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Hume Studies Volume XXVII, Number 1 (April, 2001) 85-98.


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S. CHARLES, J. C. LAURSEN, R. H. POPKIN, AND A. ZAKATISTOVS

Introduction

Louis Frédéric Ancillon was a member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences and Belles Lettres whose imagined dialogue between Berkeley and Hume was read to the Academy in 1796 and published in 1799.¹ It is important as an indicator of the reception of Hume and Berkeley in francophone philosophical circles in late eighteenth-century Prussia. Our introduction is followed by an English translation with notes.

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Ancillon's Life and Work

Ancillon was born in Berlin in 1740, grandson of Huguenot historian Charles Ancillon, who had been forced to flee France upon the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.² He was named to the Academy in 1786 shortly after winning one of its prizes for an essay on the social function of religion, and died in 1814.³ His Discourse on the Question: Besides inspiration, what are the qualities that assure that the Holy Books are superior to profane books? of 1782 won a prize from the Academy of Rouen in 1778 and he brought out a Latin Judgment of the Judgments about the Cartesian Argument for the Existence of God in 1792.⁴

Ancillon was a member of the “Speculative Philosophy” Class of the Academy. P. L. M. de Maupertuis headed this class until his death in 1759, and left his mark in at least two ways that we can still see in Ancillon. On the one hand, he had respect for philosophical skepticism, using it against the Wolffians and materialists, and on the other hand, he feared its effects on morality and Christianity.⁵ Other members of the academy in Ancillon’s day such as Jean-Bernard Mériand (d. 1807), Jean-Henri-Samuel Formey (d. 1797), and Jean de Castillon (d. 1791) carried on the tradition of respecting, adapting, and using skepticism, even as they fought some of its implications and defended Christianity.⁶

Other members of the class in Ancillon’s day included Johann Jacob Engel, Friedrich Nicolai, Christian Selle, and Frédéric de Castillon. Together, these philosophers ranged over the available philosophy with particular interest in Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, Diderot, Rousseau, Hume, and, especially after about 1790, Kant.⁷

The Academy was one of the chief sources of the dissemination of the work of David Hume in the eighteenth century. Mériand translated the first Enquiry into French in 1758 and Johann Georg Sulzer wrote the notes for the first German translation of it (1755).⁸ Mériand especially had great respect for the philosophical acuity of Hume, and Mériand’s “On the Phenomenalism of David Hume” of 1793 may have inspired Ancillon to write his “Dialogue.”⁹

Mériand was also a partisan of Berkeley’s theory of vision against that of Condillac and Diderot. Berkeley’s work was available in French as early as Alciphron and The Theory of Vision in 1734.¹⁰ A Discourse Addressed to Magistrates came out in French in 1738,¹¹ followed by Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in 1744¹² and Siris, under the title of Recherches sur les vertus de l’eau de goudron, in 1745.¹³

Ancillon’s first essay for the Mémoires of the Academy was entitled “Considerations on the state of nature.”¹⁴ He pointed out that Rousseau supplies no principle by which his unsociable and amoral man of the state of nature could
ever begin to move toward sociability and morality. He criticized Rousseau's abandonment of actual history in favor of philosophical speculation on the ground that philosophy should be working with real facts. Ironically, the essay was clearly intended as a defence of providentialist history.

In the next few years Ancillon explored philosophical psychology. "Reflections on the connections between psychological synthesis and moral synthesis" made a sharp distinction between psychology and morals, such that the first concerns facts and the second what should be; the moral sense does not concern facts. "Psychological observations on the effects of works of genius" explored the sense of admiration as a central sentiment, and "Essay toward a theory of sensibility" distinguished sensibility from sentiment, demonstrating that humans are fundamentally different from animals. One underlying purpose of all this was to defend morality and Christianity.

Then Ancillon turned to questions of philosophical skepticism. A "Memoir on certitude, and especially on the nature of human certitude" distinguished between the absolute certainty of God and the relative certainty of all human beings. It was designed in part to provide a new weapon against the Pyrrhonians, and Ancillon denied that it should be read as Pyrrhonism. But any theory that uses the trope of relativity of knowledge and concludes that man's nature is to search for truth without ever finding it certainly skates very close to Pyrrhonism. Ancillon was joining the ranks of the "sceptiques malgré eux."

This was followed by "Doubts about the bases of the calculation of probabilities," which distinguished between certainty and probability and between objective and subjective probability. He borrowed Humean strategies concerning probability to show that all human knowledge ultimately breaks down into probability. Moses Mendelssohn, Christian Garve, Leibniz, Jacques and Nicolas Bernoulli, and others had offered theories of the logic of probability for everything from law to medicine to political arithmetic, Ancillon admitted. But he was convinced that the logic of the probable would never be an exact science because it would always ultimately concern individual human beings with all of their specific personal differences of experience and of interpretation. His ambivalence as a skeptic in spite of himself emerges in the first sentence of his concluding paragraph: "I am almost ashamed of the consequences to which these reflections seem to lead me." But they should in no way undermine morality and Christianity, he asserts; they should only undermine the dogmatism of science.

Then came "Considerations on the principle of thought, or examination of a passage of Locke on this subject." Here, Ancillon attacked Voltaire for...
expanding on Locke's suggestion that God could have endowed matter with thought. The immortality of the soul was at stake in such materialism, with implications for faith and morals. Ancillon provides a sociology of philosophy, rather like his colleague Mérian's, in which the success of Locke's philosophy vis-à-vis Leibniz's is attributed in part to "the English ascendancy in learned Europe." Locke was truly religious and would not have countenanced Voltaire's use of his ideas to promote materialism, Ancillon concludes. Voltaire's anti-religious skepticism is incoherent, contradictory, hypocritical, and in bad faith; it is "dogmatism hidden behind the appearance of universal doubt."23

Ancillon's next piece for the Mémoires was his imagined "Dialogue between Berkeley and Hume." We shall return to its philosophical substance below, but first we shall review briefly some of the rest of his work in order to show how the dialogue fits in his life's work. In the same volume of the Mémoires as the "Dialogue," Ancillon published an "Ontological Essay on the Soul."24 It began with mention of the limits to human knowledge (128) and proceeded to a critique of Kant in which Ancillon offered "judgments of exposition and of explication" as substitutes for Kant's unusual use of "analytic" and "synthetic" (134–9); he also criticized Kant on other matters (181–3). Ancillon disagreed with Hume on the status of resemblance, contiguity, and causality (146), but agreed with him on the point that causality is something in us and not out in the world (155). He discussed Hume and the skeptics (169) and contrasted Hume, for whom the soul was a faculty, with Kant, for whom it was a force (173). In remarks that might help us interpret his understanding of his own "Dialogue," Ancillon observes that when it came to the question of the origin of our knowledge Leibniz abandoned the dialogue form "which in a matter like this is not susceptible to any of the agreements that this genre of literature demands, and would lead always to repetitions and overlong passages" (185). In an extended comparison between Locke and Leibniz, the latter emerges as the better philosopher (184–93).

After the "Dialogue" and the "Ontological Essay," Ancillon continued as a productive member of the Academy until his death in 1814.25 Later essays include a series of three essays on the metaphysics of the Greeks, in which he demonstrated that all of the ancients had been pantheists who confused the world with God; this was, he said, the same as atheism.26 His last contribution was an "Essay on the Spirit of Leibnizianism" which, among other things, praises Leibniz for defending his Theodicy so well against the arguments of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Bayle, and Newton.27
Ancillon's Son

Ancillon is sometimes confused with his son, Jean Pierre Frédéric Ancillon, who was named a full member of the Academy in 1805. The son's first piece for the academy was entitled "Considerations on the idea and feeling of the infinite." He contributed éloges of Mérian and Ernst Ferdinand Klein, political aphorisms, and an essay on press legislation. Two of his efforts to combat dogmatism were "Considerations on exclusive theories and methods" and "On the extremes in philosophy and all moral sciences." Outside of the Mémoires, he published numerous works from Considerations on the Philosophy of History of 1796 to Means for Reconciling the Extremes of 1831. He was most famous for Tableau of the Revolutions of the System of Politics in Europe since the End of the XV Century of 1803–1805 and On the Spirit of Constitutions of 1825. Long active in political life, he was Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1832 to 1837.

The Dialogue

A translation of Ancillon's "Dialogue" is supplied here as an appendix, so we will not engage in a thorough analysis and explication of it. Ancillon's playful references to Molière and La Rochefoucauld are identified in the notes to the translation. Here, we will draw the reader's attention to various relevant philosophical aspects which will aid in understanding it.

Hume and Berkeley were notorious in the eighteenth century as skeptics, with respect to both philosophy and religion. There is not much doubt about Hume, who described himself as a skeptic. Berkeley was a bishop, so accusations of religious skepticism may seem surprising. But Berkeley was perceived as a philosopher who denied the existence of the external world, which meant that Jesuits first, and then other Christians, accused him of destroying the cosmological proof of the existence of God, which was the only valid proof for the majority of Enlightenment thinkers. A review in the Mémoires de Trévoux, followed by philosophers such as the Abbé Raynal, asked how a philosophical point in favor of solipsism could deal with the creation ex nihilo of a material world. Berkeley's Alciphron was banned by the French censor in 1734 for its alleged Pyrrhonism, and numerous authors characterized him as an atheist and skeptic, with little sense that there might be a difference between these terms.

Early in the dialogue, Ancillon has Berkeley deny that he is a skeptic. His opposition to giving Berkeley a place in the sceptical tradition might have its origin in the French version of the Discourse to the Magistrates, an early translation of one of Berkeley's works. Ancillon's apologetic purposes apparently
overrode the weight of interpretive authority in his attempt to save Berkeley for Christianity and morality.38

On the next page, Ancillon has Hume assert the traditional view that Berkeley denied the existence of bodies (89). The alternative view, that Berkeley did not actually deny the existence of bodies, was held by Maupertuis, David Boullier, and Charles Bonnet.39 Ancillon has Hume challenge Berkeley's view of continuous creation, which had raised earlier eighteenth-century objections (92).40 His Hume argues that Berkeley must explain why something outside of the soul or of God could not be the cause of a sensation (96).41 His Hume also retails an argument from Voltaire (107).42 It is clear that Ancillon was familiar with the Berkeley scholarship of the day.

He also knew how to situate Berkeley in the history of philosophy. He has Hume claim that Berkeley is a Malebranchist in respect of seeing everything in God (98).43 But he should have realized that his attack on Berkeley for denying that our sensations arise from the soul or from bodies (103) was better as an attack on Malebranche than on Berkeley.44 Berkeley accepts the fact that sensations come from bodies, but denies that a material substance exists behind corporal qualities. Ancillon also has Hume claim that Berkeley is a Spinozist in that everything is God (98).45

On a number of points, Ancillon is faithful to Hume's texts. He takes seriously Hume's distinction between the metaphysical question about the existence of bodies and the empirical question about their properties (102). But on other points, and contrary to his implicit claim that he is paraphrasing Hume, Ancillon is really bringing together an eclectic combination of arguments from Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Bayle. He has Hume use the term "apperception" (109), which is probably borrowed from Leibniz. The argument against immaterialism from instinct (111) may have come from Diderot.46

In keeping with the Academy's general hostility to Kant, the "Dialogue" can be read in part as a satire against the German philosopher.47 His table of categories and a priori principles of sensibility are mocked by Berkeley as a "cooking pot," and Kant's ideas are associated with Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus, along with Aristotle, who is "very surprised to find himself mixed up in this affair" (120-1). Ancillon's Hume is a metaphysician of a particular kind, who does not shy away from metaphysical issues but openly treats them as little more than amusement. In our "Dialogue," this lighthearted attitude toward metaphysics shows that Kantian transcendental metaphysics has competition. Metaphysics does not have to be about a priori conditions of experience, but may be a posteriori. Metaphysical theories are assembled by the mind from simple impressions and projected onto the external world.
They have the same epistemological status as the vulgar view of the world, where the vulgar system tells us how to live and the various possible metaphysical systems provide amusement or feed a love of truth in some sense. Thus, for Ancillon’s Hume, Kantian metaphysics is no better than any other metaphysics or common sense, if the others achieve their purposes.

Lessons for Contemporary Scholarship

Victor Cousin referred to Ancillon as “full of sense and wisdom,” and Christian Bartholmèss relied on him for his epitome of the Academy’s critique of Kant, but contemporary scholars have neglected him. This is unfortunate, among other reasons, because he anticipated them in several respects.

For example, Ancillon acknowledges a basic compatibility between Berkeley’s and Hume’s philosophical positions. He believes that by making their arguments compatible we can construct a metaphysical position that overcomes the limitations of Berkeley’s immaterialism and Hume’s critique of causation. Only recently, however, have scholars given the Berkeley-Hume connection the close textual attention it deserves. Ayers, Baxter, Bradshaw, and Raynor have argued about Hume’s indebtedness to Berkeley in his attempt to improve Berkeley’s views on abstraction, personal identity, space and time, scepticism of the senses, and the nature of ideas. Where he followed Berkeley and where he rejected him, the influence of Berkeley’s philosophy on Hume was widespread. Both men deal with the same complex of intimately connected problems, and any modification in regard to each question requires adjustment to the others. Ancillon’s “Dialogue” offers an example of this sort of approach to the two philosophers, and invites new research.

Harry Bracken’s contribution to the influence debate reminds us to consider the political and social contexts and implications of all philosophical debates. In his account, Berkeley and Hume are offering very different responses to the rise of commercial society, and thus we should not believe that their philosophies can be easily reconciled. If we apply his sort of analysis to Ancillon, we will probably see our author as calling for a sort of peacemaking, a reconciliation of Berkeley and Hume with each other and with enlightened religion, contrary to the intended meanings of the two great philosophers. It is not surprising to see a descendant of a persecuted minority—the Huguenots—fighting for the stability and philosophical peace that undergirded the Prussian political order that had granted him refuge and status. This places Ancillon in the tradition of the Conservative Enlightenment that has begun to receive attention in recent decades.
Ancillon’s reconciliation of Berkeley and Hume thus contrasts nicely with Reid’s critique of the two. As John Greco has recently characterized that critique, Reid’s overwhelming purpose was to refute skepticism. But Ancillon has no such need: he can live with skepticism by making it harmless for his purposes. His portrayal of the mutual sparring of Berkeley and Hume leaves neither of them in a position to undermine religion or the state.

Some readers may conclude that Ancillon’s Berkeley and Hume bear little similarity to the “real” Berkeley and Hume. This raises interesting questions about who has better access to the “real” intentions of famous philosophers: people writing in their own century in similar cultures, or people writing more than two centuries later and a continent away? Is Ancillon’s French closer to or further from eighteenth-century English than twentieth- and twenty-first-century English? And if, indeed, Ancillon was “wrong” about his protagonists, as two of us pointed out in our previous article on Mérian, the history of mistaken interpretations of philosophers may be as instructive and is certainly a wider field than the history of correct interpretations.

The foregoing sketch does not canvas all of the implications for contemporary interpretation of Berkeley and Hume that can be found in Ancillon’s text. We encourage philosophers to explore further ramifications!

Conclusion

Louis Frédéric Ancillon’s “Dialogue between Berkeley and Hume” provides a window into the reception of the two great philosophers in the Berlin Academy in the late eighteenth century. Ancillon obviously admired both philosophers as acute thinkers with many important insights. He agreed with them on many of the philosophical bases of their skepticism, but always sought to undermine them when faced with the moral and religious implications that he thought they might have. He belongs in that part of the Conservative Enlightenment that sought to assimilate philosophical skepticism into modern philosophy without sacrificing Christianity and morals.
NOTES


4 Louis Frédéric Ancillon, Discours sur la question: Quels sont, outre l'inspiration, les caractères qui assurent aux Livres Saints la supériorité sur les livres profanes? (Berlin and Dessau, 1782); Judicium de judiciis circa argumentum Cartesianum pro existentia Dei (Berlin, 1792).


11 In the Bibliothèque britannique, The Hague, vol. 9, 1738, part 2, 308–47.
12 George Berkeley, Dialogues entre Hylas & Philonous, trans. Jean-Paul de Gua de Malves (Amsterdam, 1744; repr. 1750).
13 George Berkeley, Recherches sur les vertus de l’eau de goudron (Amsterdam: Mortier, 1745).
28 See Hartkopf, Die Berliner Akademie, 7; Neue Deutsche Biographie, ed. Bayerischen Akademie (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1953), 1: 264–5; E. Haag and


36 Ancillon, “Dialogue entre Berkeley et Hume,” 88. The “Dialogue” will be cited hereafter in this introduction by the French page numbers in parentheses; they are inserted in brackets in the English text which follows.


43 Connections between Berkeley and Malebranche were pointed out by the Mémoires de Trévoux (May 1713), 921.


46 “L'homme un & vrai n'a point deux philosophies, l'une de cabinet & l'autre de société; il n'établit point dans la spéculation des principes qu'il sera forcé d'oublier dans la pratique” (Denis Diderot, “Pyrrhonienne ou Sceptique,” Encyclopédie, [1765], 13: 614).

47 See Bartholomé, Histoire philosophique, 2: 385.

48 Victor Cousin, Cours de philosophie, I series, 1: 129.


