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Haruko Inoue

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The Origin of the Indirect Passions in the *Treatise*: An Analogy between Books 1 and 2

HARUKO INOUE

1. The Analogy Between Book 1 and Book 2

If the central design of the *Treatise* is to demonstrate that “the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves” (T 2; SBN xii), as Hume advertises, it seems unquestionable that his intention lies in the illustration of the human mind as an integrated system dependent upon the cooperation of the understanding and the passions, which are discussed separately in Book 1 and Book 2, respectively.¹ What is yet to be determined is whether any internal or systematic connection between these two books was originally intended by the author. Is it too fanciful to agree with John Passmore, and to suggest that some dynamic system of the human mind would emerge when we open the door which stands between the first two books?²

The key for this door seems to be found in Hume’s account of personal identity. We may well remember how he distinguished two aspects of our identity, one regarding the understanding and another regarding the passions, and claimed that the latter “serves to corroborate” the former “by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures” (T 1.4.6.19; SBN

¹ Haruko Inoue is Professor of Philosophy, Sapporo University 3-7-3-1 Toyohira-ku, Sapporo 062-8520, Japan.
e-mail: gq8h-inue@asahi-net.or.jp
It seems reasonable to agree with Jane McIntyre, who suggests that “Hume recognized questions about personal identity not addressed in Book 1, and that Book 2 makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume’s account of the self and its identity.”

And once we get a good understanding of this integrated mechanism of the human mind operating with both wheels, as it were, of the imagination and the passions, all we have to do is to accept his invitation and enjoy the efficiency of this two-wheeled car, driving through the fields of “Morals, Politics, and Criticism.” For, if we take his words in his Advertisement seriously, it seems quite likely that the Treatise was published first as a set of Book 1 and Book 2, as Passmore suggests, and that Book 3 was written as the demonstration of the consistency of his system through the application of the hypothesis established in the first two books.

This paper is a modest attempt to illustrate the intimate connection between Book 1 and Book 2: the latter, planned as a proof and reinforcement of the system Hume had established in Book 1, depends on the former. His basic strategy in the Treatise is to explain both systems of the mind by means of the easy transition of the imagination, which connects different perceptions with each other according to two kinds of principles or “properties of human nature” (T 2.1.4.2; SBN 283), viz. “the association both of impressions and ideas, and the mutual assistance they lend each other” (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 284).

In Book 1 Hume establishes the system of the understanding in terms of the first association, viz. the association of ideas, and in Book 2 he proceeds to illustrate the system of passions by involving not only the second association but also the concurrence of both kinds of association which he calls “a double relation of impressions and ideas.” His basic strategy is thus to apply the same method of reasoning to the illustration of both systems, assuming that “there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas” (T 2.1.4.3; SBN 283).

The intimate connection between the two systems of the understanding and the passions is illustrated through the demonstration of the “influence of the imagination upon the passions” (T 2.3.6.1; SBN 424), or in terms of the dependence of the latter on the former. It is owing to the dependence of the association of impressions on the association of ideas, as he explains, that the imagination and affections have a close union together, and that nothing, “which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter” (T 2.3.6.1; SBN 424). The passions of pride and humility arise, for instance, when “these two kinds of association . . . very much assist and forward each other, and . . . the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object” (T 2.1.4.4; SBN 284) bestowing on the mind “a double impulse” (ibid.).
“The true system” (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 286) of a production of a passion is thus established by the explicit analogy with the hypothesis by which he has “already explain’d the belief attending the judgments, which we form from causation” (T 2.1.6.11; SBN 289): “that in all judgments of this kind, there is always a present impression, and a related idea; and that the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy, and the relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the related idea” (T 2.1.6.11; SBN 290). The analogy between the two hypotheses is founded upon this common position not only in that “without the present impression, the attention is not fixed, nor the spirits excited” (T 2.1.6.11; SBN 290), but also in that “without the relation, this attention rests on its first object, and has no further consequence” (ibid.). Hume is concerned with the origin of passions precisely because a “reflective” impression is a proof of the analogy between the two systems of the imagination and the passions, which in turn “must be allow’d to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses” (T 2.1.6.11; SBN 290).

2. The Distinction Between the Indirect and the Direct Passions

Hume’s system of passions is founded upon three distinctions among perceptions, viz. original and secondary, calm and violent, and direct and indirect. The first is the basic distinction between “impressions of sensation” and “impressions of reflection.” The mind, in its perceptions, begins with the former, “which, without any introduction, make their appearance in the soul” (T 2.1.1.2; SBN 275) through the sense organs. The subject of Book 2 is the reflective impressions, which are supposed to arise either from the former original impressions, or from ideas of them.

The reflective impressions are divided into two kinds, the calm and the violent. Although “this division is far from being exact,” being dependent solely upon the violence with which perceptions appear in the mind, it is “this vulgar and specious division” (T 2.1.1.3; SBN 276) on which the theory of our identity with regard to the passions depends. In the last chapter reserved for the discussion of the direct passions, Hume tries to account for the will in terms of the violence of a (direct) passion, which is supposed to increase according to the increase in the vivacity of the related idea. In his examination of “those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent” (T 2.3.4.1; SBN 419), Hume’s object lies plainly in the demonstration of the “close union” (T 2.3.6.1; SBN 424) between imagination and affection.

The reflective impressions or passions are again divided into the direct and the indirect. Hume might seem to attach little importance to this distinction,
since he says nothing more to “justify or explain [it] any further” than this: by the direct passions we are to understand “such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure,” whereas by the indirect we are to understand “such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities” (T 2.1.1.4; SBN 276). In spite of the brevity of his explanation, however, it is indeed this division to which Hume’s system of passions owes its dynamism.

Having introduced these three distinctions, Hume immediately begins his new discussion with the subject of pride and humility. Annette Baier asks quite naturally why he begins with the indirect, and not with the direct passions, and suggests that “to understand Book Two of the Treatise, and its place in the Treatise as a whole, we need to see why he there begins with pride, and why its ‘indirectness’ is important.” And for selecting “this set of passions” (T 2.2.1.6; SBN 330) as his initial topic, Hume indeed has a systematic reason, it seems to me, rather than “philosophical priorities” concerning the “reflexivity, indirectness, [and] conflict” alleged by Baier to be “opening themes carried over from Book One” (Baier, 134).

Hume has a good reason to begin with the indirect passions rather than with the direct, mainly because the indirect passions are derived in a great measure from “the double relation of impressions and ideas,” whereas the direct passions may arise even when “they have but one relation, and sometimes without any” (T 2.3.4.2; SBN 420): “the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable” (T 2.3.9.8; SBN 439). In short, it is convenient for him to begin with those passions derived from the double association of impressions and ideas, in order to show how our affective experience depends on the same principles by which the system of ideas was explained in Book 1. His lengthy eight “experiments” (T 2.2.2.1; SBN 332) are nothing but the demonstration that “tis by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produc’d” (T 2.2.2.28; SBN 347), or that “an object without a relation, or with but one, never produces either of these passions” (ibid.).

Hume’s strategy is to establish first the basic structure of the passions by the analogy with the system of ideas in his discussion of the indirect passions, and then to proceed to examine the direct passions, for which he allows “proper limitations” to the general rule of the double association, claiming that “they readily mingle and unite, tho’ they have but one relation, and sometimes without any” (T 2.3.4.2; SBN 420). Our puzzle often alleged concerning Hume’s selection of his opening subject in Book 2 may be thus solved when we understand how important it is for him to show that the same
method of reasoning he has established for the system of ideas is applicable, as “the double association of impressions and ideas,” to the system of the passions, and to demonstrate how the easy transition of the imagination among related ideas gives rise to a new passion by causing the “transfusion” (T 2.1.5.11; SBN 290) of impressions. The subject of the indirect passions enables Hume to display an analogy or connection with Book 1, whereas the subject of the direct passions, as it involves the will or volition, connects Book 2 with the subject of morals, the central theme of Book 3.

Hume’s basic strategy for establishing the analogy between the system of the understanding and the system of the passions may also explain why pride and humility are more convenient for him than love and hatred as the initial subject of his discussion. The reason may be that the universal rule of the double association is more rigid for the former set of passions, whereas it is comparatively loose for the latter: though it is “universally true” that “there is always requir’d a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order to produce either love or hatred” (T 2.2.4.2; SBN 351), “the passion of love may be excited by only one relation of a different kind” (T 2.2.4.2; SBN 352).

However, we may still wonder, with Baier, why Hume selects, from among all the passions, four in particular: pride and humility, love, and hatred. Baier sees Hume’s selection of these two set of passions as a reflection of his concern with, respectively, “self-awareness” and “our awareness of fellow persons,” about which Book 1 was “virtually silent” (Baier, 133). But our puzzle regarding his exclusive concentration on these two sets of passions seems to be solved more naturally when we understand that the indirect passions are those specific passions which are “determined to have self [or another self] for their object, not only by a natural, but also by an original property” (T 2.1.3.2; SBN 280). Pride, humility, love, and hatred are examined first, as they are those “principal passions” (T 2.3.9.31; SBN 448) which “being once rais’d, immediately turn our attention to ourself [or another self], and regard that as their ultimate and final object” (T 2.1.2.4; SBN 278).

There seems to be good grounds for holding that Hume’s intention in the first half of Book 2 is to establish the basis or framework of the system of the passions as the natural outgrowth of the hypothesis established regarding the operation of the imagination in Book 1. This basis, called vaguely “the situation of the mind” (T 2.2.11.6; SBN 396), is constituted by two sets of indirect passions (pride and humility, love and hatred), which are related to each other in a twofold manner, by the similitude of the sensation of pleasure or pain as well as by the identity of the idea of self or of another self. The human mind is described here as a sort of closed system dependent on the
transition of the imagination between the “four affections, plac’d as it were, in a square” (T 2.2.2.3; SBN 333). It is this “situation of the mind” that is supposed to provide the basis for the discussion of “the situation of the object” (T 2.3.4.1, 2.3.8.13; SBN 419, 438), or “the circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent” (T 2.3.4.1, 2.3.8.13; SBN 419), in terms of which “the will and the direct passion” is to be illustrated.

3. The Double Association of Impressions and Ideas

As a Newtonian theory of human nature, the Treatise is founded upon the definite maxim that “there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas” (T 2.1.4.3; SBN 283). In Book 1 the human mind has been illustrated in terms of the easy transition of the imagination along related ideas: ideas are capable of preparing the smooth passage for the easy transition of the imagination by “forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture” (T 2.2.6.1; SBN 366), since “ideas never admit of a total union, but are endow’d with a kind of impenetrability by which they exclude each other” (ibid.). If Hume’s intention in the Treatise lies in maintaining the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and the passions, it is in terms of the association of impressions, as we may naturally expect, that the nature and origin of passions is to be illustrated in Book 2. There is, however, one circumstance peculiar to the passions that he has to take care of, in order to sustain the analogy between two systems of the mind: impressions are not capable of preparing a smooth passage for the easy transition of the imagination in the same way ideas are. This special circumstance is derived from the fact that impressions or passions “are susceptible of an entire union; and, like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole” (T 2.2.6.1; SBN 366).

As ideas are for Hume just like “the extension and solidity of matter” (T 2.2.6.1; SBN 366), he has good grounds to assert that “identity depends on the relations of ideas; and that these relations produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion” (T 1.4.6.21; SBN 262). It is difficult, however, to expect the same thing to happen with impressions, and to hold both that “identity depends on the relations” of impressions, and that “these relations produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion.” For we cannot expect impressions to prepare an easy passage as stepping-stones do: like “colours, tastes, smells, and other sensible qualities” (T 2.2.6.1; SBN 366), an impression can “transfuse” into another and change its nature. The association of impressions may occasion a transition of the imagination,
but the influence runs in general in the reverse direction: “the relation of ideas must forward the transition of impressions” (T 2.2.8.20; SBN 380). What Hume specifically marks with this observation is that each kind of association helps and strengthens the other. In order to see how “the mutual assistance they lend each other” (T 2.1.4.5; SBN 284) is required for the production of a passion, let us examine the circumstance in which the passion of pride—pride, for example in my beautiful house—is claimed to arise through this double association of impressions and ideas.

The basis of his discussion is founded on the fact that my experience of being proud of my house consists in these two kinds of perception, viz. the perception of my house and the perception of my passion, which may be called C(ause) and P(assion) respectively. Hume’s strategy is to explain how P is derived from C as the outcome of the following two processes: the correspondence between the two sets of constituents which compose C and P, and the “conversion” or “transfusion” of each constituent of the former set into the latter one. (It must be noted that what is converted into the perception of my passion is not the perception of my house itself, as we shall see in the following discussion.)

The first half of the procedure begins with the specification of the two sets of properties of which C and P are constituted. Concerning the former, Hume first distinguishes the agreeable sensation (CS) relevant to “the quality, which operates” (T 2.1.2.6; SBN 279) from the idea of myself (CO) relevant to “the subject, on which it is plac’d” (ibid.) on the one hand, and then, concerning the latter, he distinguishes its peculiar pleasurable emotion (PS) from the idea of the self (PO) on the other.

What makes the basis for the production of the passion is the “double relation of impressions and ideas” established between these two sets of constituents, which are supposed to compose my experience when I am proud of my beautiful house: “That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion” (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 286). The first process is said to happen in the following way:

(3-1) “these two attractions or associations of impression and ideas concur on the same object” (T 2.1.5.10; SBN 289);
(3-2) “they mutually assist each other” (T 2.1.5.10; SBN 289);
(3-3) “the transition of the affections and of the imagination is made with greater ease and facility” (T 2.1.5.10; SBN 289);
(3-4) “the mind receives a double impulse from the relations both of its impressions and ideas” (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 287);
“the new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence” (T 2.1.4.4; SBN 284).

When Hume claims that “the true system breaks in upon me with an irresistible evidence” (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 286), we can see that he is satisfied with his success in demonstrating the analogy between the two systems through the illustration of the origin of a passion by means of the easy transition of the mind. He indeed has good grounds for being proud, because the successful application of the same method of reasoning to the different aspects of the mind confirms the validity of the hypothesis established in Book 1. He has succeeded in showing that, although we can never observe any “real bond” (T 1.4.6.16; SBN 259) among the perceptions which constitute the mind, the connection among perceptions produces a new passion, which is real and never “fictitious” (T 1.4.6.15; SBN 259).

We may here be tempted to compare this “true system” with the one he has already established by the analogy with the identity of “plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature” (T 1.4.6.15; SBN 259). Personal identity regarding the imagination is, as we remember, “only a fictitious one” (T 1.4.6.15; SBN 259), because it proceeds “entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas” (T 1.4.6.16; SBN 260). But when it comes to our identity regarding the passions, we may now see that however “fictitious” the identity may be, being entirely dependent upon the connection among ideas, it can at least reflect something reliable or trustworthy, insofar as it is the source of our “present concern for our past or future pains or pleasure” (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). This seems to be the point of Hume’s assertion that “our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures” (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261).

4. The Conversion of an Idea Into an Impression

The second half of the procedure is discussed as the problem of how it is possible for CS to be “converted” into PS when the transition of the mind is “render’d so much more easy and natural” (T 2.1.4.4; SBN 284). We may wonder how Hume could maintain that “a double impulse” (T 2.1.4.4; SBN 284) entails “a new passion.” He prepares his answer in the following way:

“an impression and idea . . . transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation” (T 2.1.5.11; SBN 290);
The one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and the one impression into that which resembles and corresponds to it” (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 286–7).

In order to understand the circumstance in which the conversion of an idea into an impression serves as the key process for the production of a passion, we cannot be too insistent on this peculiar feature of the indirect passions: the indirect passions stand in such complex relations to other ideas and impressions as to make them very much like complex impressions in themselves. Passions or “impressions of reflexion” may certainly be “simple and uniform impressions” (T 2.1.2.1; SBN 277), as Hume assures us, but they are nevertheless virtually “complex” or rather ‘hybrid’ in their nature, as they consist in these two “original qualities” which are “correspondent to the suppos’d properties of their causes” (T 2.1.5.3; SBN 286): “the peculiar direction of the thought” (ibid.) to the self or to the other self, and “the peculiar [pleasurable or painful] emotions they excite in the soul . . . which constitute their very being and essence” (T 2.1.5.4; SBN 286). If so, all that is required for the illustration of the origin of my pride is, crudely speaking, to discover the source of the ingredients of the “hybrid” impression of pride from which these two kinds of components— the pleasurable sensation and the idea of myself—are derived.

Although nature has given us special “organs [which] are so dispos’d as to produce the passion; and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea” (T 2.1.5.6; SBN 287), passions must be assisted by “some foreign object” (T2.1.5.7; SBN 287) for the excitation of these organs. “The difficulty, then, is only to discover this cause, and find what it is that gives the first motion to pride, and sets those organs in action which are naturally fitted to produce that emotion” (T .1.5.8; SBN 288). And “anything that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride” (T 2.1.5.8; SBN 288), since this passion is “also agreeable, and has self for its object” (ibid.). In other words, any object “unavoidably” gives rise to pride if and only if it can supply the passion with the ingredients of the two elements that compose the “hybrid” impression of pride. To put it the other way round, there must be some source of the ingredients of PS and PO, in so far as “the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere” (T 2.1.1.2; SBN 275). This is the circumstance established between the two sets of components in which “the one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and the one impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it” (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 286–7).

Hume’s next business is to explain how CS+CO is “converted” into PS+PO. This problem is difficult, because, in his view, it cannot be a simple replacement of an ingredient derived from one perception into the component of
another perception. A barn, for instance, can be converted into a garage without any structural alteration, being turned to a different use. However, the ingredient derived from one perception cannot immediately be the component of another perception. For, although CS and PS are both claimed to be sensations, the former may be an idea of sensation (for example, my thought of a house merely planned for future construction), whereas the latter is definitely an impression which constitutes the “very being and essence” (T 2.1.5.4; SBN 286) of the passion.

The key to this problem seems to be given when Hume invites us to “compare” his “true system” to the hypothesis that he has established regarding belief formation: “in all judgments of this kind, there is always a present impression and a related idea; and that the present impressions gives a vivacity to the fancy, and the relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the related idea” (T 2.1.5.11; SBN 290). What is here asserted is a stronger analogy between the two hypotheses: the conversion depends not only on the easy transition of the imagination along related ideas but also on the enlivening of the ideas with the vivacity conveyed from “the present impression.” In other words, the mere unity produced by the connection of different perceptions is not sufficient for the production of a passion: the reinforcement or enlivening of the related ideas is required as well. That is to say, the easy transition of the imagination is necessary, not for “seducing” us to “feign the continu’d existence of the perceptions of our senses” (T 1.4.6.6; SBN 254), but for the transmission of the vivacity which is to be conveyed “so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition” (T 2.1.11.8; SBN 320).

We may here have two questions. How can the conversion of CS+CO into PS+PO happen when the former acquires the vivacity from the present impression? What is “the present impression” from which the vivacity is supposed to be conveyed?

5. Sympathy as the Secondary Cause of Passions

In seeking Hume’s answer of these questions, we need to recognize that sympathy is introduced into his discussion as a “secondary” cause of the indirect passions. Having established that “pride requires the assistance of some foreign object” (T 2.1.5.7; SBN 287), he proceeds to argue that “besides these original causes of pride and humility, there is a secondary one in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections” (T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316). The beauty of my house, as he assures us, has “little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others” (T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316).
What is asserted in this contention is the distinction between the impressions of reflection and those of sensation: the production of the former depends on the opinions and sentiments of others whereas the latter does not. In short, the indirect passions are, for Hume, virtually “reflected” or “converted” impressions of the sentiments of others. Hume’s concern lies therefore in explaining by the same method of reasoning how my pride is caused by the appreciation or consideration of others, for example, my friend’s respect. In other words, he tries to explain the causal connection between my pride and my friend’s respect in terms of another double relation between the two sets of the ingredients which compose my pride and my friend’s respect, viz. the pleasurable sensation and the idea of myself on the one hand, and the pleasurable sensation and the idea of my friend on the other. If we call the first set of ingredient PS and PO, and the second RS and RO respectively, Hume’s problem is to show how PS is derived from RS.

In order to illustrate how my pride (PS+PO) is derived from my friend’s respect (RS+RO), Hume has to solve this difficulty: it cannot be a mere replacement of the former’s ingredients by the latter’s, since RS is an idea whereas PS an impression. Finding no difficulty, however, Hume assumes simply that this problem can be explained by the analogy with belief-formation. He asserts that “the different degrees of their force and vivacity are . . . the only particulars that distinguish them [i.e., ideas and impressions]: And as this difference may be remov’d, in some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, ’tis no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion, may by this means so enliv’en’d as to become the very sentiment or passion” (T 2.1.11.7; SBN 319). Obviously, in this assertion, the conversion is claimed to be one of those “most remarkable” cases in which “the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression” (T 2.1.11.7; SBN 319). Hume even assimilates the conversion to the cases in which “we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it” (T 2.1.11.7; SBN 319).

There seems no doubt that the conversion of an idea into an impression is first conceived by Hume as a process parallel to belief-formation. For, the conversion is asserted to be entirely dependent on the degree of force and vivacity with which the idea is enlivened: “since these relations [i.e., resemblance, contiguity, causation] can entirely convert an idea into an impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition, we may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone, may serve to strengthen and enliven an idea” (T 2.1.11.8; SBN 320). The conversion happens, he seems to assume, only if the vivacity is conveyed from the present impression to the idea “so perfectly as
to lose nothing of it in the transition.” And more importantly, the conjunction of all the three relations is claimed to be required mainly for this “perfect” transmission of the vivacity, and consequently to make us conceive the related idea “in the strongest and most lively manner” (T 2.1.11.6; SBN 318). This is the way, according to him, in which we “feel the sympathy in its full perfection” (T 2.1.11.8; SBN 320).

It may be true that “the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression” (T 2.1.11.7; SBN 319), but, we may wonder, does Hume go further than is justified by this original position, when he proceeds to say that a “lively idea changes by degree into a real impression” (T 2.2.4.7; SBN 354)? Of this alleged extension of his own position, Hume may clear himself by calling our attention to the restriction he carefully includes whenever he mentions the conversion of an idea into an impression: “’tis there [in the opinions and affections] principally that a lively idea is converted into an impression” (T 2.1.11.8; SBN 319). He is not claiming that the lively idea of any objects always changes into impression: it is “principally” “the ideas of the affections of others [that] are converted into the very impressions they represent” (T 2.1.11.8; SBN 319).

But if it is so, we may still wonder what makes “an idea of a sentiment or passion” so special and distinct from any other ideas as to make such a conversion possible? Hume answers: what is “most remarkable in the opinions and affections” (T 2.3.11.7; SBN 319) is that the vivacity of “the impression or consciousness of our person” (T 2.1.11.6; SBN 318) is involved owing to “a great resemblance among all human creatures” (T 2.1.11.5; SBN 318). In other words, “an idea of a sentiment or passion” is peculiar just because it becomes enlivened by “the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person” (T 2.1.11.5; SBN 318): “the impression or consciousness of our own person [conveyed] to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others . . . makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner” (T 2.1.11.6; SBN 318). The conversion of an idea into an impression now turns out to be dependent, precisely speaking, not on the forcefulness nor liveliness of the vivacity in general, but on this content or peculiarity of the impression from which the vivacity is conveyed: “’Tis evident, that an idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that ’tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it” (T 2.1.11.4; SBN 317).

In that case, Hume has some reason for holding that “whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves, must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception, according to the foregoing principles” (T 2.1.11.4; SBN 317, emphasis
mine). But he is still misleading in his explanation that “this lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression; these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity” (T 2.2.4.7; SBN 354), which makes it sound as if the conversion were merely the matter of the degree of vivacity. Though misleading, Hume still has a sufficient reason for being proud of his success in establishing sympathy as “the strong confirmation . . . to the foregoing system concerning the understanding, and consequently to the present one concerning the passions” (T 2.1.11.8; SBN 319), because that “in sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression” (T 2.1.11.8; SBN 320) is ipso facto a proof of his foregoing principle that “the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression” (T 2.1.11.7; SBN 319). This is the very situation he specifically marks by claiming that “sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding; and even contains something more surprising and extraordinary” (T 2.1.11.8; SBN 320).

But, if the conversion depends on the resemblance between ourselves and others, how can we recognise a resemblance as such that is not the relation between objects before our eyes, but the relation between the object before our eyes and ourselves?

The latter relation has such a strong influence over the mind, according to Hume, only when there is a resemblance between what perceives and what is perceived, which enters into the situation in either of two ways. “This not only happens,” he writes, “where they [i.e., we] remark this resemblance betwixt themselves [i.e, ourselves] and others, but also by the natural course of the disposition, and by a certain sympathy which always arises betwixt similar characters” (T 2.2.4.6; SBN 354). Where we remark this resemblance, “it operates after the manner of a relation, by producing a connection of ideas” (T 2.2.4.6; SBN 354), by which “the imagination makes the transition, and conveys to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person” (T 2.1.11.5; SBN 318). But where we do not remark it, “it operates by some other [but similar] principle” (T 2.2.4.6; SBN 354), viz. by “our natural temper [that] gives us a propensity to the same impression, which we observes in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion” (T 2.2.4.7; SBN 354). That is to say, any “remarking” or recognition of the relation is not always required for the resemblance to enter into the latter circumstance, as it principally depends on our “natural temper” or “by a certain sympathy which always arises betwixt similar characters” (T 2.2.4.6; SBN 354). In short, as Hume puts it, “resemblance converts the idea into an impression, not only by means of the relation, and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea; but also by presenting such materials as to take fire from
the least spark” (T 2.2.4.7; SBN 354). But what sort of process is actually asserted, we may still wonder, when he claims that the idea, thus enlivened, “changes by degrees into a real impression” (T 2.2.4.7; SBN 354) by “taking fire from the least spark”?

This notoriously metaphorical explanation of Hume’s may be restated as follows, using our example in which my friend’s respect for my beautiful house gives rise to my pride. My friend’s respect (RS+RO) is converted into my pride (PS+PO) when RS (the pleasurable sensation) breaks off from RO (the idea of my friend) to be combined with PO (the idea of myself) owing to the resemblance of RO and PO, and is enlivened with the vivacity of the new partner, PO, which is, though an idea, so lively a conception as to properly be called an “impression” (T 2.1.11.4; SBN 317). We may notice here that the conversion of RS into PS depends on its mating with the new partner, the idea of myself, and on its consequent enlivening with the new partner’s vivacity: the enlivening presupposes the new partner, and not the other way round.

To summarize, Hume’s strategy for explaining the origin of my pride (PS+PO) consists of two main processes: first to specify both the original and secondary causes as the two kinds of source from which PS is derived, and then to hold that the passion is virtually the “reflection” of the secondary cause, viz. the opinion or sentiment of others such as my friend’s respect (RS+RO), involved by the perception of the original cause, viz. a foreign object such as my beautiful house (CS+CO). Hume’s main concern lies therefore in showing how the double conversion, of CS into PS, and RS into PS, is possible. Now that he has shown how and why the latter conversion happens when RS is combined with PO, nothing seems more natural than to expect that the same thing will happen with the former at the appearance of PO, and that CS is converted into the component of the “hybrid” impression, when combined with PO by the resemblance of CS=RS, both of which are agreeable sensations.10

6. Conclusion

It is often pointed out regarding Hume’s position about the idea of the self that he is inconsistent in Book 1 and in Book 2: in the former he explicitly denies the idea of the self whereas in the latter he asserts the idea of ourselves even as an impression which is “always intimately present to us” (T 2.2.4.7; SBN 317). It is true that in Book 1 he rejects the view that we are every moment intimately conscious of a simple self that remains the same through time, on the ground that introspection reveals no impression from which the idea of self is derived. But it is easy to see that there is no inconsis-
tency in his position concerning the present issue expressed in the two books. What Book 1 denies is “the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being” (Appendix 10; SBN 633), or that the idea of the self is derived from an impression of anything distinct from the ordinary impressions and ideas in the mind—like an impression of the self or ego. And what he suggests instead is the view that it can be derived from a sequence of ordinary impressions and ideas, or from the part of the sequence that consists of present impressions, and is then extended to past and future.

We have seen how Hume struggles to explain the origin of the indirect passions by the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and the passions. It is this basic strategy of holding the analogy that made him introduce such a notoriously obscure process as the “conversion” of an idea into an impression. In order to understand Hume’s intention in his discussion of the indirect passions, it seems important to recognize that sympathy is suggested as one of the typical instances in which a passion arises from the double association of impressions and ideas, rather than to take it as a mere cause which is necessary for the production of pride or humility, or any of the indirect passions. Throughout his discussion of the indirect passions, Hume is quite proud of his success in demonstrating the parallelism between the two systems of the mind, claiming it as “no despicable proof of both hypotheses” (T 2.1.5.11; SBN 290) he has established concerning the understanding and passions. A separate discussion is needed in order to see if he succeeds in pursuing this basic strategy for the illustration of the nature and origins of the direct passions.

NOTES

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2 See John Passmore, Hume’s Intentions (London: Duckworth), 106.
3 Jane McIntyre, “Personal Identity and the Passions,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* (1989): 556-7. The difference between her point and mine, which are quite close, may lie principally in the fact that the former makes a particular point about the relation between Book 1 and Book 2, whereas the latter gives a more general account of the same relation.

4 Hume announces in his Advertisement: “If I have the good fortune to meet with success [in the establishment of the basic system], I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will complete this Treatise of Human Nature” (T 2; SBN xii). And as far as we judge from this announcement, it seems likely that originally Hume planned to show the efficacy or consistency of his hypothesis by accounting for those three aspects of our social life by means of this established system. But for some reason, he quitted his investigation only with the examination of the first subject.

5 Passmore has a good ground for holding, it seems to me, that “Books I and II of the *Treatise* had to be published as a single work” (*Hume’s intentions*, 106) as we judge from their systematic unity. Passmore sees deeper unity than Árðal when he suggests regarding Books 1 and 2 that “in both cases association is the source of order and complexity” (Passmore, 2). Árðal marks, on the other hand, “the peculiar unity” between Books 2 and 3, on the grounds of the sameness of the subjects discussed in the two books, holding that “both deal with the active or ‘passionate’ side of human nature rather than the understanding” (Páll S. Árðal, *Passion and Value* [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966], 4).


7 “Love may shew itself in the shape of tenderness, friendship, intimacy, esteem, good-will, and in many other appearances; which at the bottom are the same affections, and arise from the same causes, tho’ with a small variation, which it is not necessary to give any particular account of. ’Tis for this reason I have all along confin’d myself to the principal passion” (T 2.3.9.31; SBN 448). Also in his discussion of the direct passions, he notes: “I have confin’d myself to the examination of hope and fear in their most simple and natural situation, without considering all the variations they may receive from the mixture of different views and reflections. Terror, consternation, astonishment, anxiety, and other passions of that kind, are nothing but different species and degrees of fear. ’Tis easy to imagine how a different situations of the object, or a different turn of thought, may change even the sensation of a passion; and this may in general account for all the particular sub-divisions of the other affections, as well as of fear” (T 2.3.9.31; SBN 447-8).

8 Hume attaches a great importance to this “situation of the mind,” regarding it as a proof that we are “sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by a kind of presentation; which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves” (T 2.2.1.9; SBN 332): “if love and esteem were not produc’d by the same qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of proceeding wou’d be very absurd, nor cou’d men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person, with those themselves have entertain’d” (ibid.). Cf. Haruko Inoue, “Hume’s

9 Needless to say, this “sympathy” is distinct from the “sympathy” mentioned in his main discussion: the former is meant to be a sort of attraction “which always arises betwixt similar characters” (T 2.2.4.6; SBN 354) whereas the latter is intended to imply the principle by which we “receive by communication their [i.e., others people’s] inclinations and sentiments” (T 2.1.11.2; SBN 316). The former notion of “sympathy” appears twice in Book 1, viz. (T 1.4.3.11; SBN 224) and (T 1.4.6.12; SBN 257).

10 It is important to see that CS is connected with RS by the relation of resemblance, just because, as I suggested above, Hume’s discussion of the indirect passions depends on what he calls “the situation of the mind” (T 2.2.11.6; SBN 396), or rather, the symmetrical relation between the two sets of passions, pride/humility and love/hatred, “plac’d, as it were, in a square” (T 2.2.2.3; SBN 333). Hume assumes that the case in which my beautiful house causes my friend’s envy or resentment instead of his respect or esteem may be explained by the same reasoning, and prepares a separate discussion which involves the principle of “comparison” (T 2.2.10.8; SBN 392–4).