is a major disagreement over the existence of mental substance in the period just between Descartes and Berkeley: for there we find that Locke denies what these others accept, the existence of substance as natured. There are substances in which other entities inhere, but such substance has lost its essence. Substances which are mental are so only nominally. Substance itself is bare. In this respect it is Hume, at least as he is traditionally interpreted, and not Descartes or Berkeley, who stands closest to Locke, for Hume seems to deny categorically that there are intrinsically mental substances. If Berkeley is a throwback to rationalism for sticking with mental substance, then Locke and Hume are the modernists for going beyond it (Hume apparently is the bigger hero because he gets rid of the category altogether). Of course it then becomes questionable as to what it means to classify entities as mental.

The heart of the second doctrine which shapes the view of the intrinsically mental is **intentionality**. Many philosophers in the way of ideas tradition are representationalists. Whatever else that may mean, the following is a central claim of the doctrine: some items with which one is directly acquainted, namely some ideas, are said to be about objects in the physical world in virtue of representing them. One entity represents another at least in virtue of properties that these items and objects 'share', and the causal connection between them.
Representation is asymmetrical. Objects in the world which are represented by intentional entities do not themselves represent anything. Thus, intentionality must come to more than 'similarity' of property, since normally, similarity is symmetric.\textsuperscript{21}

Though ideas in the Cartesian sense are intentional partially as a function of other characteristics like 'similarity', the asymmetrical nature of intentionality, at least, is retained from the medieval conception.\textsuperscript{22} But Descartes and the medievals, e.g., Aquinas, have radically different notions of the ontological status of intentional entities. According to Descartes the direct object of an awareness, especially a sensory awareness, is an idea in the mind of the perceiver. A duck in the physical world which one is, commonsensically speaking, said to see, is intended -- represented -- by its idea, which is itself the object of an awareness. Thus the awareness is only indirectly of the physical duck; the idea is an intermediary between the duck and the awareness. Or, to put the point slightly differently, to see a duck is to have a visual idea of it. The shape of the duck, while formally in the bird itself, is depicted by the idea, where the shape is thought to exist only objectively. Thus, though the duck has a shape, the idea does not. Yet it is because the shape can be 'in' the idea without rendering it duck-shaped that the idea and the duck 'share' something.

The departure from the medieval view is striking. Aquinas also had a notion of the object perceived and the 'thought' as 'sharing' a form. When one sees a duck, the form of the duck 'inexists' in the mind.\textsuperscript{23} But here, the act of perceiving is a
complex entity, one of whose components is the form *qua* inexistant in the mind. The form is what gives the act its content, thus 'directing' it to its object. This object is the physical duck. In no way is the form as it exists 'in' the mind the intention of the act of awareness; it, the form in the mind, is that by means of which we think, not what is thought about. Intentional inexistence is Aquinas' way of accounting for how it is that the object makes itself known to us by, as it were, directing our thought toward it. Of course, how the form in the mind provides this direction for the act is the mystery of the intentional.

For representationalists, it is the intentionality of the intermediary ideas which allows us to 'perceive' the external world at all. On Descartes' view, then, an idea of a duck is a very peculiar duck, and the awareness directed at it a very peculiar awareness. For, the former is mysteriously ducklike, while the latter is directionless: as an act, it does not have as a constituent any indication of its object. Thus, how Descartes' ideas represent via 'likeness' is as mysterious as how Aquinas' thoughts are directed toward their proper objects. For, if the qualities in question are the same as, or of the same ontological category as, those that characterize physical bodies, one wonders how they 'obtain' the crucial intentional characteristic that prevents them from being characteristics of mental substances. If, on the other hand, these forms or qualities are intrinsically mental, if they have some sort of property of intentionality as it were, then their relation to their physical 'counterparts' is so far unexplained. As we shall see, it is precisely their
stand on the solution to these problems that marks the crucial move of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume into the way of ideas.

Let us summarize. For Descartes and other representationalists, some entities are about others, this aboutness is characteristic of some mental items and, indeed, is what 'makes' them mental. How these entities are invested with this aboutness, of course, is crucial. If one believes that mental substances somehow invest their ideas with intentionality, then the intentional does not provide a second sense of 'intrinsically mental'. On the other hand, mental substances may be claimed to be such because they have, by nature, properties, namely ideas, which are about something. In that case, ideas are intrinsically mental 'by nature', and one might wish to claim that the primary notion of the mental is not that of natured mental substances, but that of the intentional entity, thereby raising the possibility of eliminating mental substance altogether. Of course, for those in the substance tradition who have both natured substances and intrinsically intentional ideas, the connection between the two is, to say the least, close. Certainly, on such a view, ideas and minds are made for one another, just as are qualities and the substances on which they depend. The two former categories, just as many have argued is true for the two latter, have 'hooks' out for one another. When Descartes claims that the nature of the mind is to think, he may be saying (see below) in effect that intentional -- intrinsically mental -- entities, ideas, are characteristic of minds.

For Descartes, for Locke and Berkeley, and for Hume the objects of sensory awareness are mental. In
this respect all are in the way of ideas tradition. However, if to be in the way of ideas tradition means acceptance of the intrinsically mental, then Hume would officially have to deny that affiliation. We are going to show that it is on this issue that Hume makes the mistake which he senses so strongly in the Appendix but fails precisely to identify. Hume's portrait of ordinary objects and persons both excludes and depends on a commitment to intrinsic mental objects. Indeed, it is not clear to us how one could be in the way of ideas tradition without such commitment.

Almost everyone who ends up on the way of ideas does so because he is persuaded by considerations of perceptual variation. The one possible exception is Berkeley, whose collapse of the act-object distinction might be considered sufficient as an argument for the way of ideas (see below); yet Berkeley uses both this collapse and considerations of perceptual variation in the Dialogues. The argument appeals to what is taken to be an undeniable fact of perception to the effect that objects sometimes do, and potentially always can, appear other than they are; that is, they appear, or through changes in the conditions of perception can be made to appear, to have properties they do not really have. Operating from the perspective of third-person, this assumes from the outset that there are material objects, and that they have colors, shapes, and all those attributes beloved by commonsense.

The argument proceeds as follows. Commonsense believes objects can exemplify only one property under a given category at a given moment (one shape in the same space, one color in the same space, etc.) and, in
addition, that they can hold their properties over time, other things being equal (where there are changes they are explainable in terms of standard lawful relations). The problem of perception therefore becomes one of reconciling the perspective of third-person with that of first-person whereby the object appears, but cannot consistently be held, to exemplify these other properties. We shall refer to these as dangling properties. This use of 'dangling' is suggestive, we hope, of the fact that Descartes and others impressed by the facts of perceptual variation saw here a profound ontological problem: all believed that, in the case of a dream or an ordinary perceptual variation, something was experienced which was not identical with what they knew to exist. The issue was the exact ontological status of that something.  

The most critical stage of the argument from perceptual variation occurs now: it is claimed that because the dangling properties cannot be exemplified by the material object without contradiction, they must be "in the mind." This move, which sounds strange to (some) modern ears, was a natural one for anyone in the modern tradition, even for someone like Locke who rejects natured substances. The reason is that the ontological categories of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries with their overtones of natured substance and qualities forces the exclusive classification of all entities into the categories of the mental or material. Even Locke sees the mental and physical as the only alternatives.

Along with these extremes of categorization, of course, there is an extreme, final step: the assimilation of all perceptions to the status of dangling properties. So far it has been concluded
that at least some of the properties we are aware of in perception are different from the actual properties of bodies. So long as the third-person point of view is maintained, this is as far as one can get, however. It is only when the argument shifts completely to a first-person perspective, from which one cannot tell any difference in kind between any perceptions that one has, that it is concluded that, since some of these perceptions are mental, all must be.30

However, as we have explained earlier, placing the sensible qualities in the mind does not make them predicative of the mind. What is the justification for this latter claim? The medieval view that forms may inexist in the mind, echoed in the early modern view that properties may have objective existence in ideas, creates an ontological problem. Is the form of the physical duck literally the same as the form that inexists in the mind? Is the shape of the physical object the same shape — perhaps one should say: the same (ontological) kind of shape — as the one 'in' idea? If so, then it is not the form, or the shape, that is intrinsically mental, but rather the 'stuff' 'in' which it is said to exist. For if it were intrinsically mental, then it could not characterize physical objects. For Descartes at least, it all depends on how one thinks of ideas. If they are simple, and if the properties are literally the same in both physical object and 'in' idea, then mental substance itself must render them mental and defang them so that, for example, the mind is not square when one sees a square thing. This account, however, leaves the residence of the property of intentionality unexplained: for if the properties in things and in the mind are literally the same, then the asymmetrical
nature of intentionality is unaccounted for, and the possibility that it is somehow 'communicated' to the idea by virtue of its modifying mental substance is, to say the least, as mysterious as the notion of intentionality itself.

If the forms or the properties are not literally the same ones as are characterized by physical objects, then one could hold that these 'forms' and 'shapes' are themselves intrinsically mental. Indeed, Locke is here an interesting case. He has intentional ideas with no natured mental substance to which to hook them; these ideas are 'like' or 'similar to' (at least with respect to the primary qualities) qualities in the physical world. Stillingfleet's wondering why on Locke's view that bodies could not think, and Locke's answer that it was possible, can now be seen in a somewhat different light. We can sympathize with Stillingfleet's puzzlement: for on the view that ideas are intentional, Locke is committed to natured mental entities; on the view that ideas are like physical objects, he is not. Had Locke been able to make good on his notion of the intentionality of ideas, ideas as intrinsically mental, he might have held that minds are not substances, but collections of such ideas, thereby securing the intrinsically mental without mental substance.

On the above conception of Locke's ontology of mind, Locke's view in effect anticipates one version of the position to which, as we shall argue, Hume must be committed. The other version is Berkeley's, with a metaphysics of natured mental substances and hook-less ideas. Berkeley maintains that ideas do not represent and hence are not intentional. Yet Berkeley is an idealist, and all ideas for him are mental in
the sense of logically depending upon the mind that has them. Thus, whatever Berkeley does to secure ideas as intrinsically mental, i.e., his justification for connecting them necessarily with natured mental substance to begin with, it is because ideas are so connected that they themselves can be termed mental. Their status as mental, that is, rubs off on them indelibly because of their (alleged) logical connection with natured mental substance.

There is more than one way of putting the argument from perceptual variation. Some versions appear to rely heavily on certain causal considerations. Nothing would be seen at all in a particular case if the lighting conditions, perspective of the perceiver, etc., were not of a certain sort, and it is agreed that nothing could be seen without the assistance of the brain and the organs of sensation. Since, the argument goes, (a) sensible qualities that appear to the perceiver vary as the conditions of perception vary, (b) these qualities cannot consistently be exemplified by the object and so are only revealed by changes in the conditions of perception (as argued above), (c) because these variations may occur with respect to any character types -- shape, color, etc. -- it is concluded that what qualities under a type are actually experienced at any given moment are lawfully tied to the conditions of perception. Since this approach would at best establish a causal depend-

* In the twentieth century we have a mixture of the medieval and early modern. Russell and Moore, for example, have mental acts, whose intentions are sense-data, and these sense-data may be thought to represent physical objects. The sense-data, however, are not like Cartesian ideas, because sense-data do not have properties 'in' them merely objectively, but as genuine properties. Sense-data have phenomenal shapes and phenomenal colors, and these are said to correspond in some way to physical properties. We think that reading this view into the way of ideas has kept many from seeing the correct structure of ideas in that tradition.
ency of perceptions on material structures (sense organs, lighting conditions, and the like), the argument must ultimately return to the mainstream account if a conclusion of mind dependence is to be drawn. Hume, as we shall see presently, follows this pattern in "Of Scepticism With Regard to the Senses."

B. The Collapse of the Act-Object Distinction

Whether Hume can be shown to be like Locke or Berkeley with respect to the intrinsically mental will be a matter of considerable controversy. This much, however, we think is less contentious. At least part of what motivates Hume's final position, he has in common with Berkeley: a rejection of the act. In the first Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, Hylas advocates an act-object distinction in the attempt to block Philonous' arguments for idealism:

Hyl. One great oversight I take to be this: that I did not sufficiently distinguish the object from the sensation. Now, though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot.\[31\]

Berkeley, responding to this contention, wants no part of the distinction between act and object and attempts to collapse it as the Dialogue progresses. As pain goes\[32\] so for Berkeley go all perceptions; and so it goes, even more deliberately, for Hume. As memory is simply a string of ideas accurately reproducing the order of the original entrance of impressions, and belief an idea with sufficient force and vivacity, so all mental acts are nothing more than the occurrence of impressions or ideas. For Hume we cannot say, as Hylas would have wished, that the properties of the act of perceiving, as act, are very different than the
properties of the object of that act, as object. On this matter Hume is totally committed: the object of perception and the act of perception are one.

It is crucial to see clearly that Berkeley's collapse of the act-object distinction, together with his views that all sensible qualities are ideas, and all ideas are mental, leaves him with no way of justifying the latter claim unless he takes the alternative discussed earlier: ideas are mental because they are tied in some strong relation, presumably a logical one, to intrinsically mental substances. For what is the alternative? The only other sense of intrinsically mental that makes sense is that of the intentional, in the sense that ideas are intentional by nature. But Berkeley's view is that ideas are not intentional; that is what is behind his claim that only ideas can be like other ideas, and that representationalism is a mistaken view. Hume tries to escape these implications with the mental contextually defined; we shall argue below that this cannot work to establish the claim that all perceptions are mental.

3. Hume's View of the Mental

In the Treatise, Hume denies that we are justified in believing in the continued, independent existence of bodies. It may thus seem that he cannot use the argument from perceptual variation to establish that all perceptions are mental, since that argument depends upon the third-person perspective on propertied material objects. This may lead some to the unwarranted conclusion that he is, in the sense defined at the end of section 1, a neutral phenomenalist, like Goodman. That is, one will be tempted to ignore Hume's claim that all perceptions are mental as
irrelevant to the constructions he offers of mind and body. Goodman, however, begins from the first-person point of view. Beginning that way, one ends with the view that some entities, classes or structures of other entities, are mental and some are not. No 'building block' of Goodman's system is intrinsically mental or intrinsically material. Thus there is a crucial difference which this conclusion, that Hume is a neutral phenomenalist, blatantly ignores. Hume believes that all perceptions are mental. That position makes no sense outside of the notions of the intrinsically mental that we have developed above. Furthermore, his reconstructions suffer from his belief that all perceptions are mental. The latter cannot be ignored; it is fundamental to Hume's view. Let us see.

But when we compare experiments, and reason a little upon them, we quickly perceive, that the doctrine of the independent existence of our sensible perceptions is contrary to the plainest experience. (T 210)

This key passage in the crucial section of the Treatise, "Of Scepticism With Regard to the Senses," shows two things. The first, a mere repeat of a point Hume emphasizes from the first of the Treatise, is that every perception is mental. The second is that the argument from perceptual variation plays a crucial role in establishing that claim. Rather amazingly, the claim that belief in the existence of continuing independent objects cannot be justified is given on the same page, indeed in the same breath, as the argument from perceptual variation, which crucially depends, as we have seen, on the negation of the former claim. Thus there is an essential tension in Hume's arguments about the external world. Yet it
seems that Hume must surely have noticed the apparent contradiction. We think that, in the Appendix, he does; that is, the tension in the Appendix over atomism and the reconstruction of the mental is a species of this same problem. Since Berkeley makes virtually the same mistakes in his use of the argument from perceptual variation, and in the same short space, it is surely the case that the apparent contradiction was not apparent to two of the greatest minds of the eighteenth century. Our task now is to explain why.

What does it mean to say that a perception is mental? Given our explications of the notion of the mental, which ones -- if any -- fit Hume? Take first the notion of the intrinsically mental, in the sense that ideas, i.e., perceptions, are such. Hume argues strongly against representational realism. Perceptions, at least impressions of sensation, are not intentional.\(^{33}\) So they can't be intrinsically mental in that sense. Hume, of course, analyses the mind as 'bundle', and denies the existence of natured mental substance.\(^{34}\) So perceptions can't borrow their being mental from such substances. It appears, then, that the claim that a perception is mental is one about the relations in which the perception stands to other perceptions. In particular, to say a perception is mental implies that it has some relation to a bundle.

A bundle is a certain grouping of perceptions. The grouping of perceptions is not for Hume merely a matter of convention, nor is it a grouping that a natured mental substance might provide. Rather, we encounter perceptions in repeatable patterns and relationships which we habitually identify in terms of structures of certain specific sorts. A collection is
habitually identified as a mental structure or as a material structure depending upon the patterns and relationships into which its members enter. No single perception is by itself, nonderivatively, either mental or material. Indeed, for Hume the same perception may be both mental and material; but none can be merely material. The question of the mental character of perceptions then revolves around the relationship of a perception to one of these structures.

Hume argues that although the existence of unperceived perceptions is logically possible there are as a matter of fact no such perceptions. Berkeley believes that there is no such logical possibility. It thus appears that what we shall call strong idealism -- perceptions are (in a logical sense) necessarily mental -- is not open to Hume. Whether he is an implicit strong idealist remains to be seen.

The relationship between a perception and its being perceived must be a weaker one in Hume's view than in Berkeley's. According to Hume, while it is logically possible for any particular impression to exist apart from any mental collection at all, there are as a matter of fact no impressions which do so; nor, as a matter of lawful fact, could there ever be such impressions. We call this view "weak idealism."

Of course, "apart from" is ambiguous. There are two possibilities. First, Hume might mean that as a matter of fact all perceptions must exist as members of mental bundles; second, Hume might think that perceptions lawfully depend upon minds without necessarily being members of such bundles. The following passage seems to support either version.

When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become double, and one half of them to be remov'd from their
common and natural position. But as we do not attribute a continued existence to both these perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature, we clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. (T 210-211)

Weak idealism seems to rescue Hume from any charge that he has intrinsically mental entities: perceptions are not logically dependent on minds. Hence, one could provide, plausibly, a reconstruction of the notion of the mental such that a perception is mental only because of its relation to that structure. Hume begins to sound like Goodman.

He isn't. We believe that arrival at the claim that all perceptions are mental, and in particular weak idealism, comes through the collapse of the act-object distinction in conjunction with the argument from perceptual variation. Unfortunately for Hume, this conjunction is incompatible with weak idealism.

The collapse of the act-object distinction eliminates the possibility that perceptions may be lawfully linked with minds without being their constituents. Hume denies there are mental acts. Consequently, a perceiving can be nothing more than a perception or a string of perceptions, parts of a mental structure (a mind). Hume's claim that the existence of a perception depends upon its being perceived requires that every perception be part of such a string and, thereby, of such a collection. With mental acts it would be possible to consider relations that a perceived perception might bear, or as in Hume's case, would be lawfully compelled to bear, to the perceiving, as the cash value of the claim that perceptions are mental. This would not
require that impressions be members of mental structures.

This move by Hume, we suggest, is actually a reflection of Berkeley's strategy in the first Dialogue. When Hylas poses the act-object distinction to block Philonous' effort to put sensibles in the mind, Philonous attacks the distinction. Once it collapses, Berkeley believes, the perception, now identical to the perceiving, must be in the mind.

In the end Berkeley with his commitment to mental substance deviates from Hume's intended view by tying sensibles to the mind necessarily; this is how he secures them as mental. Thus, if Hume is to maintain weak idealism, he must hold that, although no impressions exist outside of mental collections, it is logically possible that they could. To make good on this point Hume adopts the argument from perceptual variation as quoted above. But the argument from perceptual variation is antithetical to weak idealism. The reasons are as follows. First, as we have seen, the argument depends upon the third-person point of view and third-person knowledge that there are independent continuing objects. Second, the resolution of the problem of the dangling property is the creation of an intentional entity that, after all, is what a perception really is. If perceptions were not such entities what would they be, coming into existence as they do as the result of the process described in the argument from perceptual variation? Could they be Russellian sense-data, existing outside of mental structures and representing the material world? As we have just argued, the collapse of the act-object distinction precludes this.
Perhaps Hume relies on assimilation of act and object alone to make his claim, without use of perceptual variation. But Hume cannot use the collapse to establish weak idealism. As we argued previously, Berkeley takes the collapse as an argument for the claim that all objects of perception are mental. This move succeeds, if at all, by assimilating the logic of object to the logic of act. To put the point another way, such objects must be intrinsically mental in one of the senses defined previously. Thus, Hume faces the following alternatives. Either the collapse of act and object renders perceptions intrinsically mental or it does not. If it does, Hume is committed to either natured mental substances or intentional entities. If it does not, then we are left with the problem of explaining why every perception is mental. The collapse of act and object would not, on this alternative, secure perceptions as mental, unless acts are already understood as being intrinsically mental, while use of the argument from perceptual variation can only be legitimately used to secure entities as intrinsically mental.

We thus come to the last defense of Hume against the charge of an implicit commitment to the intrinsically mental. In effect this defense is that Hume is the Goodman described at the end of section 1. Beginning from the purely first-person point of view, it is alleged, Hume can reconstruct both the physical and the mental in terms of lawfully related perceptions. Even the argument from perceptual variation can be successfully reconstructed. Thus, it is alleged Hume can gain all his results including that all perceptions are mental without commitment either to the intrinsically mental or the intrinsically
material. We shall show, however, that even this
defense must finally be abandoned. Indeed, it is
ultimately incoherent.

Consider an ordinary physical object, a penny
for example, which looks round from one angle, oval
from another. The difference between the account of
this situation from first and third-person is quite
striking. From the third-person perspective, an
object like a penny has a real shape. If a perceiver
P sees it 'improperly', then that property is off and
dangling. On the other hand, if Goodman is right, the
notion of a material object can be reconstructed
entirely from first-person: an ordinary physical
object like a penny is a construct from momentary
data. From first-person perspective, the only differ-
ence between the real and apparent shape of the penny
will be lawful relations in which the momentary data
stand. There is no reason, then, why such a phenomen-
alist cannot place all the 'apparent' properties in
the penny, and distinguish the predicable ones in
terms of their lawful relations to others. Once one
sees that, the fact of perceptual variation will be
seen to be accounted for, and there will be no reason
whatever to move the dangling properties into the
mind. They will not be dangling; they will be con-
stituents of objects without being properties of them.

But this cannot be Hume's solution, for he
believes that all perceptions are mental. That is, he
must be impressed by the problem of contradictory
properties, discussed in section 2, which motivates
the argument from perceptual variation. He must
believe that if properties are constituents of physi-
cal entities, they are predicable of them. Thus, he
must present a second account whereby these properties
are taken out of the external body on the grounds that if they were in it they would be predicatable of it. On this account he simply follows out the logic of the argument from perceptual variation, according to which not only are the appearances put into the mind but, because of considerations of no-intrinsic-difference, the predicatable properties are placed there as well. These moves simply make no sense from a purely first-person point of view, i.e., from the point of view of a neutral phenomenalism.36

With all the perceptions now in the mind, Hume has totally removed the object. This leaves things in a rather bad way. None of the perceived properties are actually predicatable of the mind (see below) anymore than for, say, Aquinas, the form of the horse in the mind makes (it) a horse or, for Descartes, red being in the mind makes the mind red. After all the first, crucial placement of the apparent, as opposed to real, properties in the mind is effected precisely to rob them of their predicative power. But, it may be claimed, we are forgetting Hume's bundles. He reconstructs objects from perceptions. Now if the logic of the move of properties into the mind is not to be violated, then strictly speaking we cannot predicate any of the properties of the newly constructed object either.37 If, on the other hand, Hume wishes to give a bundle view of objects with predication -- objects which are now constituted entirely of perceptions -- the entire problem engendered by the argument from perceptual variation is simply reintroduced. The distinction between real and apparent properties which is required by the perceptual variation argument and which the original Goodman-type reconstruction accommodates has, for the moment,
disappeared. Hume must, therefore, reintroduce it in terms of the newly conceived 'mental' bundles. A chair will be a bundle of perceptions, some of which are lawfully connected in such a way that these are the real properties of the chair, and the other properties, perceptions, that are members of the chair bundle will not qualify it. But this option was open to Hume before he moved all the qualities into the mind. So he has gotten nowhere.38

Put simply, the point is this. Hume either tries to reconstruct physical objects as bundles before he places all perceptions in the mind or he tries to reconstruct them after. If he does so before, there is no need to do so after, and if he does so after, he could have done so before. It is of course extremely tempting to see Hume, and Berkeley before him, as sense-data theorists since, after all, they attempt to reconstruct physical objects from the data of sense. But twentieth century sense-data theorists like Russell and Moore are impressed by the fact that the oval shape of the penny is like its real shape, since after all it appears to be a shape and could characterize some other object -- there are, after all, oval things -- and so they claim that there is something oval, namely the sense datum. It is then an open question as to whether such entities are physical or mental. But Hume thinks that the data of sense are mental, so the logic of his move is that he does not, at least initially, want the dangling properties to be predicable of anything. That is, as we have shown, a crucial ingredient in what is meant by calling them mental.

Thus Hume cannot make sense of the perceptions in question being mental without either reintroducing
mental substances or becoming a representationalist. Let us put our point slightly differently in order once again to demonstrate, and finally to summarize, why.

In the bundles which define the new object, predication is supposed to occur because the properties involved are the sort of properties such bundles as material objects can exemplify. Even if some of the members are not actually predicated of the object, namely the appearances, they are of the sort that could be. These same properties, however, are also part of the bundle which is the mind. Yet, with respect to the mind none are predicable; not because they could be but are not, but rather because they are not the sort of property about which considerations of such predications are even relevant. This is crucial to Hume's argument. We recall that the reason some properties are removed from physical bodies is that if they were in them they would be predicable of them, which would result in objects having contradictory properties. Presumably the same logic must hold for properties that would be relevant to minds. So properties like shapes or colors cannot be in a mind and of the kind predicable of it, for if they were then nothing would prevent predication, and one would have the absurd result that the mind was red or square. That is, these properties would be in exactly the same boat with respect to the mind as the dangling ones were with respect to their place in the physical object: they couldn't be in that physical object without qualifying them, so they had to be moved. These properties, therefore, are not in the mind as property at all but in some other way. The question then becomes, what constitutes their classification as
mental? As we have seen, they must either borrow their classification as mental from being necessarily connected to an intrinsically mental substance, or be intentional, in which case one cannot reconstitute objects from them.

We return, finally, to the question with which we started this section. Why didn't Berkeley and Hume notice the apparent contradiction between their use of the argument from perceptual variation and their claim that there are no objects existing independently of perception? Our reconstruction of the mistake yields the intellectual motive: thinking that they can successfully reconstruct the physical object in the mind, they do not realize that they cannot do this consistently with the use of the argument from perceptual variation. For that argument yields the result that all properties of the physical object are in the mind only at the expense of being able to predicate the qualities of anything. Berkeley and Hume are thus trying to have it both ways, and do not see that they cannot. They fool themselves into believing perceptions are mental because the argument from perceptual variation, and the collapse (at least for Berkeley) of the object into the act seems to yield that result. However, that result only makes sense if perceptions are intrinsically mental, as we have shown. If that is the case, commonsense disappears; there is no way then to reconstruct what we mean when we truly say that this object is square.

4. Conclusion

Many commentators have noted that Berkeley's view, and Hume's subsequent modification of it, both break new ground with the notion of predication while
at the same time holding fast to the old, Aristotelian concepts. 40 We have tried to show that these relationships are extremely complex and subtle. If we are right, the basic idea that motivates the argument from perceptual variation is the view that apparent properties, e.g., the oval-looking coin, were they left in the object, would have to be predicated of it. Why the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries believed this, and the exact reasons behind the tremendous change in the view of predication first marked by the introduction of sense-data, and then by work like Goodman's, are (to us, at least) unclear. But with respect to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we have said enough to speculate: the logic of the Aristotelian substance tradition was still firmly at work.

Alan Hausman
Ohio State University

David Hausman
Southern Methodist University

1. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 207. Further references to the Treatise will be cited as 'T' followed by the relevant page number(s).

2. We use single quotes to mark problematic uses of expressions. Double quotes are used to mention linguistic expressions.

3. Stroud, pp. 120, 128.

4. Stroud alludes to the importance of this issue when he wonders what property collects perceptions into a mental bundle. See pp. 138-139.

5. See, for example, T 207.
6. There is another possibility here: that a perception can depend upon a mind, i.e., be lawfully connected to it, without being 'in' it, in any plausible sense of "in." This important alternative is discussed in detail in later sections.

7. We take off from the places in which H.H. Price's classic discussion of these issues in Hume's Theory of the External World fails. Our view of phenomenalism comes from Price, Russell's An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Goodman's The Structure of Appearance, and various works by Ayer, especially The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.

8. Another resolution of the problem rests on an alleged distinction between reason and the imagination. Hume, it is said, is very interested in the Treatise in showing that reason constantly clashes with the imagination, thus producing sceptical dilemmas that can only be resolved by letting nature take its course. Then the specific clash described above is merely one aspect of the general clash between the imagination, which posits the possibility of unsensed perceptions, and reason, which tells us that such a possibility is in fact not actualized. Thus Hume is quite aware, on this interpretation, that there is a conflict between his atomism and the theory of ideas, and he plays off of this conflict consciously and constantly. We will not discuss this possibility in the paper.

9. Stroud thinks the problem in the Appendix is that Hume thinks that one's 'gaze' is limited to one's own perceptions; for if one's gaze is so limited, there is no problem about getting an idea of the self, as Hume thinks the vulgar idea arises. He believes that if Hume did not assume one's gaze was so restricted, then he couldn't account for our idea of ourselves. He thus thinks that Hume's problem in the Appendix has to do, not with accounting for the self, but for our idea of it as a unified entity. But why does Hume assume that one's gaze is limited to one's own perceptions? Does he have Berkeley's early view that to be is to be perceived by the perceiver? See Stroud, pp. 136ff.

10. This is certainly the view of Russell and the positivists, who made Hume a hero because they
felt -- unjustifiably, as we shall see -- that he was the first genuinely neutral phenomenalist.

11. This connection is explored in Alan Hausman's "Adhering to Inherence: A New Look at the Old Steps in Berkeley's March to Idealism."

12. See especially The Structure of Appearance.

13. Thus, though commonsense, or a philosopher's version of it, might insist on some sort of 'given', Goodman insists that it is not necessary to make such an assumption in order to reconstruct the physical and the mental.

14. See Alan Hausman, "Goodman's Perfect Communities," pp. 185-188.

15. For example, the brain as reconstructed will be found to be lawfully connected to all mental items and so will not itself be mental. For an opposite view, see Berkeley, who maintains in the second Dialogue that the brain cannot be the cause of all ideas, since it itself is an idea (or collection of ideas), and hence cannot cause itself. See George Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, p. 44. This rather amazing argument is certainly a departure from the commonsense of Berkeley's day, and signs a major flaw in Berkeley's system. We document this in a paper under preparation. Hume, of course, is going to have the same problem as Berkeley here.

16. We have not tried to use other terms that traditionally mark this distinction, e.g., public-private, objective-subjective, because we think they have more pejorative implications than our own. We are not, of course, interested in defending the distinction; we believe that we are merely calling attention to two long traditions that begin with Descartes. See, for example, C.D. Broad's discussion in Chapter IV of Mind and Its Place in Nature. Another classic discussion is in Arthur D. Lovejoy's The Revolt Against Dualism, pp. 157ff.

17. For the sake of our argument, we take the laws of science to be free of metaphysical implications. This supposition functions in an important way in our later statement of the argument from perceptual variation.

19. An excellent discussion of the seventeenth century substance tradition in general and of mental substance in particular is in Louis Loeb's *From Descartes to Hume*.

20. See Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Meditation III, pp. 24-25. The conditions of likeness and causal connection are common to both Descartes and Locke.

21. Ideas are effects, so one might try to place the asymmetrical nature of ideas here, in their alleged 'passivity'. But events in the physical world can be effects and not be intentional.

22. In broad terms, this is the view of Aquinas (which we take as typical of the medievals) presented by Gilson in *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, pp. 377ff. See also Mahoney, and an excellent discussion of Aquinas' theory of intentionality in Lisska.


24. It would thus be easy to assimilate the problem to the general problem of the interaction between mind and body. Aquinas does not seem to have this latter difficulty.

25. Presumably this would work, at least in Descartes' case, by appeal to the nature of mental substance as a thinking thing. Ideas would be 'structured' as it were, by this essence, hence intentional; they would represent an unfolding of the nature of the mental.

26. We think this is one plausible way of reading Locke's claims, that ideas represent and that there are no natured mental substances.


28. This point needs clarification. For one thing, we earlier introduced the view we called third-person as one which assumed the laws of physics and perspective in describing the experience of another person. Descartes takes the laws of physics to show that objects do not have colors. However, this unwarranted assumption does not show up in the *Meditations* in any simple way.
What does show up is the dream problem which, on our view, is a species of the argument about properties that we are presenting. That argument, in turn, plays quite illegitimately on a continual shift between the third and first-person point of view.

29. Of course the move that there is a 'something' at all, is controversial, in that many in the twentieth century have challenged it. That challenge, however, comes after twentieth century phenomenalists make the dangling qualities into properties of momentary entities which they call sense-data. But on our view, this is precisely what Descartes and Locke do not do. It may appear that Berkeley and Hume do make this move, but as we shall argue below, they do not: the bundle view of objects, with whatever attendant predicational analysis it carries, comes after the dangling property argument has functioned in the way Descartes intended it. Berkeley and Hume are not sense-data theorists.

30. Here, Berkeley's arguments in the Dialogues are typical.


32. Reid (I, i, p. 27) attempts to make the logic of the collapse clear when he says, "When I am pained, I cannot say that the pain I feel is one thing, and that my feeling it is another thing."

33. One might wish to argue that ideas, as Hume uses the term, are intentional in some sense, since they are copies of impressions. But even if one can argue this successfully, the crucial problem comes with impressions of sensation.

34. A bundle cannot be a mere class, since the perceptions are ordered.

35. Goodman provides a perfect example of this in The Structure of Appearance. Beginning with phenomenal colors, places, and times as data, and a relation of togetherness, he first constructs color-spot-moments, i.e., a color, a place, and a time that are all together. Such entities may seem to be sense-data, or minimum sensibilia, but Goodman does not claim that the place-time has a color. It is not until much larger units are
constructed from color-spot-moments that a notion of predication is defined. He thus differs markedly from Russell and Moore and other phenomenologists who want to claim that the momentary datum is described by true atomic propositions which attribute a property to a 'thing'.

36. Of course a neutral phenomenalist might be tempted to take some of the qualities out of bodies, to take the oval out of the penny, perhaps even to put it 'in' the mind. But what sense would it make to take them all out, and to put them all in the mind? One would at best be right back where one started.

37. Of course, that logic has already been violated by totally getting rid of knowledge claims about physical objects. Still, one might try to defend Hume on the predication issue by saying, "Of course. Hume is, after all, a nominalist, and doesn't have genuine predication at all." But if this is so, there was no point in moving properties out of the physical object to begin with; there was nothing to move out. The argument from perceptual variation entails that properties have some sort of ontological status, and those who use it cannot consistently take a nominalistic position.

38. The move that Hume might make, of taking some of the properties out of the object, was also open to him before he put them all into the mind.

39. It would certainly be peculiar for Hume to make a primary secondary-quality distinction and take some qualities out of those collections of perceptions that constitute physical objects or, for that matter, to move any of the apparent qualities out of these collections, given how these qualities got into the mind to begin with. Yet, as we have pointed out, if they can all live together in the reconstituted object in the mind, why can't they do so outside the mind?

40. For a discussion see Pappas.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


