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The Bibliothèque raisonnée Review of Volume 3 of the Treatise: Authorship, Text, and Translation

DAVID FATE NORTON AND DARIO PERINETTI

Abstract: The review of volume 3 of Hume’s Treatise, a review that appeared in the Bibliothèque raisonnée in the spring of 1741, was the first published response to Hume’s ethical theory. This review is also of interest because of questions that have arisen about its authorship and that of the earlier review of volume 1 of the Treatise in the same journal. In Part 1 of this paper we attribute to Pierre Des Maizeaux the notice of vols. 1 and 2 of the Treatise published in the spring 1739 issue of the Bibliothèque raisonnée. We then focus on the question of the authorship of the review of vol. 3. In Part 2 of our paper we provide a transcription of the French text of this review. Part 3 is a new English translation of the review. Part 4 provides comparisons between passages from the text of the Treatise, the French translations of these passages in the Bibliothèque raisonnée review, and our back-translations of these same passages. We also provide brief comparisons between our translation of passages from this review and an earlier translation of these passages.

Volumes 1 and 2 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature,1 first published in January 1739, were soon after publication the subject of five notices and four reviews.2 Volume 3, published at the end of October 1740, received no notices and was reviewed only in the Bibliothèque raisonnée.3 This anonymous review of vol. 3 is of interest not only for

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what it says about Hume’s views as set out in the third book of the Treatise (this review is the first published, critical response to Hume’s ethical theory), but also because of questions that have arisen about the authorship of this and an earlier review of vol. 1 of the Treatise published in the same journal. In Part I of this paper we begin by reviewing the grounds for attributing to Pierre Des Maizeaux the notice of vols. 1 and 2 of the Treatise published by the Bibliothèque raisonnée in its April–June, 1739 issue. We then focus principally on the question of the authorship of the review of vol. 3 of the Treatise published by the Bibliothèque raisonnée in its April–June, 1741 issue, but we also consider in passing the grounds that have been offered for attributing to Francis Hutcheson the critical components of the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of vol. 1 of the Treatise. In Part II of the paper we present a transcription of the French text, never before reprinted, of this review. Part III is a new English translation of this text. In an effort to show the differences between the sense of the Treatise presented by translated quotations of it and Hume’s original texts, Part IV offers some three-column comparisons of three relatively lengthy French “quotations” of Treatise 3 found in the review, our back-translations of these texts, and the versions of these texts found in the Treatise. It then offers in a similar format, comparisons of the present and earlier translations of passages of the review of vol. 3.

I. The Bibliothèque raisonnée and the Treatise

The Bibliothèque raisonnée was an important French-language periodical published in Amsterdam from 1728–1753. From 1728–1741 it was published by the firm of Wetstein and Smith—of Jacques Wetstein and William Smith—and directed by Smith. This partnership ended in 1741, and thereafter until its demise in 1753 Wetstein alone was director and publisher of the journal. During the thirteen years that it was directed by Smith the Bibliothèque raisonnée reviewed approximately 465 books. Of these, only about twenty, plus the two volumes of the Treatise, may be classified as (sometimes using the term loosely) philosophy. Given the subject matter of the Treatise, the amount of space the Bibliothèque raisonnée devoted to it was unusual.

A. The Bibliothèque raisonnée notice of volumes 1 and 2 of the Treatise. A substantial portion of each issue of the Bibliothèque raisonnée was devoted to literary news, and news of this kind from London typically came first. As we have noted, the first two volumes of the Treatise were published in the winter of 1739. In the spring 1739 issue of the Bibliothèque raisonnée the lead item in the news from London was this brief notice:

A gentleman, a Mr. Hume, has published A Treatise of human Nature: being an Attempt, &c. That is, Traité de la Nature humaine; où l’on essaye d’introduire la Méthode expérimentale de raisonner dans les sujets de Morale. In 8vo. 2 vol. This work is divided into two volumes, of which the first, concerning the
Understanding, contains four Parts each divided into several Sections. The first Part concerns ideas, their origin, composition, abstraction, connection, &c.; the second, the ideas of space and time; the third, knowledge and probability; and the fourth, scepticism and the other systems of philosophy. The second volume, concerning the passions, contains three Parts. The first Part is concerned with pride and humility; the second with love and hatred; and the third with the will and the direct passions. Those who desire something new will find what they want here. The author argues on his own terms, he goes thoroughly into things, and he follows new ways of thinking. He is very original.\textsuperscript{6}

This, the first published response to the \textit{Treatise}, was the work of Pierre Des Maizeaux. We can confidently make this attribution for three reasons. (1) From the inception of the \textit{Bibliothèque raisonnée} in 1728 through 1744, Des Maizeaux regularly provided the journal with its literary news from London, so that it can be said that most of the pages of the “Nouvelles littéraires d’Angleterre” were written by him.\textsuperscript{7} (2) On 27 September 1740, William Smith\textsuperscript{8} sent to Des Maizeaux an itemized list of the contributions to vols. 22–4 of the journal for which the latter was to be paid. The items listed include the column containing the notice of the \textit{Treatise}.\textsuperscript{9} (3) We know that Hume revealed his identity as author of the \textit{Treatise} to Des Maizeaux. That he did so accounts for the fact that the author of this notice, alone among those who wrote notices or reviews of the \textit{Treatise}, could identify the author of the work.\textsuperscript{10}

Pierre Des Maizeaux (1673–1745) was born in Auvergne, France, the son of a Calvinist pastor. He and his family moved to Avenches, Switzerland in 1685, and Pierre went on to study at Basel (1688?), at the Lyceum in Berne (1690), and finally at the Academy in Geneva (1690). Having decided not to become a pastor (a decision for which his father never forgave him), and having done distinguished work for teachers with connections to Pierre Bayle, Des Maizeaux went to Holland in 1699. He there met not only Bayle, but also Jean Le Clerc and Benjamin Furly. The latter two had close connections with John Locke, and all three with Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury. By the summer of 1699 Des Maizeaux was in England with letters of recommendation to both Locke and Shaftesbury. He was thereafter supported financially by, among others, Shaftesbury, Joseph Addison, and Anthony Collins. From 1710, until Collins’s death in 1729, Des Maizeaux spent long periods with Collins and is thought to have had a hand in the development of the latter’s defense of free-thinking (\textit{A Discourse of Free-thinking}, 1713). Thereafter Des Maizeaux was instrumental in the publication of the collected works of Bayle (\textit{Oeuvres diverses}, 4 vols., 1727–1731) and of a new translation of Bayle’s supremely important \textit{Historical and Critical Dictionary} (London, 1734-1738), to which Des Maizeaux prefixed a lengthy biography of Bayle.\textsuperscript{11} To sum up: Des Maizeaux spent his early years among those who dissented from the established religion of France,
and then dissented from them. Much of his adult life was spent in close association with English dissenters and free-thinkers. Bearing these associations in mind, we may conclude that Des Maizeaux’s comment about vols. 1 and 2 of the *Treatise*—“Those who desire something new will find what they want here. The author argues on his own terms, he goes thoroughly into things, and he follows new ways of thinking. He is very original.”—is not so bland as it may now seem.

**B. The Bibliothèque raisonnée review of volume 3 of the *Treatise*.** The Bibliothèque raisonnée gave more substantial attention to the *Treatise* on two other occasions. In the spring of 1740 it published a 6000-word review of vol. 1;¹² one year later it published a 4200-word review of vol. 3. There is no direct evidence of the authorship of these reviews. During the period in which it was under the direction of William Smith (1728–1741), the reviews in the Bibliothèque raisonnée were, with rare exception, written by three regular contributors: Des Maizeaux, Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744), and Armand Boisbeleau de La Chapelle (1676–1746).¹³ Each of these three must be considered a possible author of the *Treatise* reviews. It has also been said that these reviews were written by Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746). We examine this hypothesis.

*Pierre Des Maizeaux.* We must start with a clarification. Whoever it was that wrote the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of vol. 1, he had at his disposal, and made ample use of, a copy of Hume’s *Abstract* of the *Treatise*, for about two-thirds of the review is constituted of a (sometimes loose) translation of that pamphlet. In a real sense, then, Hume himself is the source of a substantial part of the review. This fact was first pointed out by John Yolton, who then went on to suggest that Des Maizeaux could easily have had a copy of the *Abstract* and used that as the basis of the review of Volume 1.¹⁴ It happens, however, that the letter establishing that Des Maizeaux wrote the brief notice quoted above also indicates that he did not write the review published in the following spring, for William Smith does not include that review in the list of contributions for which Des Maizeaux is to be paid. This is not surprising, for Des Maizeaux’s contributions to the Bibliothèque raisonnée were nearly always limited to his accounts of the literary news in London. He appears to have written no more than a half-dozen reviews and on occasion may have passed on to others reviews assigned to him. In addition, critical passages of the sort found in the review of *Treatise* 1 are uncharacteristic of Des Maizeaux’s work. Neither in the reviews that can be attributed to him, nor in his longer works on Bayle, Saint-Evremond, and others, did Des Maizeaux go beyond reportage to criticism or analysis.¹⁵ These same facts indicate that it is equally unlikely that Des Maizeaux wrote the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of vol. 3.

*Jean Barbeyrac.* According to William Smith, Jean Barbeyrac wrote two-thirds of the reviews in the Bibliothèque raisonnée.¹⁶ But despite this substantial level of contribution, it is unlikely that Barbeyrac is the author of either of the Bibliothèque raisonnée reviews of the *Treatise*. We reach this conclusion for a variety of reasons.
(1) These reviews are not among the 124 Bibliothèque raisonnée reviews that scholars have attributed to Barbeyrac.¹⁷

(2) The reviews are not like the reviews that Barbeyrac is thought to have written. The typical Barbeyrac review is an extract, a careful summary, with copious scholarly notes (especially to classical sources), without critical commentary.¹⁸ As we have said, the Bibliothèque raisonnée reviews of the Treatise include critical passages. The number of notes in these reviews is of modest proportions, and only a single note, found in the review of vol. 1, refers to a classical source (Sextus Empiricus on causation).¹⁹

(3) Barbeyrac, when faced with an anonymous work, invariably makes a point of providing his readers with the identity, or likely identity, of the author of that work.²⁰ Given that Des Maizeaux had identified the author of the Treatise in an earlier issue of the Bibliothèque raisonnée, we believe Barbeyrac would have repeated this information had he reviewed the Treatise.

(4) Barbeyrac said that he was motivated to write reviews because he wanted the books for his library, and that he possessed all but two of the works he had reviewed.²¹ His extensive library was catalogued in the year of his death and auctioned the following year. Neither the Treatise nor the Abstract are listed in that catalogue.²²

On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that it is unlikely that Barbeyrac reviewed the Treatise, but no direct evidence rules out this possibility.

Francis Hutcheson. The attribution of the Bibliothèque raisonnée reviews to Hutcheson, a hypothesis that originated with James Moore, begins with Hume’s one extant comment on the Abstract, a comment made in a letter to Hutcheson:²³

My Bookseller has sent to Mr Smith a Copy of my Book, which I hope he has receiv’d, as well as your Letter. I have not heard yet what he has done with the Abstract. Perhaps you have. I have got it printed in London; but not in the Works of the Learned; there having been an Article with regard to my Book, somewhat abusive, printed in that Work, before I sent up the Abstract.²⁴

Moore’s conclusion that the critical components of the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of vol. 1 of the Treatise, and the entire review of vol. 3, were the work of Hutcheson, rests on an extended set of considerations and claims:

(M1) That the “Mr Smith” mentioned by Hume in this brief remark was an old friend of Hutcheson, namely, William Smith of Smith and Wetsstein, Amsterdam, and that it was Hutcheson, not Hume, Charles Corbet, or John Noon, who sent the Abstract to Smith.²⁵ Moore notes that Hutcheson had several years earlier sent Smith a letter praising a work by Robert Simson, Professor of Mathematics at the University of Glasgow, and that Smith then published a translation of this letter from, as he put it, “Francis Hutcheson, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow . . .
his old and intimate friend.” As Moore points out, this letter was written by Simson himself, and thus, he argues, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Hutcheson acted analogously when Hume gave him a manuscript of the Abstract.26

(M2) That at the same time Hutcheson sent Smith a manuscript of the Abstract he also sent to him the critical comments that constitute up to one-third of the review of vol. 1. Moore reaches this conclusion by reviewing Hutcheson’s early writings on logic and metaphysics,27 and comparing them with the critical comments found in the review of vol. 1. These comments are characterized as “in every case consistent with what is known of Hutcheson’s logic and metaphysics as set out in his . . . Latin compends and in his better known English writings and correspondence.”28 Although he elsewhere grants that it is “possible that these comments on the Abstract were provided for Smith, not by Hutcheson but by one of the regular contributors” to the Bibliothèque raisonnée, Barbeyrac, Des Maizeaux, or La Chapelle, Moore goes on to say that this account of the matter is “highly improbable” for two reasons. “First, there is no evidence, no mention of the two reviews in any of the surviving correspondence” or other remains of these three individuals. Second, in Moore’s view “Hume appears to have concluded that the comments were the work of Hutcheson,” for a few months later, in the Appendix to vol. 3 of the Treatise, he “took up these remarks . . . and responded to them, in the same order or sequence in which they appeared in the review” and in language that is, as Moore describes it, “evocative of [his] correspondence with Hutcheson.” That is to say, Moore points out, Hume begins the Appendix by saying that he is glad to have “an opportunity of confessing my errors” (App. 1; SBN 623), and then goes on to clarify his ideas of belief and power; to reflect on his discussion of the self or personal identity; to consider his account of abstract ideas; to reiterate his observation that many philosophers decline to offer a definition of equality; and to offer a general defence of skepticism.29

(M3) That when Wm. Smith “undertook to review book 3 of the Treatise . . . he again consulted Hutcheson.” It would have been odd, we are told, if he had not done so given Hutcheson’s stature as a moral philosopher. In addition, Moore claims: “None of the reviewer’s concerns are intelligible if one supposes that the review was written by Barbeyrac or La Chapelle, the regular contributors to the journal: their moral philosophies, like Smith’s were natural law theories, modelled on Pufendorf, Locke, and Cumberland. The critical perspective of the reviewer, on the other hand, was particularly and peculiarly Hutcheson’s.”30

(M4) “There is enough correspondence in Dutch and French archives . . . to rule out the usual contributors as author of these reviews.”31

We are in agreement with several features of this account. The “Mr Smith” mentioned in Hume’s letter to Hutcheson is almost certainly William Smith, the editor of the Bibliothèque raisonnée. That Hutcheson sent to Smith a copy of Robert Simson’s abstract of his book on conic sections is a matter of record. Hume and Hutcheson obviously did discuss publication venues for the Abstract, and Hutcheson may well
have suggested sending the work to Smith, and may in fact have sent a manuscript of it to him. There is no known external evidence—manuscripts or letters—linking the two reviews to the regular contributors to the *Bibliotheque raisonnee*, and, as we have shown, there are good grounds for concluding that the two reviews were not the work of Des Maizeaux or Barbeyrac. There is also some evidence that the two reviews had the same author, and it is clear that the Appendix to vol. 3 takes up (among other things) the issues of belief, personal identity, abstract ideas, equality, and skepticism. Finally, it is generally agreed that there are between Hume and Hutcheson deep philosophical differences, especially about moral theory, differences that in 1744–1745 appear to have led Hutcheson to oppose Hume’s candidacy for the position of Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.

Seen as it were from a distance, these facts may allow one to suppose that the *Bibliotheque raisonnee* reviews of the *Treatise* are the work of Hutcheson, but a closer look leads to a different conclusion. This closer look shows it unlikely that Hutcheson provided the critical components of the review of vol. 1 of the *Treatise*, and highly improbable that he was the author of the review of vol. 3.

In opposition to Moore’s theses, M1–M4, we suggest:

(N-P1) That while Hutcheson may have sent a manuscript of the *Abstract* to Smith, a closer reading of Hume’s admittedly meagre remark about this matter leads us to suggest that it was Hume himself who sent a copy of the *Abstract* to Smith. In his brief remark Hume first hopes two things: that “Mr Smith” has received the copy of the *Treatise* sent by his publisher, John Noon, and that he has received a letter sent by Hutcheson. He then says: “I have not heard yet what he has done with the Abstract. Perhaps you have.” This suggests that Hume himself, because he sent the *Abstract* to Smith, had reason to hear from Smith about it. Because he had not so heard, he wonders if Hutcheson has. In short, Hume seems to be saying: “Noon sent the *Treatise*; you (Hutcheson) sent a letter; I sent the *Abstract*; I haven’t heard if any of these missives has reached its objective; have you?”

(N-P2) That while there is no doubt that Hutcheson sent Smith an authorial abstract of Robert Simson’s book, there is a significant disanalogy between that action and what Moore supposes Hutcheson to have done with Hume’s *Abstract*, a disanalogy that is at the heart of our disagreement with Moore. In this second case Hutcheson is supposed to have sent not merely an authorial abstract, as he did for Simson, but also to have sent a set of objections to the work abstracted.

This disanalogy is of greater importance than it may seem at first glance. Moore is asking us to suppose that on two occasions Hutcheson pretended to be giving assistance to Hume, a young philosopher who had sought that help, but then blind-sided him with covert criticisms sent to Smith. In the first instance the scenario would have been essentially this: “Yes, David Hume, I’ll help you publicize your work. You make a copy of your abstract for my old friend William Smith, and send it to him. In the meantime I’ll write to him and encourage him...
to publish the abstract in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*. I did this for my colleague Robert Simson, and Smith published what Simson wrote and I sent him.” But on this occasion, instead of sending Smith a positive letter along with the text of the *Abstract*, Hutcheson is supposed to have sent a critical letter—to have listed the faults of the book he is recommending for review—and thereby provided the critical content of the review of vol. 1.³⁴

The second scenario would have gone like this: Hutcheson offered to recommend vol. 3 of the *Treatise* to his own publisher, Thomas Longman. Hume asked for this letter, and Hutcheson wrote it, this being a safe inference to draw from the fact that Longman did publish the third volume of the *Treatise*.³⁵ But then, having given Hume this substantial assistance, Hutcheson is again supposed to have blind-sided his younger colleague by covertly criticizing, in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* review of this volume, the same book that he had recommended to Longman.

Both these scenarios attribute to Hutcheson a deviousness or duplicity inconsistent with his known moral character. William Leechman, Hutcheson’s colleague at Glasgow, said of him that he had “the most amiable dispositions and most useful virtues: the purity of his manners was unspotted from his youth . . . His integrity was strict and inviolable: he abhorred the least appearance of deceit either in word or actions . . . his nature was frank, and open, and warmly disposed, to speak what he took to be true.”³⁶

(N-P3) As we show below, at least one regular contributor to the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, Armand de La Chapelle, was both capable of, and experienced at, reviews in several ways like that of vol. 3 of the *Treatise*. That is, contrary to Moore’s claim (M3), the critical portions of the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* review of the *Treatise* are well within La Chapelle’s interests and capabilities.

(N-P4) Neither we nor Lagarrigue have been able to find correspondence in Dutch and French archives sufficient “to rule out the usual contributors as author of these reviews.” Indeed, Lagarrigue reports that he has examined, in archives throughout Europe, more than 7000 unpublished letters of individuals associated with the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, and has found only one letter, that cited in note 9, that bears on the authorship of this review or the review of vol. 1.³⁷

(N-P5) Internal evidence also shows it highly improbable that this review was by Hutcheson. The author of the review reveals early on that he is suspicious of philosophical attempts to provide a foundation for morality. The “metaphysician who undertakes to demonstrate the principles of natural right by making them abstract wastes his time and effort.” It is not just that such abstract approaches, because they are understood by so few, can be of limited benefit. It is, more importantly, that these works, because they are obscure and make virtue seem disagreeable, do more harm than good.³⁸ Moreover, as the review progresses this general suspicion of philosophical morals is replaced by a more narrowly focused dissatisfaction with the moral sense theory found famously in the work of Hutcheson, and now in this
new work. Noting that *Treatise 3.1.1 (Moral distinctions not deriv’d from reason)* raises the issue of the foundation or source of moral distinctions, and that the views of both Clarke and Wollaston are rejected as unsound, the reviewer complains that the author of the *Treatise* “approves none of what is most approved on this subject.”

Then, following a substantial sketch of Hume’s arguments showing that moral distinctions cannot derive from reason, the reviewer turns to the positive theory of the *Treatise*. Those who wonder how this skilful metaphysician explains virtue and vice should know that he supposes that “the mind, as much as the body, has a taste,” and that it is this taste or sense that enables it to distinguish right from wrong in the same way that we can “at first glance distinguish that which is beautiful from that which is ugly. It is a matter of sentiment: reasoning has no place in it, for virtue or that which “is right gives pleasure and is approved; what is wrong produces pain and is blamed.”

The reader is next provided with a more complete summary of Hume’s theory, and then a lengthy paragraph criticizing him for offering nothing more than an unimproved version of the useless, demonstrably defective moral sense theory of Hutcheson:

That is the whole system of our author. When Mr Hutcheson proposed it in his *Recherches sur l’origine des Idées que nous avons de la Vertu & du Bien moral*, able people found in it three great flaws. Firstly, they did not approve of this supposition of a new mental faculty, intended only to enable our mind to discern right from wrong. They saw this as absolutely useless, and claimed that the mind, given its indisputable capacity to reflect and sense, is adequately furnished with all that is necessary for it to distinguish good from evil. Secondly, they observed that in this system the perception of objects is confounded with the sentiments that result from it. On this, Mr. Burnet raised objections that up until now have remained unanswered. Thirdly, and last, they did not conceal that this mental taste, or this moral sentiment, whatever one wishes to call it, is clearly linked to fanaticism, and can at least very easily open the door to the excesses of enthusiasm. Dr. Berkeley sharply exposed this difficulty in his *Alciphron*, and made it clear that nothing would be more arbitrary than the ideas of right and wrong if these depended on such an inner taste. I do not understand how it is that our author did not find it appropriate to examine the objections of these scholars. They would have opened a beautiful field for his speculations, and for his profound metaphysics. Perhaps it is modesty, perhaps even prudence. How can one add anything to the ingenious efforts that Mr. Hutcheson has opposed to Mr. Burnet’s reflections on this topic?

These pointed criticisms of Hutcheson’s moral theory tell heavily against the hypothesis that Hutcheson is the author of this review. Hume is severely
criticized for offering an overcomplicated theory, the theory of a moral sense, when no theory is needed, and when, furthermore, any competent philosopher would already know that this theory, a theory explicitly attributed to Hutcheson, has been shown to be: (i) useless and redundant; (ii) philosophically confused (it confounds the perception of objects with the sentiments such perception produces); and (iii) a tool of enthusiasm or even fanaticism. The reviewer goes on to criticize Hume for failing to attempt to rescue this sorry theory, but for present purposes we point out that the reviewer’s criticism of Hutcheson is here neither indirect or implicit. The shortcomings of Hume’s theory of moral perception are precisely the substantial shortcomings of Hutcheson’s theory. We suggest that it is highly unlikely that Hutcheson would have criticized Hume by pointing out that the moral theory of the *Treatise* has exactly the same flaws that competent critics have found in Hutcheson’s own theory.

Taking these points together, we conclude it highly unlikely that Hutcheson was the author of this review.

*Armand Boisbeleau de La Chapelle.* We suggest that the author of the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* review of vol. 3 of the *Treatise* was most likely to have been Armand Boisbeleau de La Chapelle. There is both external and internal evidence to support this hypothesis.

(1) The suggestion that it was La Chapelle who wrote the review in question is consistent with the known practices of those associated with the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* during the years that William Smith directed the journal. Smith thought La Chapelle an informed and spirited scholar, and would have known that he had a continuing interest in moral philosophy. La Chapelle had translated into French and published a part of the *Tatler*, and Humphrey Ditton’s *Discourse concerning the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, a work that includes a lengthy discussion of the nature of moral certainty and belief. In his translation of this work La Chapelle added notes referring to Toland, Locke, Hobbes, Stillingfleet, Pierre-Daniel Huet, Fontenelle, and Descartes. In the *Bibliothèque angloise*, the immediate predecessor of *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, La Chapelle had reviewed William Wollaston’s *Religion of Nature Delineated*; John Clarke’s *An Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Natural Evil*; the second edition of Bernard Mandeville’s *Fable of the Bees*; and a work by one of Mandeville’s critics, George Blewitt’s *An Enquiry Whether a General Practice of Virtue Tends to the Wealth or Poverty, Benefit or Disadvantage of a People*. He had also briefly discussed Hutcheson’s *Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*. In the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* La Chapelle is credited with reviewing two editions of Boullier’s *Essai philosophique sur l’âme des bêtes*. The second edition of this work is also concerned with moral certainty and belief. He also reviewed F.-A. Boureau-Deslandes’s *Histoire critique de la philosophie*, and Christian Wolff’s *Theologia naturalis*. La Chapelle had the background and interest to write both *Bibliothèque raisonnée* reviews of the *Treatise*. 

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(2) The style of the review of Treatise 3 is recognizably that of La Chapelle. This review is a critical review, while it was La Chapelle almost alone among the contributors to the Bibliothèque raisonnée who added an element of criticism to his reviews. This critical tone was not just a matter of temperament. La Chapelle openly advocated the inclusion of criticism in his reviews, refusing to restrict himself to copying long and boring excerpts. It is, he said, “necessary that the criticism of a journal be a little argumentative; it is necessary to include discussion and proofs, and then how is one to avoid raillery and banter if the occasion lends itself to that?” As a result, La Chapelle’s reviews characteristically combine paraphrase and excerpts with critical remarks and digressions, features found in the review of Treatise 3.

As corollaries of this critical attitude, La Chapelle had two favourite criticisms: objections to what he found to be obscure and confusing language, and to false pretensions of originality. Philosophers often fail, he said, to reach the appropriate equilibrium between satisfying the specialist and reaching a larger public. Reviewing Boureau-Deslandes’s Histoire critique de la philosophie, he wrote:

If there is a risk in public speech it is particularly at this juncture. Does one want to be content with stating superficial and ordinary remarks with simplicity? Scholars get bored, close the book and do not open it again. Does one want, on the contrary, to elevate oneself? One becomes unintelligible to ordinary readers, who get tired and discouraged. It is necessary to be skilful enough to strike the right balance.54

Bureau-Deslandes’s Histoire critique failed to come close to this exacting standard. La Chapelle found in this work “manner of speaking so unnatural” that they “cause an extreme pain.” Of Christian Wolff’s Theologia naturalis, he observed that it is difficult “to grasp the truth when it is lost in the labyrinth of a long chain of complicated propositions.”56 Compare these remarks with this passage from the review of Treatise 3:

It is sometimes unfortunate to have too much genius and penetration. If one does not bring oneself near enough to the level of the vulgar, one is not understood, and then it is wholly in vain that one delivers to them all these speculations, for their beauties, being too sublime, remain unperceived. Nevertheless, when one intends to reform the ideas of almost all humankind, and to open paths new even to the eyes of philosophers, it would be only natural before all things to forge a language that is simple and clear, which anyone could easily understand. Without this it is impossible to communicate one’s ideas, and even more difficult to make them agreeable.57

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La Chapelle also appears to have taken pleasure in showing that an author’s pretensions to originality are ill-founded. One of the earliest casualties of this rhetorical weapon was none other than Francis Hutcheson himself, whose *Inquiry* was given a short notice in *Bibliothèque Angloise*. La Chapelle accused Hutcheson of plagiarizing from Jean-Pierre Crousaz’s *Traité du beau*. Not only did Hutcheson “daringly repeat the original” (*se débite hardiment pour l’Original*), but he also pretended to be “the first to have clarified the chaos that hitherto reigned in this philosophical field.” Boullier’s *Essai philosophique* received the same treatment. Boullier claimed to have opened new philosophical paths by producing a treatise on moral certainty. La Chapelle pointed out that this was not a new subject, and that Humphrey Ditton had written an excellent book (translated by La Chapelle, as we have seen) dealing extensively with the topic—a book that Boullier had not so much as mentioned. Wolff’s lack of originality is similarly emphasized. The German philosopher is “persuaded that no one before him has produced a clear and solid demonstration of the existence and attributes of God.” Not so, according to La Chapelle: Wolff’s system has already been taught by “skilful Jesuits” who had followed St. Augustine.

The review of vol. 3 of *Treatise* is consistent with this pattern. Although there is some concession to the originality of the author, the reviewer not only suggests, as we have noted, that Hume’s account of the moral sense is simply Hutcheson warmed over, he also says that Hume’s account of justice is simply “Hobbes’s system clothed in a new fashion.”

(3) The orientation of the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* reviews of the *Treatise* is consistent with La Chapelle’s known philosophical interests and views, which are not, as Moore maintains, marked by a commitment to natural law theories. As we have seen, La Chapelle’s reviews show him to have had a continuing interest in the latest productions of British moral philosophers. In the *Bibliothèque angloise* this interest manifests itself in reviews of works by John Clarke, Wollaston, and Hutcheson, two of whose names reappear in the review of *Treatise* 3. When we observe that La Chapelle’s positive review of the work of Wollaston has a parallel in the positive comments made about his views in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* discussion of *Treatise* 3, and that his earlier hostility to the work of Hutcheson is also reflected in that discussion, we have further grounds for supposing it was La Chapelle who wrote the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* review of the third volume of the *Treatise*.

(4) There are some characteristic linguistic similarities between La Chapelle’s earlier reviews and the review of *Treatise* 3. La Chapelle is fond of “candidly” (*ingénuement* or *avec ingénuité*) admitting his ignorance about some of the issues raised by the authors he is reviewing. In the *Bibliothèque angloise* he said, after reporting an argument by John Clarke, “I confess very candidly, that I’m not endowed with discernment enough to discover the soundness of this argument.” In a *Bibliothèque raisonnée* review he said: “I would say it even candidly. Even when we would make
a lot of Mr. Deslandes' lights and discernment, we could neither adopt all his ideas on the different subject matters making up the *Histoire Critique de la Philosophie*, nor could we hold back the reasons that prevent us from adopting them.”  

The reviewer of *Treatise 3* says: “I candidly admit my ignorance. I was stopped at the beginning of the first part.”

There is also a significant similarity between the concluding words of La Chapelle’s review of the *Fable of the Bees* and a remark found near the end of the review of vol. 3 of the *Treatise*. In the earlier of these reviews La Chapelle had said:

>This is certainly enough, and perhaps too much, to reveal the morals of this author—his principles, his views, his style, and his manner of reasoning.  

In the later one he says:

>But this is indeed more than is necessary to give an idea of the morals of the profound author of all the beautiful discoveries contained in the *Treatise of Human Nature*.

Taken together, these considerations lend substantial support to the hypothesis that it was La Chapelle who wrote the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* review of *Treatise 3*.

Armand Boisbeleau de La Chapelle was born at Auzillac, in Saintonge (now Charente Inférieure). He studied first at the College of Bordeaux, but after 1685 was sent to London to study with Isaac Dubourdies, pastor of one of the French churches there. By the time he was eighteen his studies of church history and theology had qualified him to become a pastor. After two years in Ireland, he was in 1707 named pastor at Wandsworth, near London, and in 1711, to three united churches in London. In 1725 he accepted a call to the pastorate of the Walloon church at The Hague. In the meantime, he had in 1719 become editor of the *Bibliothèque angloise*, and he continued to produce that journal until its demise in 1727. The following year he joined the editorial team of *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, and continued this connection until 1742, by which time William Smith had ceased to oversee the journal. Some of his contributions to the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, insofar as they are relevant to this paper, have been sketched above.

It cannot be said that La Chapelle was, like Des Maizeaux, a confidante of free-thinkers. But La Chapelle was a religious dissenter, and he took the view that even libertine views should be published and discussed. He told his readers that Mandeville’s *Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue* undermines “the foundation of morals, which suppose an essential difference between vice and virtue,” and that Mandeville’s commentary on his poetic *Fable of the Bees*, which draws heav-
ily on Montaigne, Bayle, and others, “makes things worse, if that is possible.” It does this because its author, having shown “the corruption of humankind,” does not condemn, but eulogizes this condition. At this point, La Chapelle explains why he is nevertheless going on to report and discuss some of Mandeville’s most licentious passages:

I do not know whether reasonable readers will appreciate my effort. I mean readers who have conscience and religion. Those lacking these will doubtless be charmed at finding here a system of libertinage and the commonplaces of debauchery. But that which will please those individuals can only scandalize other people. Would I not do better to follow the taste of the latter? Some will, perhaps, answer “yes” to this question. Nevertheless, would you believe me if I very sincerely and with all the simplicity of my heart, said that this answer does not appear to me to be sufficiently thought out? It is my settled view that what we call dangerous books are dangerous only because of the mysterious air we give them. If instead of banning them, or of talking only secretly about them, we would meet them with good responses—with, that is, solid and well-written responses, for those two things are equally necessary—what would happen? The libertine works would get all the contempt they deserve, and truth, crowned with a new victory, would only be more triumphant. I know only of bad causes that gain or can gain from the suppression of books and arguments from the opposite point of view. If I had to justify this, I think I would not be short of proofs. I may be wrong, but that is nonetheless my opinion and not until I am led to change it will I scruple to review dangerous pieces, while taking care to interweave with them my observations in order to show their weakness, or include the refutations that others have published.71

Although it is not obvious that La Chapelle found Hume’s Treatise to be dangerous, he did “interweave” into his review of it his own observations and criticisms. In doing so he gave us the first philosophically significant response to Hume’s moral theory.

* * * * *

Post-Script. It was only a few months before his death in August 1776 that Hume made his famous comment on the fate of the Treatise:

Never literary Attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of human Nature. It fell dead-born from the Press; without reaching such distinction as even to excite a Murmur among the Zealots.
Those who cite this famous remark all too often overlook the historical context Hume gives it. Just prior to saying the Treatise fell dead-born, he had said:

In the end of 1738, I published my Treatise; and immediately went down to my Mother and my Brother, who lived at his Countryst aye house and was employing himself, very judiciously and successfully in the Improvement of his Fortune.

And just after, he goes on to say:

But being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine Temper, I very soon recovered the Blow, and prosecuted with great Ardour my Studies in the Country. In 1742, I printed at Edinburgh the first part of my Essays: the work was favourably received, and soon made me entirely forget my former Disappointment.  

In other words, when Hume said that the Treatise fell dead-born from the press, he was speaking about exactly the period, 1739–1741, in which the Treatise was noticed and reviewed in the Bibliothèque raisonnée, and thus we know that his great work did not come into the world unnoticed. It was, for its time, widely reviewed. There were three notices and five reviews of the Treatise, as well as a substantive (and critical) letter to the editor of Commonsense. One of these reviews, and one we know that Hume had read, that in the History of the Works of the Learned, does at times appear to be the “Murmur” of a zealot.  

What, then, are we to make of Hume’s “dead-born from the Press”? Are we to conclude that he did not value these reviews? That he did not count them as genuine notice of the Treatise? That by 1776 he had forgotten about them? That a dead-born Treatise suited well the literary history of himself that he hoped to promote? On this matter we are left with a puzzle, but whatever may account for Hume’s famous claim, the Treatise did receive significant attention in the years immediately following its publication. Moreover, the most complete coverage of it was that published in the Bibliothèque raisonnée, some of which was written by Pierre Des Maizeaux, and some, we believe, by Armand de La Chapelle.

II. The Text

We present here a diplomatic edition of the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of volume 3 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. Interpolations (a missing word, a missing letter, and missing punctuation) and corrections (a mistaken reference) appear within angle-brackets. Original page numbers appear within angle-brackets printed superscript. The footnotes of the original review follow an
alphabetical sequence that begins anew with each page. To follow that pattern while embedding the relatively short pages of the small octavo Bibliothèque raisonnée within the much longer pages of this journal would result in more than one note a or b at the foot of a single Hume Studies page. To avoid the confusion this would create, we have flagged notes with a non-repeating sequence of letters, a, b, c . . . p. As nothing would be gained by reproducing the inconsistent placement of footnote flags in relation to the punctuation of the copy-text, we have uniformly placed these after commas and periods. In addition, no attempt has been made to reproduce the initial drop capital “vo,” in voici at the beginning of the review, or to use the long “s” and the many ligatures commonly used in eighteenth-century printing. Finally, quotation marks and their use have been modernized.

The copy-text for the present edition is the copy of the

BIBLIOTHÈQUE RAISONNÉE DES OUVRAGES DES SAVANS DE L’EUROPE


held by the Special Collections Department, University of Victoria Library, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada (shelf mark Z1016 B5). The title-page of this copy is shown in facsimile here. We have also consulted the corresponding copy in a facsimile edition of the Bibliothèque raisonnée (Genève: Slatkine, 1969). This facsimile reprint includes three periods that are not found in our copy-text, but that are supplied in brackets in the present edition (see below, pages <414>, <416>, and <426>).

ARTICLE VIII.

A Treatise of Human Nature, being an attempt to introduce the experimental Method of reasoning into Moral Subjects. Volume III.

C’est-à-dire:


Voici la troisième Partie d’un Ouvrage, dont les deux premières ont roulé, ainsi que nous le disions dans le Tome XXIV.de cette Bibliothèque, sur l’Entendement, & sur les Passions. L’Auteur y met la dernière main à l’exécution de son plan. Il y traite des matières les plus intéressantes au bonheur de l’Homme, <412>, & ces matières étant faites pour être entendues de tout le monde, il a tâché de s’exprimer d’une manière plus intelligible, qu’il ne l’avait fait dans les Volumes précédens.

Hume Studies
« Il est bon, dit-il dans un court Avertissement, que le Public sache que cette troisième Partie du Traité de la Nature Humaine, est en quelque sorte indépendante des deux premières, & qu’on pourra fort bien l’entendre, sans être initié dans les raisonnemens abstraits des deux autres. Je ne doute
point que le commun des Lecteurs n’en saisit les principes, pourvu qu’on y apporte la même attention, qu’on donne à tous les Ouvrages de ce genre. Il faut seulement se souvenir que je prends toujours les termes d’Impressions & d’Idées dans le même sens, & que par des a Impressions j’entends des perceptions fortes & vives, telles que sont nos affections, nos sensations, nos sentiments; au-lieu que par des Idées je n’entends que des perceptions languissantes & foibles, ou que les copies de celles-ci dans la mémoire & dans l’imagination ».

Nous souhaitons de toute notre âme, que le Public juge des choses comme l’Auteur l’espère: mais ce n’est pas sans appréhender que le commun des Lecteurs ne se plaigne encore que sa Métaphysique est un peu obscure, & qu’il aurait pu y répandre plus de jour. Il est quelquefois 413 malheureux d’avoir trop d’esprit & de pénétration. Comme on ne s’abaisse point assez à la portée du vulgaire, on n’en est point entendu, & c’est en pure perte qu’on lui débite des spéculations, dont il n’aperçoit pas les beautés trop sublimes pour lui. Cependant, quand on veut réformer les idées de presque tout le Genre-humain, & se tracer des routes nouvelles aux yeux mêmes des Philosophes, il sera naturel de se faire avant toutes choses un langage simple & clair, que tout le monde pût aisément comprendre. Sans cela il est impossible de communiquer ses idées, & moins encore de les faire goûter. La Morale, principalement, doit être enseignée avec la plus grande simplicité. Un Métaphysicien qui croit démontrer les principes du Droit Naturel, à force de les rendre abstraits perd son temps & sa peine. Peu de gens savent apprécier son travail, & presque personne n’en profite. Je ne sai même, si cette méthode ne fait pas réellement du tort à la Religion, contre l’intention des Philosophes qui s’en servent. On sait que le cœur cherche incessamment des prétextes pour se dispenser de l’obéissance; & quel prétexte plus plausible que celui qui se tire de l’obscurité des Ouvrages qu’on publie pour enseigner les élémens de la Vertu? Est-ce afin de les rendre aimables, qu’on les rend si difficiles? N’est-ce pas au contraire le moyen d’en dégoûter pour toujours?

Nous ne faisons, comme on voit, qu’étendre les idées de l’Auteur de ce Traité, & nous nous croyons obligés à lui rendre cette justice, qu’il a réellement fait quelques efforts pour se proportionner à la capacité d’un plus grand nombre de personnes. Non seulement il a eu soin d’éclaircir quelquefois ses principes par des exemples populaires; il a outre cela souvent ajouté des Notes au Texte, & ces Notes, au moins la plupart, y répandent véritablement quelque lumière.

Tout ce troisième livre est divisé en trois Parties, dont voici le Plan.

La I. Partie, qui traite de la Vertu & du Vice en général, contient deux Sections, destinées à prouver, l’une, que la différence que nous observons entre le Bien & le Mal

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*a By Impressions I mean our stronger perceptions, such as our sensations, affections and sentiments; and by Ideas, the fainter perceptions, or the copies of these in the memory and imagination.*
ne dérive pas de la Raison; l’autre, que cette différence découle d’un Sens ou d’un Goût Moral, qui est attaché à notre Nature.


Tel est le Plan général de Morale que notre Auteur s’est formé. C’est, à notre avis, plutôt une ébauche des principes de l’Art de bien vivre, qu’un Système complet & lié dans ses parties. Il pourrait y avoir plus d’ordre, plus de clarté, plus de détail; mais aussi, il ne saurait y avoir plus de paradoxes, plus d’associations singulières d’idées & de mots, que personne ne s’est encore avisé de joindre; plus d’endroits propres à piquer la curiosité des gens qui n’aiment pas les routes battues; & pour tout dire enfin, plus de pensées neuves & originales. Il faut en tenir compte au subtil & ingénieux Anonyme. Non omnis fert omnia tellus.

Je me garderai bien d’entreprendre ici l’analyse raisonnée d’un Ouvrage si profond. L’Auteur seul est capable de la faire, & quand il aura eu cette bonté pour le Public, il restera à chercher des Lecteurs assez versés dans la Métaphysique, pour être en état de le suivre dans les spéculations abstraites dont il leur aura montré le chemin.

J’avoue ingénument mon ignorance. J’ai été arrêté dès l’entrée de la première Partie. L’Auteur y agite l’importante question des fondemens & de la différence du Juste & de l’Injuste. Le sentiment de CLARKE, qui trouve le principe de cette différence dans la Nature & dans l’Ordre des choses, ne lui plait point. Celui de Mr. WOLLASTON, qui prétend que ce qui est conforme à la Vérité des choses, mérite par cela même le nom de Justice, lui paroit absurde. En un mot il ne goûte rien, de ce qui est le plus goûté sur ce sujet. Selon lui, l’état de la question n’a pas été proposé comme il faut, & voici à quoi il le réduit. b Est-ce par le moyen de nos idées, ou de leurs impressions, que nous appercevons de la différence entre le Vice et la Vertu, & que nous prononçons qu’une action est ou louable ou blâmable? Un Disciple de CLARKE ou de WOLLASTON répondroit, que c’est par nos idées que nous jugeons de cette différence, & que c’est uniquement par-là que nous pouvons...

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b Pag. 4.

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en juger. Mais notre Auteur est bien éloigné de le penser de la sorte. Rappelant ici les notions qu’il a données de la Raison humaine dans son second Livre, il soutient que cette Raison étant un principe sans vie & sans activité, elle est incapable d’exciter en nous aucune passion, ou de nous pousser à aucune action: d’où il conclut que nos idées ne sauroient être le principe des règles de notre conduite. Laissons-le parler lui-même, & abandonnons au commun des Lecteurs le soin de l’entendre.

« La Raison, dit-il, c’est la découverte du Vrai & du Faux. Le Vrai consiste dans une convenance, soit avec les relations réelles des idées, soit avec l’existence réelle des choses en matière de fait; & le Faux consiste précisément dans le contraire. Par conséquent tout ce qui n’est point susceptible de cette convenance ou de cette disconvenance, ne pouvant être ni Vrai ni Faux, ne sauroit être l’objet de notre Raison. Or il est évident que nos Passions, nos Volitions & nos Actions n’en sont pas susceptibles, parce qu’elles sont des faits originaux & des réalités originales, qui existent chacune à part indépendamment de toute autre Passion, de toute autre Volition, de toute autre Action. Donc on ne sauroit les dire vraies ou fausses, conformes ou contraires à la Raison. Elles sont ou louables ou blâmables, mais il y auront de l’absurdité à les appeler raisonnables ou déraisonnables . . . . . . . Si je me trompe en croyant que certains objets peuvent me donner du plaisir ou me causer de la douleur, si je m’égaré dans le choix des moyens que j’emploie pour satisfaire mes désirs, je suis àplaindre, mais je ne suis point à blâmer. Telles erreurs ne font aucune tache à mon caractère . . . elles n’ont pas la moindre influence sur ce qu’on appelle Vice ou Vertu . . . . On objectera peut-être, que si l’erreur de Fait ne peut jamais passer pour criminelle, il n’en est pas de même de l’erreur de Droit, & que cette dernière peut visiblement être une source d’immoralité ou de Vice. Mais je nie que l’erreur de Droit, non plus que l’autre, puisse jamais être la source originale de quelque chose de vicieux, parce qu’elle suppose déjà quelque chose de droit & quelque chose d’injuste, antérieurement au jugement qu’on en porte. D’où il suit, que si une erreur de droit entraîne après elle quelque sorte d’immoralité, ce ne peut être qu’une immoralité dérivée de quelque autre qui existait antécédemment à l’erreur elle-même ».

\(^c\) Liv. II. Part. III. Sect<.> III.
\(^d\) Pag. 6.
\(^e\) Pag. 9.
\(^f\) Pag. 10.
Le grand argument, qui détermine notre Auteur à rejeter la pensée de ceux qui trouvent dans les relations nécessaires des choses, les fondemens de la distinction du Juste & de l’Injuste, c’est non seulement, qu’il ne peut jamais résulter de-là des obligations proprement dites, mais seulement de simples motifs de convenance, pour déterminer à agir d’une façon plutôt que d’une autre; c’est sur tout, que si le Juste & l’Injuste découloient de l’observation & du violement de certains devoirs, nécessairement attachés à telles ou telles relations, par-tout ou ces relations au­roient lieu, l’observation de ces devoirs pourrait être exigée, & seroit une vertu, tandis que leur violement seroit un crime. Or le contraire lui semble entièrement démontré par une réflexion, qui, sans être nouvelle, prend un air de nouveauté dans ses mains, par la manière dont il la propose. La voici. C’est que les Brutes, & même les Créatures inanimées, se trouvent quelquefois dans des relations toutes semblables à celles où les Créatures raisonnables se rencontrent, sans que personne s’avise pour cela de soutenir qu’en conséquence de ces relations, elles ont de semblables devoirs à remplir, & qu’elles sont coupables quand elles les violent. Par exemple, il n’est point de crime plus énorme que le Parricide. Mais d’où vient le Parricide est-il un crime si énorme? Est-ce à cause de la relation que la naissance a formée entre un Fils & un Père? Il est aisé de le savoir.

« Supposons qu’un Chêne ou qu’un Orme laissent tomber à leurs pieds quelques-unes de leurs graines, & que de-là il s’élève de jeunes Arbres, qui s’étendant peu à peu étouffent enfin ceux à qui ils devoient leur existence. Je demande si ce cas n’offre pas à nos yeux les mêmes relations violées, que dans le cas du Parricide? J’y vois un Arbre produit, qui étouffe un autre Arbre duquel il tenoit la vie, précisément comme lorsqu’un Enfant tue son Père. Dira-t-on que l’Arbre n’a ni connaissance, ni choix? Eh qu’importe? Ce n’est pas la volonté ou la liberté, qui forment entre un Père & un Fils, la relation de Fils & de Père: c’est la génération; & cette génération forme aussi précisément la même relation entre un Orme, & un Ormeau produit de la graine du premier. C’est la volonté ou la liberté, qui détermine un homme à tuer son Père: de même ce sont les loix du mouvement, qui déterminent un Ormeau à s’élever pour étouffer l’Orme qui l’a produit. Ici, en un mot, la même relation a bien de différentes causes, mais elle demeure toujours la même relation. Par conséquent, puisqu’elle ne produit pas le même effet, dans l’Homme & dans l’Arbre, elle ne sauroit être regardée comme le principe du crime, que le prémier commet en devenant le meurtrier de son Père; ou pour dire la même chose en d’autres termes, ce n’est pas pour l’avoir violée, que le Parricide est criminel ».

6 Pag. 20.

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« Prenons un exemple qui soit encore plus sensible. Je voudrois savoir d’où vient que l’Inceste passe pour un crime si abominable, parmi les hommes, & qu’on n’y attache pas la moindre idée de turpitude, quand c’est une bête qui le commet? Répondra-t-on que c’est parce qu’un Animal brute n’a pas assez de Raison pour découvrir la turpitude de ce crime, au-lieu que l’Homme a toutes les lumières nécessaires pour l’appercevoir? . . . Ce seroit tomber dans un cercle vicieux, car alors on supposeroit qu’il y a quelque turpitude dans la nature des choses, avant que la Raison la découvre; qu’ainsi la turpitude est indépendante des décisions de la Raison, qu’elle en est l’objet, mais qu’elle n’en est point l’effet, . . . & que par conséquent, quoique les Animaux n’aient pas un degré de Raison suffisant pour découvrir les devoirs qui découlent de certaines relations, c’est assez qu’ils se trouvent eux-mêmes dans ces relations, pour être soumis à ces devoirs & obligés à les remplir ».

Or cette conclusion est absurde: par conséquent le principe qui y mène est insoutenable, & jamais on ne provera que l’Homme soit juste entant qu’il agit d’une man- ière assortie aux relations que sa Raison découvre entre les autres Étres & lui. Notre Auteur ne craint point de dire que cet argument est sans replique, & ce n’est pas à nous à le lui contester.

On demandera sans doute, en quoi cet habile Métaphysicien fait donc consister la Vertu ou le Vice d’une Action. La question est des plus graves. Il y répond aussi en détail, dans la Section II. de cette I. Partie, & même dès la fin de la I. Section.

« Lors, dit-il, que nous décidons qu’une action est mauvaise, ou qu’un caractère est vicieux, cela ne signifie autre chose, sinon que par une suite de la constitution de notre nature, nous ne pouvons y réfléchir, sans éprouver en nous un sentiment qui nous porte à les blâmer. Il en est donc du Vice & des Vertus, comme des qualités sensibles, des sons, des couleurs, du chaud & du froid, &c. Ces qualités ne sont proprement que des perceptions de notre Ame. Elles n’existent point dans les objets. On ne les y apperçoit point à force de raisonner: on les sent. De même, ce qu’il y a de Moral dans les actions humaines, ne se découvre pas par la voie de la réflexion, mais par celle du sentiment: si l’on en juge d’une autre manière, c’est que ce sentiment est si prompt, si délicat, si subtil, qu’on le confond par habitude avec les idées qu’il fait naître ensuite ».

\(^{h}\) Pag. 24.

\(^{i}\) Pag. 26.
En un mot, suivant notre Auteur, l’Ame a un Goût aussi-bien que le Corps, & ce Goût lui sert à distinguer ce qui est juste d’avec ce qui est injuste, de la même manière qu’au prémier coup d’œil on distingue ce qui est beau d’avec ce qui est laid. C’est une affaire de sentiment: le raisonnement n’y entre pour rien.

Que si l’on veut savoir en quoi consiste la différence des impressions que le Juste fait sur ce Goût spirituel, d’avec celles qu’y fait l’Injuste, on n’a pour s’en instruire qu’à rentrer en soi-même. Ce qui est Juste fait plaisir, on l’approuve; ce qui est Injuste fait de la peine, on le blâme. Voilà la clé de tout le mystère! Enfin si l’on n’est pas content, & qu’on demande encore, d’où vient cette diversité d’effets, & pourquoi la Vertu produit en nous un sentiment de Plaisir, tandis que le Vice porte dans l’Ame un sentiment de douleur? notre savant Métaphysicien répond, que cette diversité d’effets vient de différentes causes, les unes Naturelles, & les autres Artificielles; & après avoir bien subtilisé sur ces termes, il renvoie à s’expliquer dans la suite, sur les idées précises qu’il y attache. Ce n’est pas pourtant sans conclure, qu’on a grand tort de dire, généralement parlant, que la Vertu est une chose naturelle à l’Homme. Puisqu’il y a des Vertus artificielles, elles ne sont pas toutes naturelles, & un bon Philosophe doit en savoir faire la différence.

Dans le langage vulgaire, tout ce qu’on vient de lire se réduit, si je ne me trompe, à ceci; que pour s’exprimer avec exactitude sur la différence du Juste & de l’Injuste, il faut poser l’état de la question en ces termes: Pourquoi notre Ame, à la simple vue de certaines actions, est-elle touchée d’un sentiment de plaisir qui les lui fait approuver; au-lieu qu’à la vue d’autres actions, elle est touchée d’un sentiment contraire? Bien des gens se contenteroient de répondre, que c’est parce que nous sommes ainsi faits: mais, au gré de notre Auteur, cela n’est pas assez Philosophique. Il faut répondre, que la chose se passe de cette manière, parce que notre Ame, outre ses autres facultés, a un Goût spirituel, qui lui est naturel en partie, mais qui est aussi en partie artificiel, c’est-à-dire, qui est en partie une suite de la constitution de notre nature, & en partie le fruit de l’éducation, de l’exemple, des conventions & des constitutions humaines. À l’aide de ce Goût, notre Ame s’aperçoit d’abord, par le plaisir ou par la douleur qu’elle éprouve, de ce qui est moralement bon & moralement mauvais; & ainsi, parfaitement dispensée de raisonner, ce sentiment lui suffit pour se déterminer surement à embrasser la Vertu & à fuir le Vice.

Voilà tout le Système de notre Auteur. Quand Mr. Hutcheson le proposa dans ses Recherches sur l’origine des Idées que nous avons de la Vertu & du Bien moral, d’habiles gens y trouvèrent trois grands défauts. Primièrement, ils ne goûtèrent point cette supposition d’une nouvelle Faculté spirituelle, uniquement destinée à mettre notre Ame en état de discerner le Juste & l’Injuste: ils la regardèrent comme absolument inutile, & ils soutinrent que l’Ame, par la faculté qu’elle a

1An Inquiry concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue and Moral Good. 8°.
incontestablement de réfléchir & de sentir, est suffisamment pourvue de tout ce qui lui est nécessaire pour distinguer le bien d'avec le mal. Secondement ils observèrent, que dans ce Système on confond la perception des objets, avec les sentiments qui en résultent; & Monsr. BURNET fit là-dessus des objections qui jusqu'à présent sont demeurées sans replique. Troisièmement enfin, ils ne dissimulèrent pas, que ce Goût spirituel, ou ce Sentiment moral, comme on voudra l’appeller, tient visiblement au Fanatism, & peut au moins très aisément ouvrir la porte aux excès de l’Enthousiasme. Le Dr. BERCKLEY <sic> poussa vivement cette difficulté dans son Alciphron, & fit toucher au doigt, qu’il n’y aurait rien de si arbitraire que les idées du Juste & de l’Injuste, si elles dépendoient de ce Goût intérieur. Je ne sai d’où vient que notre Auteur n’a pas trouvé à propos d’examiner les objections de ces Savans. Elles auraient ouvert un beau champ à ses spéculations, & à sa profonde Métaphysique. Peut-être est ce modestie, peut-être aussi est ce prudence. Comment renchérir en effet sur les efforts de génie, que Mr. HUTCHESON avoit opposés aux réflexions de Mr. BURNET sur cette matière?

Quoi qu’il en soit, c’est sur la supposition d’un Sens ou d’un Goût spirituel, que toute la Morale de l’ingénieux Anonyme est fondée; & d’abord ce qu’il en conclut, c’est que la Vertu tire tout son prix, non du sentiment qu’on a de son devoir, mais des motifs qui y portent. Pourquoi y a-t-il du mérite à être juste, à restituer, par exemple, un dépôt que l’on a reçu? Ce n’est certainement pas l’action elle-même qui en fait la Justice; c’est la fin qu’on s’y propose, c’est le motif qui y engage. Et quel est-il ce motif? Est-ce l’amour du bien public? Est-ce l’utilité particulière? Est-ce quelque autre principe général, qui découle de la constitution de la Nature humaine, & dont tous les hommes soient affectés? Jusqu’ici, les Philosophes & les Jurisconsultes avoient cru l’un ou l’autre; mais ils se sont fort trompés, au jugement de notre Auteur. Le sentiment qu’on a de la Justice & de l’Injustice ne découle point, à ce qu’il prétend, de la manière dont nous sommes faits.

« Il ne nait en nous, dit-il, qu’artificiellement, quoique nécessairement, de l’éducation & des conventions que les hommes ont faites entre eux . . . Ainsi la Justice n’est dans le fond qu’une Vertu artificielle, encore que ses règles ne soient nullement arbitraires ».

4 Letters between the late Mr. Gilbert Burnet and Mr. Hutcheson, concerning the true foundation of Virtue &c. 8. Lond 1735. Jamais Controverse Philosophique n’a été traitée de part & d’autre avec plus d’esprit, de candeur & de politesse, que dans ces Lettres de Mrs. Burnet & Hutcheson. On peut hardiment les donner pour modèle parfait en ce genre.

1 Alciphron, ou le petit Philosophe. Dialog. III.

m Part. II. Sect. I. pag. 40.

n Pag. 48, 49.
Pour éclaircir ces ténèbres, l’Auteur examine plus particulièrement, o quelle est l’Origine de la Justice & du Droit de Propriété, & là-dessus il se propose deux questions importantes. Présentement, dit-il, il faut voir « de quelle manière les règles de la Justice ont été établies par l’artifice des hommes; & secondement, quelles sont les raisons qui nous déterminent à attacher à l’observation de ces règles des idées de Beauté morale, au lieu que nous en regardons le violemment comme quelque chose de laid & de difforme », que nous ne saurions raisonnalement aimer.

La première de ces deux questions l’occupe beaucoup. Il juge, p « que les règles de la Justice doivent leur origine à des conventions humaines, destinées à remédier à quelques inconvénients qui naissent du concours de certaines qualités de l’Ame, & de la situation des objets extérieurs. Ces qualités, ajoute-t-il, sont l’amour-propre, & une générosité bornée. La situation des objets extérieurs, c’est leur inconstance, jointe à leur rareté en comparaison de nos desirs & de nos besoins ». Quel langage! Tout cela signifie, selon les principes de notre Auteur, que les hommes s’étant réunis en Société, ont établi des Loix, dont leur intérêt mutuel a été la base; & que ces Loix sont tellement les règles de la Justice, qu’antérieurement à elles, il n’y avait rien de semblable au droit de Propriété, ni par conséquent à ce qu’on appelle Justice ou Injustice. C’est, comme on voit, le Système de Hobbes habillé dans un goût nouveau. Si ce Philosophe l’avait produit de cette façon, je doute qu’on lui eût fait tant d’accueil dans le Monde.

Mais en voilà plus qu’il n’en faut pour donner une idée de la Morale du profond Auteur de toutes les belles découvertes, que le Traité sur la Nature Humaine contient. Nous n’oserions le suivre plus loin, parce que nous nous sentons incapables de saisir toujours précisément sa pensée, & plus encore de le rendre intelligible sans y faire de trop grands efforts. Le plus sûr est de renvoyer à l’Ouvrage même les Lecteurs curieux de subtilités & d’abstractions métaphysiques. Si l’Auteur vouloit y ajouter un Glossaire, il leur épargneroit bien du travail.

III. The Translation

In the translation that follows the notes of the reviewer appear as footnotes flagged by upper-case letters paralleling the lower-case letters used in the foregoing transcription of the original text. Our glosses on these notes are enclosed within square brackets, while our own notes to the review appear as endnotes flagged by

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\*Part. <II.> Sect. II. pag. 50.

\*Pag.> 67. Voici les paroles mêmes de l’Auteur: *These are intended as a remedy to some inconveniences, which proceed from the concurrence of certain qualities of the human Mind, with the situation of external objects. The Qualities of the Mind are selfisheness <sic> and limited generosity: And the situation of the external objects, is their easy change, joint’d to their scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men.*
arabic numerals. Page numbers of the original text appear within angle brackets, superscript, just as they do in the transcription above.

ARTICLE VIII

A Treatise of Human Nature, being an attempt to introduce the experimental Method of reasoning into Moral Subjects, Volume III.

That is, Treatise of Human Nature in which an attempt is made to introduce the Experimental Method of reasoning into Moral Subjects. V. III On Morals, 310 pages including an Appendix containing clarifications of some passages from the first two Volumes. London, by Thomas Longman, 1740 large Octavo.78

This is the third part of a book of which the preceding two, on the Understanding, and the Passions have been published, as we have said in vol. 24 of this journal. The author here puts the finishing touches to his plan. He treats of those matters of the most concern to the happiness of man.412 Since these matters are intended to be understood by everyone, he has taken care to express himself in a more intelligible manner than he has done in the preceding volumes.

“It is proper,” he says in a short advertisement, “that the public know that this third part of the Treatise on Human Nature is in some ways independent of the first two, and that one can very easily understand it without being initiated into the abstract reasonings of the two others. I do not doubt that ordinary readers will understand the principles, provided that they give it the same attention that one gives to all works of this kind. It is only necessary to remember that I always use the terms impressions and ideas in the same sense, and that by A impressions I mean lively and strong perceptions, such as are our affections, our sensations, and our sentiments, while by ideas I only mean languishing and weak perceptions, or the copies of those others in the memory and in the imagination.”

We wish with all our heart that the public judges of things as the author hopes, but not without fearing that ordinary readers may again complain that his metaphysics is a little obscure, and that he could have shed more light on it. It is sometimes unfortunate to have too much genius and penetration. If one does not bring oneself near enough to the level of the vulgar, one is not understood, and it is wholly in vain that one delivers to them all these speculations, for they

^“By Impressions I mean our stronger perceptions, such as our sensations, affections and sentiments; and by Ideas the fainter perceptions, or the copies of these in the memory and imagination.”
do not perceive those beauties too sublime for them. Nevertheless, when one hopes to reform the ideas of almost all humankind, and to open paths new even to the eyes of philosophers, it would be only natural to forge first of all a language that is simple and clear, which everyone could easily understand. Without this it is impossible to communicate one’s ideas, and even more difficult to have them appreciated. Morals especially must be taught with the greatest simplicity. A metaphysician who undertakes to demonstrate the principles of natural right by making them abstract wastes his time and effort. Few people can appreciate his work, and almost no one benefits. I do not even know whether this method is not really harmful to religion, in spite of the intention of the philosophers that use it. We know that the heart constantly seeks pretexts for avoiding obedience. Is there any more plausible pretext than that drawn from the obscurity of books intended to teach the elements of virtue? Is it to make these praiseworthy that they are made so difficult? Is this not, on the contrary, the means of making them forever distasteful?

We limit ourselves, as can be seen, to elucidating the ideas of the author of this treatise. We are obliged to grant that he has really made an effort to accommodate himself to the capacity of a greater number of people. He has not only sometimes taken care to clarify his principles by using popular examples; he has as well often added notes to the text, and these notes, at least most of them, truly do shed some light on it.

This third book is divided into three parts, of which this is the plan.

Part I, which treats of Virtue and Vice in general, contains two sections, one of which is intended to prove that the difference that we observe between Good and Evil does not derive from Reason; the other, that this difference follows from a Sense or Moral Taste that is implanted in our nature.


Part III, finally, treats the other Virtues and other Vices. It is divided into six sections. Sect. I. Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and the Natural Vices. Sect. II. Of Greatness of Mind. Sect. III. Of Goodness and Benevolence. Sect IV. Of Natural Abilities. Sect V. Some farther Reflections concerning the Natural Virtues. Sect. VI. Conclusion of this Book.

Such is the general plan of morals that our author has devised. It is, in our opinion, more an outline of the principles of the art of living well than a complete
and well-connected system. It could have more order, more clarity, more detail; but also, it could scarcely contain more paradoxes, more singular associations of ideas and words that no one ever thought of putting together before; a greater number of passages likely to arouse the curiosity of people who dislike the usual paths; and, in a word, a greater number of new and original thoughts. It is necessary to grant that to the subtle and ingenious author. *Non omnis fert omnia tellus.*

I will refrain from undertaking here the reasoned analysis of such a profound work. The author alone is capable of doing this, and when he has done this favour for the public, there will still be wanting readers well-versed in metaphysics to be able to follow him in the path of the abstract speculations which he would show them.

I candidly admit my ignorance. I was stopped at the beginning of the first part. The author raises there the important question of the foundation of, and the difference between, right and wrong [*du Juste & de l’Injuste*]. The sentiment of Clarke, who finds the principle of this distinction in the nature and order of things, does not please him. That of Mr. Wollaston, who claims that that which conforms to the truth of things, for this reason deserves the name of right [Justice], he finds absurd. In a word, he approves none of what is most approved on this subject. According to him, the state of the question has not been properly proposed. Here is what he reduces it to: Is it by means of our ideas, or of their impressions, that we perceive the difference between vice and virtue, and that we pronounce that an action is either praiseworthy or blameable? A disciple of Clarke or of Wollaston would answer that it is by means of our ideas that we judge of this difference, and that it is exclusively thus that we can judge of it. But our author is very far from thinking in this way. Recalling here the account of human reason he has presented in his second book, he holds that this reason, being a lifeless and an inactive principle, is incapable of exciting any passion in us, or of inciting us to perform any action: hence he concludes that our ideas could not be the foundation of the rules of our conduct. Let him speak himself and leave to common readers the task of understanding.

“Reason,” he says, “is the discovery of truth and falsehood. Truth consists in an agreement, either with the real relations of ideas, or with the real existence of things in matters of fact; and falsehood consists in precisely the contrary. Consequently, all that is not susceptible of this agreement or of this disagreement, being incapable of being either true

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8 Page 4.

C Bk. II. Part III. Sect. III.

D Page 6 [*Treatise* 3.1.1.9; SBN 438].
or false, could not possibly be the object of our reason. Now it is evident that our passions, our volitions, and our actions are not [thus] susceptible, because they are original facts and original realities, each of which exists separately, independently of all other passion, of all other volition, of all other action. Thus one could not call them true or false, conforming or contrary to reason. They are either laudable or blameable, but it would be absurd to call them reasonable or unreasonable. . . . If I am mistaken in believing that certain objects can give me pleasure or cause me pain, if I get lost in choosing the means that I use to satisfy my desires, I am to be lamented, but I am not to blame. Such errors cannot blemish my character . . . they do not have the least influence on what is called vice or virtue. . . . Someone objects, perhaps, that if a mistake of fact can never be taken as criminal, it is not the same with a mistake of right, and that this latter can clearly be a source of immorality or of vice. But I deny that a mistake of right, any more than the other, could ever be the original source of something vicious, because it already supposes something right and something unjust, prior to the judgement that one makes of it. Hence it follows that if a mistake of right brings with it some kind of immorality, it can only be an immorality derived from some other that exists prior to the mistake itself.”

The great argument that determines our author to reject the view of those who find in the necessary relations of things the foundation of the distinction between right and wrong, is not only that obligations, properly speaking, can never result from these relations, but only mere motives of agreement for determining one course of action rather than another. It is, above all, that if right and wrong derive from the observance and breach of certain duties, necessarily attached to such and such relations, then wherever these relations took place the observance of these duties would be required, and would be a virtue, while their breach would be a crime. But the contrary seems to the author fully demonstrated by a consideration which, without being new, in his hands takes on an air of novelty, because of the way in which he presents it. Here it is. It is that brutes and even inanimate creatures sometimes find themselves in relations completely like those in which reasonable creatures find themselves, but without anyone taking it into his head to claim that, in consequence of these relations, they have the same duties to fulfil, and that they are guilty when they breach them. For example, G there is no crime more outrageous than parricide. But how comes it about <that> parricide

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E Page 9 [Treatise 3.1.1.12; SBN 459–60].
F Page 10 [Treatise 3.1.1.14; SBN 460].
G Page 20 [Treatise 3.1.1.24; SBN 467–68].

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is such an outrageous crime? Is it because of the relation that birth has formed between a son and a father? It is easy to know this.

“Suppose that an oak or an elm drop some of their seeds at their feet, and that from these young trees rise up, which, growing little by little, finally stifle those to which they owe their existence. I ask whether this case does not offer to our eyes the same breached relations as in the case of parricide? I see here a tree produced, that stifles another tree from which it derived its existence, precisely as when a child kills his father. Does someone say that the tree has neither knowledge nor choice? Of what import is that? It is not the will or freedom that forms between a father and a son the relation of son and father: it is generation; and this generation forms also precisely the same relation between an elm and a young elm produced from the seed of the former. It is the will or freedom that determines a man to kill his father: just as they are the laws of motion that determine a young elm to grow up to stifle the elm that produced it. Here, in a word, the same relation has certainly different causes, but it remains always the same relation. In consequence, since this does not produce the same effect in man and in trees, it should not be regarded as the source of the crime that the former commits by becoming the murderer of his father: or, to say the same thing in other terms, it is not for having violated it that parricide is criminal.”

“Let us take an even more tangible example. I would like to know how it comes about that incest is considered so abominable a crime, among men, while not the least idea of turpitude is attached to it when it is an animal that commits it? Does someone reply that it is because a brute animal does not have enough reason to discover the turpitude of this crime, while a man has all the light required to perceive it? . . . This would be to fall into a vicious circle, for then one would suppose that there is some turpitude in the nature of things, before reason discovers it; that, thus, the turpitude is independent of the decisions of reason, that it is the object, but not the effect of it . . . and that in consequence, even if animals have not a degree of reason sufficient to discover the duties which follow certain relations, it is enough that they find themselves in these relations, in order to be bound by these duties and obliged to fulfil them.”

But this conclusion is absurd: in consequence, the principle that governs it is untenable. Moreover, it will never be proved that man is right insofar as he acts in a manner conforming to the relations that reason discovers between other beings and himself. Our author does not hesitate to say that there is to this argument no reply, and it is not for us to dispute his claim.
It will be asked, no doubt, in what, according to this skillful metaphysician, does the virtue or the vice of an action consist. The question is one of the most serious. He also responds to it in detail in section 2 of part 1, and even already at the end of section 1.

“When, he says,\(^{11}\) we pronounce that an action is evil, or some character is vicious, this signifies nothing more than that as a consequence of the constitution of our nature, we cannot reflect on it without feeling in ourselves a sentiment that leads us to blame them. It is thus of vice and of the virtues as of the sensible qualities, of sounds, of colours, of heat and of cold, etc. These qualities are properly only perceptions of our mind. They do not exist in the objects. We do not perceive them by means of reasoning: we feel them. Likewise\(^1\) whatever is moral in human actions is discovered not through the path of reflection, but through that of sentiment. If we think it otherwise it is only because this sentiment is so quick, so gentle, so subtle, that we customarily confound it with the ideas that it generates afterwards.”

In a word, according to our author, the mind,\(^{422}\) as much as the body, has a taste, and this taste helps it to distinguish that which is right from that which is wrong, in the same manner as we at first glance distinguish that which is beautiful from that which is ugly. It is a matter of sentiment: reasoning has no place in it.

If one wishes to know what the difference is between the impressions that right makes on this mental taste, and those made by wrong, one can instruct oneself only by returning into oneself. What is right gives pleasure and is approved; what is wrong produces pain and is blamed. There is the key to the whole mystery! Finally, if one is not satisfied and asks again, whence comes this diversity of effects, and why virtue causes in us a sentiment of pleasure, while vice brings to the mind a sentiment of pain? our learned metaphysician answers, that this diversity of effects comes from different causes, some natural, the others artificial, and, after a great deal of hair splitting over these terms, he postpones the explanation of the precise ideas he attaches to them. It is not, however, without concluding that it is a great mistake, generally speaking, to say that virtue is something natural to man. Since there are artificial virtues, they are not all natural, and a good philosopher must know how to distinguish them.

In ordinary language, what we have just read amounts, if I am not mistaken, to this. In order to express with precision the difference between right and wrong, it is necessary to state\(^{423}\) the question in these terms. Why is it that our mind,

\(^{11}\)Page 24 [Treatise 3.1.1.26; SBN 469].

\(^1\)Page 26 [Treatise 3.1.2.1; SBN 470].

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on a simple view of certain actions, is touched by a sentiment of pleasure that makes it approve them, whereas on the view of other actions it is touched by a contrary sentiment? Many people would be satisfied to reply that it is because we are so made, but for the liking of our author, this is not philosophical enough. It is necessary to say that things happen in this way because our mind, besides its other faculties, has a mental taste that is partly natural to it, but also partly artificial—that is to say, which in part follows from the constitution of our nature, and in part is the product of education, example, conventions and of human laws [des constitutions humaines]. With the help of this taste our mind notices at once, by the pleasure or pain it experiences, that which is morally good and morally bad, and thus, entirely spared from reasoning, this sentiment suffices for it to choose, without doubt, to embrace virtue and avoid vice.

That is the whole system of our author. When Mr. Hutcheson proposed it in his *Recherches sur l’origine des Idées que nous avons de la Vertu & du Bien moral*, able people found in it three great flaws. Firstly, they did not approve of this supposition of a new mental faculty, intended only to enable our mind to discern right from wrong. They saw this as absolutely useless, and claimed that the mind, given its indisputable capacity to reflect and sense, is adequately furnished with all that is necessary for it to distinguish good from evil. Secondly, they observed that in this system the perception of objects is confounded with the sentiments that result from these perceptions. On this, Mr. Burnet raised objections that up until now have remained unanswered. Thirdly, and last, they did not conceal that this mental taste, or this moral sentiment, whatever one wishes to call it, is clearly linked to fanaticism, and can at least very easily open the door to the excesses of enthusiasm. Dr. Berkeley sharply exposed this difficulty in his *Alciphron*, and made it clear that nothing would be more arbitrary than the ideas of right and wrong if these depended on such an inner taste. I do not understand how it is that our author did not find it appropriate to examine the objections of these scholars. They would have opened a beautiful field for his speculations, and for his profound metaphysics. Perhaps it is modesty, perhaps even prudence. How can one add anything to the ingenious efforts that Mr. Hutcheson has opposed to Mr. Burnet’s reflections on this topic?

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1 *An Inquiry concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue and Moral Good*. 8°. [The reviewer cites, with a minor alteration (“and” for “or”) the English title given to Treatise II of Hutcheson’s *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*.]

2 *Letters between the late Mr. Gilbert Burnet and Mr. Hutcheson, concerning the true foundation of Virtue &c*. 8°. London, 1735. No philosophical controversy has ever been conducted, by both parties, with so much spirit, candour and politeness, as in these letters of Messrs. Burnet and Hutcheson. One can without reservation offer them as a perfect model for this kind of dispute.

3 *Alciphron; or, The Minute Philosopher*. Dialogue III.
Be that as it may, it is on the supposition of a sense or mental taste that the whole of the morals of our ingenious anonymous author is founded. At the outset he concludes that virtue is evaluated,^M not according to the sentiment that one has of one’s duty, but from the motives leading to it. Why is there any merit in being just, in restoring, for example, a loan one has received? The justice of it certainly does not lie in the action itself; it is the end that one proposes for oneself; it is the motive that engages to it. And what is that motive? Is it the love of public good? Is it private utility? Is it some other general principle that derives from the constitution of human nature and by which all men are affected? Until now, philosophers and jurists have believed one or the other; but they are, in the judgement of our author, seriously mistaken. The sentiment one has of justice or injustice derives not, he claims, from the manner in which we are made.

“[It arises in us, he says,]^N only artificially, though necessarily, from education and conventions that men have made between themselves. . . . Thus, justice is at bottom only an artificial virtue, even though its rules be not at all arbitrary.”

To clarify these obscurities, the author^O examines more particularly the *Origin of Justice and the Right of Property*, and on this matter suggests two important questions. Firstly, he says, we must see

“in what manner the rules of justice have been established by the artifice of men; and secondly, what are the reasons that determine us to attach to the observance of these rules the ideas of moral beauty, while we consider the breach of them as something ugly and deformed”

that we could not reasonably approve.

He is much concerned with the first of these two questions. He judges^P

“that the rules of justice owe their origin to human conventions, intended to remedy some inconveniences, which arise from the concurrence of certain *qualities* of the mind, and the *situation* of external objects. These

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^M Part II Sect I. Page 40 [*Treatise* 3.2.1.7; SBN 479].

^N Pages 48, 49 [*Treatise* 3.2.1.17, 19; SBN 483, 484].

^O Part <II>. Sect II, p.50. [The quoted questions that follow are from Part 2, Sect. 2, of Book 3 (3.2.2.1; SBN 484). The reviewer mistakenly cites Part III].

^P Page 66. [*Treatise* 3.2.2.16; SBN 494, pages 66–67 in the first edition of the *Treatise*.] Here are the exact words of the author: “These are intended as a remedy to some inconveniences, w<h>ich proceed from the concurrence of certain *qualities* of the human Mind, with the *situation* of external objects. The Qualities of the Mind are *selfishness* <sic> and *limited generosity*: And the situation of the external objects, is their *easy change*, join’d to their *scarcity* in comparison of the wants and desires of men.”
qualities, he adds, are self-love and a limited generosity. The situation of external objects, is their inconstancy, joined to their scarcity in comparison with our desires and our needs.”

What language! All this means, according to the principles of our author, that men, having come together in society, have established laws based on their mutual interest, and that these laws are so much the rules of justice that, prior to them, there was nothing like the right of property or, in consequence, that which we call justice or injustice. This, as one can see, is Hobbes’s system clothed in a new fashion. Had that philosopher brought it forward in this manner, I doubt that he would have had such a reception in the world.

But this is indeed more than is necessary to give an idea of the morals of the profound author of all the beautiful discoveries contained in the Treatise of Human Nature. We would not dare to follow him farther, for we feel incapable of always grasping his meaning precisely, and even more of making it intelligible without making too great an effort. The most sure [course] is to send readers curious about metaphysical subtleties and abstractions to the book itself. Were the author willing to add a glossary, he could spare his readers much work.

IV. Comparisons

(A) In order to show the significant differences between the sense of the Treatise as presented by the reviewer’s translated quotations of it and Hume’s original texts, we here present three-column comparisons of three relatively lengthy French “quotations” of Treatise 3 found in the Bibliothèque raisonnée review, then our back-translations of these “quotations,” and lastly, the versions of these texts found in the Treatise.81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translations of Hume’s text</th>
<th>Back-translations</th>
<th>Texts of the Treatise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>« La Raison... c’est la découverte du Vrai &amp; du Faux. Le Vrai consiste dans une convenance, soit avec les relations réelles des idées, soit avec l’existence réelle des choses en matière de fait; &amp; le Faux consiste précisément dans le contraire. Par conséquent tout ce qui n’est point susceptible de cette convenance ou de cette disconvenance, ne pouvant être ni Vrai ni Faux, ne saurait être</td>
<td>[3.1.1.9; SBN 458] “Reason... is the discovery of truth and falsehood. Truth consists in an agreement, either with the real relations of ideas, or with the real existence of things in matters of fact; and falsehood consists in precisely the contrary. Consequently, all that is not susceptible of this agreement or of this disagreement, being incapable of being either true or false, could not pos-</td>
<td>[3.1.1.9; SBN 458] “Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now ’tis evident our pas-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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l’objet de notre Raison. Or il est évident que nos Passions, nos Volitions & nos Actions n’en sont pas susceptibles, parce qu’elles sont des faits originaux & des réalités originales, qui existent chacune à part indépendamment de toute autre Passion, de toute autre Volition, de toute autre Action. Donc on ne saurait les dire vraies ou fausses, conformes ou contraires à la Raison. Elles sont ou loulables ou blâmables, mais il y aurait de l’absurdité à les appeler raisonnables ou déraisonnables. Si je me trompe en croyant que certains objets peuvent me donner du plaisir ou me causer de la douleur, si je m’égaré dans le choix des moyens que j’emploie pour satisfaire mes désirs, si je me perds de vue à cause des fautes, je ne puis me référer que si une erreur de droit enantécédement à l’erreur de droit, non plus que l’autre, immorality est évident que nos Passions, nos Volitions, et nos Actions ne sont pas susceptibles, parce qu’elles sont des faits originaux & des réalités originales, qui existent chacune à part indépendamment de toute autre Passion, de toute autre Volition, de toute autre Action. Donc on ne saurait les dire vraies ou fausses, conformes ou contraires à la Raison. Elles sont ou loulables ou blâmables, mais il y aurait de l’absurdité à les appeler raisonnables ou déraisonnables. Si je me trompe en croyant que certains objets peuvent me donner du plaisir ou me causer de la douleur, si je m’égaré dans le choix des moyens que j’emploie pour satisfaire mes désirs, si je me perds de vue à cause des fautes, je ne puis me référer que si une erreur de droit enantécédement à l’erreur de droit, non plus que l’autre, immorality est évident que nos Passions, nos Volitions, and our actions are not susceptible to any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, complete in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason. [3.1.1.10; SBN 458] Actions may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable. [3.1.1.12; SBN 459–60] If I am more to be lamented than blam’d, if I am mistaken with regard to the influence of objects in producing pain or pleasure, or if I know not the proper means of satisfying my desires. No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character. . . . I ask, therefore . . . if it be possible to imagine, that such errors are the sources of all immorality? . . . . [3.1.1.14; SBN 460] Shou’d it be pretended, that tho’ a mistake of fact be not criminal, yet a mistake of right often is; and that this may be the source of immorality: I would answer, that ’tis impossible such a mistake can ever be the original source of immorality, since it supposes a real right and wrong; that is, a real distinction in morals, independent of these judgments. A mistake, therefore, of right may become a species of immorality; but ’tis only a secondary one, and is founded on some other, antecedent to it.”
« Supposons qu’un Chêne ou qu’un Orme laissent tomber à leurs pieds quelques-unes de leurs graines, & que de-là il s’élève de jeunes Arbres, qui s’étendant peu à peu étouffent enfin ceux à qui ils devoient leur existence. Je demande si ce cas n’offre pas à nos yeux les mêmes relations violées, que dans le cas du Parricide? J’y vois un Arbre produit, qui étouffe un autre Arbre duquel il tenoit la vie, précisément comme lorsqu’un Enfant tue son Père. Dirait-on que l’Arbre n’a ni connaissance, ni choix? Eh qu’importe? Ce n’est pas la volonté ou la liberté, qui forment entre un Père & un Fils, la relation de Fils & de Père: c’est la génération; & cette génération forme aussi précisément la même relation entre un Orme, & un Ormeau produit de la graine du prémier. C’est la volonté ou la liberté, qui détermines a man to kill his parent; and they are the laws of matter and motion, that determine a sapling to destroy the oak, from which it sprung. Here then the same relations have different causes; but still the relations are the same: And as their discovery is not in both cases attended with a notion of immorality, it follows, that that notion does not arise from such a discovery.”

“Prenons un exemple qui soit encore plus sensible. Je [3.1.1.24; SBN 467]84 “Suppose that an oak or an elm drop some of their seeds at their feet, and that from these young trees rise up, which, growing little by little, finally stifle those to which they owe their existence. I ask whether this case does not offer to our eyes the same breached relations as in the case of parricide? I see here a tree produced, that stifles another tree from which it derived its existence, precisely as when a child kills his father. Does someone say that the tree has neither knowledge nor choice? Of what import is that? It is not the will or freedom that forms between a father and a son the relation of son and father: it is generation; and this generation forms also precisely the same relation between an elm and a young elm produced from the seed of the former. It is the will or freedom that determines a man to kill his father: just as they are the laws of motion that determine a young elm to grow up to stifle the elm that produced it. Here, in a word, the same relation has certainly different causes, but it remains always the same relation. In consequence, since this does not produce the same effect in man and in trees, it should not be regarded as the source [principe] of the crime that the former commits by becoming the murderer of his father: or, to say the same thing in other terms, it is not for having violated it that parricide is criminal.

[3.1.1.25; SBN 467–68] “But to choose an instance, still more resembling; I would fain ask any one, why incest
à voir d'où vient que l'inceste est considéré si abominable, parmi les hommes, & qu'on n'y attache pas la moindre idée de turpitude, quand c'est une bête qui le commet? Répondra-t-on que c'est parce qu'un Animal brute n'a pas assez de Raison pour découvrir la turpitude de ce crime, au-lieu que l'Homme a toutes les lumières nécessaires pour l'apercevoir? ... Ce seroit tomber dans un cercle vicieux, car alors on supposerait qu'il y a quelque turpitude dans la nature des choses, avant que la Raison la découvre; qu'ainsi la turpitude est indépendante des décisions de la Raison, qu'elle en est l'objet, mais qu'elle n'en est point l'effet, ... & que par conséquent, quoique les Animaux n'aient pas un degré de Raison suffisant pour découvrir les devoirs qui découlent de certaines relations, c'est assez qu'ils se trouvent eux-mêmes dans ces relations, pour être soumis à ces devoirs & obligés à les remplir ».

« Lors ... que nous décidons qu'une action est mauvaise, ou qu'un caractère est vicieux, cela ne signifie autre chose, sinon que par une suite de la constitution de notre nature, nous ne pouvons y réfléchir, sans éprouver en nous un sentiment qui nous porte à les blâmer. Il en est donc du Vice & des Vertus, comme des qualités sensibles, des sons, des couleurs, du chaud & du froid, &c. Ces qualités ne sont proprement que des perceptions de notre Ame. Elles n'existent point to know how it comes about that incest is considered so abominable a crime, among men, while not the least idea of turpitude is attached to it when it is an animal that commits it? Does someone reply that it is because a brute animal does not have enough reason to discover the turpitude of this crime, while a man has all the light required to perceive it? This would be to fall into a vicious circle, for then one would suppose that there is some turpitude in the nature of things, before reason discovers it; that, thus, the turpitude is independent of the decisions of reason, that it is the object, but not the effect of it ... and that in consequence, even if animals have not a degree of reason sufficient to discover the duties which follow certain relations, it is enough that they find themselves in these relations, in order to be bound by these duties and obliged to fulfil them.»

[3.1.1.26; SBN 469] “When you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind:

in the human species is criminal, and why the very same action, and the same relations in animals have not the smallest moral turpitude and deformity? If it be answer'd, that this action is innocent in animals, because they have not reason sufficient to discover its turpitude; but that man, being endow'd with that faculty, which ought to restrain him to his duty, the same action instantly becomes criminal to him. ... this is evidently arguing in a circle. For before reason can perceive this turpitude, the turpitude must exist; and consequently is independent of the decisions of our reason, and is their object more properly than their effect. ... Their ["Animals"] want of a sufficient degree of reason may hinder them from perceiving the duties and obligations of morality, but can never hinder these duties from existing; since they must antecedently exist, in order to their being perceiv'd. Reason must find them, and can never produce them.”

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perceive them by means of reasoning: we feel them.\[3.1.2.1; SBN 470] Likewise whatever is moral in human actions is discovered not through the path of reflection, but through that of sentiment. If we think it otherwise it is only because this sentiment is so quick, so gentle, so subtle, that we customarily confound it with the ideas that it generates afterwards.”

(B) These comparisons show important differences between the sense of the Norton-Perinetti translation and the Maury translation, leaving it to the reader to determine which of these translations is more accurate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bibliothèque raisonnée text</th>
<th>Norton-Perinetti translation</th>
<th>Maury translation</th>
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| “Tel est le Plan général de Morale que notre Auteur s’est formé. C’est, à notre avis, plutôt une ébauche des principes de l’Art de bien vivre, qu’un Système complet & lié dans ses parties. Il pourrait y avoir plus d’ordre, plus de clarté, plus de détail; mais aussi, il ne saurait y avoir plus de paradoxes, plus d’associations singulières d’idées & de mots, que personne ne s’étoit encore avisé de joindre; plus d’endroits propres à piquer la curiosité des gens qui n’aiment pas les routes battues; & pour tout dire enfin, plus de pensées neuves & originales. Il faut en tenir compte au subtil & ingénieux Anonyme. Non omnis fert omnia tellus.” | “Such is the general plan of morals that our author has devised. It is, in our opinion, more an outline of the principles of the art of living well than a complete and well-connected system. It could have more order, more clarity, more detail; but also, it could scarcely contain more paradoxes, more singular associations of ideas and words that no one ever thought of putting together before; a greater number of passages likely to arouse the curiosity of people who dislike the usual paths; and, in a word, a greater number of new and original thoughts. It is necessary to grant that to the subtle and ingenious author. Non omnis fert omnia tellus.” | “This is the general Plan of Morality that our author has formed. It is, in our opinion, more of a rough draft of the principles of the Art of well being, than a unified system. It could be more organised, have more clarity, be more detailed; but also it could have more paradoxes, more singular associations of ideas & words that nobody has yet ventured to suggest; more points intended to arouse the curiosity of people who do not like to follow the beaten track; & to say it all, more new & original thoughts. One must consider the subtle and ingenious ways of our Anonymous Author. Non omnis fert omnia tellus.” [Not all of the whole earth is fertile]
<418> « Le grand argument, qui détermine notre Auteur à rejeter la pensée de ceux qui trouvent dans les relations nécessaires des choses, les fondemens de la distinction du Juste & de l’Injuste, c’est non seulement, qu’il ne peut jamais résulter de-là des obligations proprement dites, mais seulement de simples motifs de convenance, pour déterminer à agir d’une façon plutôt que d’une autre; c’est sur tout, que si le Juste & l’Injuste découloïent de l’observation & du violement de certains devoirs, nécessairement attachés à telles ou telles relations, partout où ces relations auraient lieu, l’observation de ces devoirs pourroit être exigée, & ferait une vertu, tandis que leur violement ferait un crime. Or le contraire lui semble entièrement démontré par une réflexion, qui, sans être nouvelle, prend un air de nouveauté dans ses mains, par la manière dont il la propose ».

“The great argument that determines our author to reject the view of those who find in the necessary relations of things the foundation of the distinction between right and wrong, is not only that obligations, properly speaking, can never result from these relations, but only mere motives of agreement for determining one course of action rather than another. It is, above all, that if right and wrong derive from the observance and breach of certain duties, necessarily attached to such and such relations, then wherever these relations took place the observance of these duties would be required, and would be a virtue, while their breach would be a crime. But the contrary seems to the author fully demonstrated by a consideration which, without being new, in his hands takes on an air of novelty, because of the way in which he presents it.”

“The major argument demands that our author reject the thought of those who, in the foundations of Right & Wrong, found it in the necessary relations of things; it is not only that he cannot reject from these foundations some so-called obligations, but that he cannot rest on the simple grounds of expediency, in order to determine how to act in one way or in another. It is above all that if Right & Wrong proceed from the observation & violation of certain duties, necessarily attached to such relations, then everywhere these relations would have taken place, the observance of these duties would be required, & would be a virtue, whereas their violation would be a crime. Furthermore, the contrary seems to demonstrate entirely by reflection, which without being new, acquires a sense of newness in his hands, by the way he presents it.”

NOTES

For assistance and suggestions we are indebted to an anonymous referee for Hume Studies, Mark Box, Jan de Vet, Georges Leroux, Bruno Lagarrigue, Michel Malherbe, Mary J. Norton, Roxana Paniagua, David Raynor, M. A. Stewart, Isabel Rivers, Eric Schliesser, Piet Steenbakkers, and the delegates of the 32nd Annual International Hume Conference, University of Toronto, July 19–23, 2005. We are also indebted to the staffs of the Special Collections Department, University of Victoria Library; of the Special Collections Department of the Universiteit van Amsterdam; and of the Manuscripts Division of the British Library. Dario Perinetti’s research has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

2 The notices were, typically for the continental journals in which they were found, brief descriptive announcements that provided a sketch of the aim and contents of vols. 1 and 2 in a single paragraph. Reviews of the period were typically made up of excerpts and paraphrases that undertook to provide a digest of the book reviewed. The reviews of the *Treatise* included such elements, but the work also elicited significantly more critical comment than many other books reviewed in the same journals. For a complete list of these notices and reviews, see D. F. Norton, “Historical Account of *A Treatise of Human Nature*, from its Beginnings to the Time of Hume’s Death,” in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton, 2 vols. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2007), sect. 7. Most of the reviews of the first two volumes concentrated on vol. 1.


5 These were (a) four works in logic (in the eighteenth-century sense): Locke, *Essai philosophique concernant l’entendement humain*, trans. Coste; Charles Mayne, *Two Dissertations concerning Sense, and the Imagination*; Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, *Examen du pyrrhonisme and Logique*; (b) four works on moral theory: Jean Barbeyrac, *Traité de la morale des pères de l’église*; two editions of David Boullier, *Essai philosophique sur l’âme des bêtes*; and Mandeville, *Fable of the Bees*; (c) four works on natural law, two of which could be classed as moral theory: Pufendorf’s *Le droit de la nature et des gens* and his *Les devoirs de l’homme et du citoyen*. The others were by Heineccius: *Historia juris civilis romani, ac germanici*, and *Elementa juris Germanici*; (d) seven works in the philosophy of religion: Ditton, *La religion chrétienne démontrée par la resurrection*; [anonymous] *Essay philosophique sur la Providence*; Tindal, *Christianity as Old as the Creation*; Turnbull, *Philosophical Enquiry Concerning the Connexion between the Doctrines and Miracles of Jesus Christ*; [anonymous], *Memoires concernant la theologie et la morale*; Cudworth, *Systema intellectualae huius universi seu de veris naturae rerum*; and Wolff, *Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata*.


7 See Lagarrigue, Temple de la culture européenne, 71.


9 British Library Add. MS 4288 fo. 158, letter of William Smith to Des Maizeaux. See also Lagarrigue, Temple de la culture européenne, 74.


11 These biographical details are drawn from Joseph Almagor, Pierre Des Maizeaux (1673–1745), Journalist and English Correspondent for Franco-Dutch Periodicals, 1700–1720 (Amsterdam: APA-Holland University Press, 1989), 1–5. Des Maizeaux also translated into French a part of Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks, and published, in both French and English, the collected works (to which he contributed a biography) of another freethinker, Saint-Evremond.


13 According to Lagarrigue, the rare exceptions are reviews known to have been written by L. Baulacre (no. 576 in the list found in Temple de la culture européenne, 288–354); J.-P. Bernard (no. 880, and perhaps also no. 1185); P.-Fr. Le Courayer (nos. 752–4, a self-review, and 1045–6); J. Rouset de Missy (no. 422, and perhaps also nos. 322, 324); T. de Saint-Hyacinthe (no. 565, and perhaps also nos. 729, 830, 861). Five other individuals, C. Chais, J. J. Wetstein, J. Gagnier, P. Massuet, and a certain Taché, may have written, respectively, reviews 504, 657, 783, 873, and 926–27, while J. Vernet is known to have written no. 1167, a review of his own book. Neither Lagarrigue nor we have found any grounds for associating these individuals with the reviews of the Treatise.


16 Letter of 25 June 1737, British Library Add. MS 23416 fo. 36.

17 Lagarrigue, *Temple de la culture européenne*, 50–2, attributes 122 reviews to Barbeyrac. In correspondence Dr. Lagarrigue has added two further reviews, nos. 592 and 1096 in the list found, pages 288–354, of the work just cited.

18 We owe this point to Lagarrigue; see *Temple de la culture européenne*, 49–52.

19 See *Bibliothèque raisonnée* 24 (April–June, 1740): 325–55, 337. Of the books mentioned in note 5, Barbeyrac is thought to have reviewed Crousaz, *Examen du pyrrhonisme*, an eighty-page review with, by Lagarrigue’s count, ninety-six notes characteristic of Barbeyrac; Crousaz, *Logique*, a fifteen-page review with eight such characteristic notes; Barbeyrac, *Traité de la morale des pères de l’église*, a fifty-five page review with 121 characteristic notes; Pufendorf, *Le droit de la nature et des gens*, a thirty-two page review with thirty-three characteristic notes; Heineccius, *Historia juris civilis romani, ac germanici*, a sixty-six page review with 190 characteristic notes; Heineccius, *Elementa juris Germanici* a forty-nine page review with 141 characteristic notes; Tindal, *Christianity as old as the creation*, a seventy-two page review with 171 characteristic notes; Turnbull, *Philosophical enquiry concerning the connexion between the doctrines and miracles of Jesus Christ*, a twenty-six page review with forty-four characteristic notes; and Cudworth, *Systema intellectuale huius universi seu De Veris Naturae Rerum*, a ninety-three page review with 153 characteristic notes. Some of these reviews may also be attributed to Barbeyrac on other grounds. For further details, see Lagarrigue, *Temple de la culture européenne*, 50–2, and reviews 529–31, 342, 670–71, 1132, 1144, and 532–33 in the list, pp. 288–354.

20 See, e.g., the reviews, attributed to Barbeyrac, of *L’Etat & les délices de la Suisse*; *Christianity as old as the Creation*; *Memoires concernant la theologie et la morale*; *Enquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer*; *Examination of the Scheme of Church-Power*; and *Institution d’un prince*, items 1093, 1131, 273, 376, 591, and 566 in the list compiled by Lagarrigue, *Temple de la culture européenne*, 288–354.


22 The sale catalogue of Barbeyrac’s library was issued as *Bibliotheca Barbeyraciana* (Groningen, 1744). The auction began 30 March 1745. Several thousand titles were offered for sale.

23 As we go on to show, the attribution to Hutcheson of the critical components of the review of *Treatise* 1, and the whole of the review of *Treatise* 3, is most clearly made by Moore in his “William Smith and Hume’s *Treatise*,” 8–21. The attributions are more cautiously made in the works by Moore and Stewart cited in note 8. Readers should know that at least one scholar has taken these attributions to be correct and, insofar as they support Moore’s further conclusion that Hume was not significantly influenced by Hutcheson, of far-reaching significance. Alluding to, among others, this unpublished paper, John Robertson has said that the widely held view that Hutcheson had a significant influence on Hume, is “now very much in question. In a particularly original contribution to recent scholarship on the Scottish Enlightenment, James Moore has argued that the relation [of Hutcheson to Hume] was not one of influence, but of fundamental opposition. His evidence is both circumstantial and philosophical. It seems that Hutcheson was almost certainly the author of the successive critical reviews of Books I and III of the *Treatise of Human Nature* which appeared anonymously in the Amsterdam


25 Although the *Abstract* was ostensibly published by Charles Corbet, John Noon, publisher of Vols. 1 and 2 of the *Treatise*, was billed for the printing of the pamphlet; see D. F. Norton, “More Evidence that Hume wrote the *Abstract*,” *Hume Studies* 19 (1993): 217–22.


27 This review is carried out off-stage, as it were. The papers of Moore cited (see note 8) contain no explicit references to or discussions of the putatively relevant writings of Hutcheson.


29 Moore, “William Smith and Hume’s *Treatise*,” 16–21. In his letter to Hutcheson of 16 March 1740, Hume, speaking of the first two volumes of the *Treatise*, said: “I wish I cou’d discover more fully the particulars wherein I have fail’d. I admire so much the Candour I have observd in Mr Locke, Yourself, & a very few more, that I woud be extremely ambitious of imitating it, by frankly confessing my Errors: If I do not imitate it, it must proceed neither from my being free from Errors, nor from want of Inclination; but from my real unaffected Ignorance” (*Letters of David Hume*, 1: 39).


32 The inconclusive evidence for this possibility: (1) A survey of BR practice for the years it was overseen by Smith indicates that multi-volume works published, as the *Treatise* was, over a period of years, were typically reviewed by a single reviewer. See, e.g., items 356–7, 593–4, 633–4, 667–8, and 1152–4 in the list compiled by Lagarrigue. (2) The author of the review of vol. 3 is familiar with the earlier volumes of the *Treatise* and the review of vol. 1, and with the allegation of obscurity made in the review of
that volume: he observes that the author of vol. 3 has tried (without notable success) to make his views clearer than he had in vol. 1. (3) The two reviews show a similarity of reviewing style. The great majority of reviews in the BR are descriptive extracts. The reviews of the Treatise mix description and quotation with objections or criticism. (4) The two reviews also reveal significant similarities of language. To cite only one example, both take Hume to have described all ideas by the phrase, “faint and languid,” used only once (at Treatise 1.1.3.1) to characterize ideas of the imagination in contrast to those of the memory. Both reviews then translate Hume’s “faint and languid” as “languissantes & foibles.” And, although the phrase “faint and languid” is never used in vol. 3, the second review uses the same French phrase, “languissantes & foibles” in its translation of the Advertisement to vol. 3. Thus, while in this Advertisement Hume says only that he means “by ideas the fainter perceptions,” the reviewer has him saying “by ideas I mean only languishing and weak perceptions” (“par des Idées je n’entends que des perceptions laguissantes & foibles”). Further evidence of this last kind could strengthen the case for single authorship of the two reviews. See also note 50.


34 The reviewer may also have had a printed copy of the Abstract that had been sent to Smith by Noon, for the latter had been sending books for review in the Bibliothèque raisonnée since its inception in 1728. Indeed, Noon had more books reviewed in the Bibliothèque raisonnée than any other British publisher; see the list of reviews in Lagarrique, Temple de la culture européenne, 288–354. It would be surprising, then, if Noon, who had sent the two volumes of the Treatise to Smith, had not also sent him a copy of the Abstract, perhaps via Des Maizeaux. Alternatively, Charles Corbet could have sent a printed copy to Smith. In any event, a notice of the publication of the Abstract appeared in the spring 1740 issue of the Bibliothèque raisonnée, the issue in which the review of vols. 1 and 2 appeared. Consequently, it may be that both Hume and Noon or Corbet sent the Abstract to Smith.

35 On 16 March 1740 Hume wrote to Hutcheson: “I must trouble you to write that Letter you was so kind as to offer to Longman the Bookseller. . . . Tis in order to have some Check upon my Bookseller, that I wou’d willingly engage with another, & I doubt not but your Recommendation wou’d be very servicable [sic] to me, even tho you be not personally acquainted with him” (Letters of David Hume, 1: 38).


37 See Temple de la culture européenne, 47, 49–75, 317 (items 688–9). This lack of evidence bears equally on the claim that Hutcheson wrote the review, for it also appears,
as Moore puts it (see M2 above), that there is “no evidence, no mention of the two reviews in any of the surviving correspondence” or other remains of Hutcheson.

38 BR 26.2 (1741): 413. The original page numbers of the review appear in angle brackets, superscript, in the transcription that follows.

39 BR 26.2 (1741): 416

40 BR 26.2 (1741): 421–22

41 BR 26.2 (1741): 422–23

42 Reviewer’s Note: “An Inquiry concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue and Moral Good. 8°.” The reviewer cites, with a minor alteration (and for or) the title of the second of the two treatises making up An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.

43 Reviewer’s Note: “Letters between the late Mr. Gilbert Burnet and Mr. Hutcheson, concerning the foundation of Virtue &c. 8°. London 1735. No philosophical controversy has ever been conducted, by both parties, with so much spirit, candour and politeness, as in these letters of Messrs. Burnet and Hutcheson. One can without reservation offer them as a perfect model for this kind of dispute.”

Two remarks are in order here. First, we seriously doubt that Hutcheson would have written such an adulatory account of his own behavior. Second, Hutcheson broke off his correspondence with Burnet, correspondence published in the London Journal in 1725, so that he could prepare a less hurried response to the latter’s objections. This response he gave in his Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), where, he says, he had “endeavour’d to leave no Objections of [Burnet] unanswer’d” (p. xxi). The reviewer also reveals himself unaware that Hutcheson had expanded his replies to Burnet and other critics by revisions to the claim that he had confounded the perception of objects with the sentiments resulting from that perception. In the third edition of his Inquiry, Hutcheson clarified his view by explaining that the “quality approved by our moral Sense is conceived to reside in the Person approved, and to be a Perfection and Dignity in him: Approbation of another’s Virtue is not conceived as making the Approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy, tho ’tis attended with some small Pleasure. . . . The admired Quality is conceived as the Perfection of the Agent, and such a one as is distinct from the Pleasure either in the Agent or the approver; tho ’tis a sure Source of Pleasure to the Agent. The Perception of the Approver, tho attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from the Pleasure; even as the Perception of external Forms is attended with Pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from the Pleasure.” This explanation, he added, “may prevent many Cavils upon this Subject” (Inquiry 2.1.8).

44 Reviewer’s note: “Alciphron; or, The Minute Philosopher. Dial. III.”

45 BR 26.2 (1741): 425–6. Moore explains this apparent self-criticism on Hutcheson’s part by saying: “This was a remarkable intervention by a reviewer who was consistently critical of the author [Hume] for his lack of modesty. Would Hutcheson have demanded such unswerving loyalty, not to say adulation? Certainly, Hutcheson did not discourage discipleship of this kind among his followers in Dublin. And an obsequious deference to the leader was characteristic of the correspondence addressed to the patron of the ‘friends of virtue’ in Dublin, Viscount Molesworth. If Hume was
indeed a faithful follower of Hutcheson’s, as he seemed to be pretending, why had he not defended his mentor from his critics? The implication of the reviewer’s rhetorical questions was clear. Hume merely appeared to be a follower of Hutcheson’s. In fact, he was nothing of the kind.” In notes to this remark Moore refers his readers to the “contributions of Arbuckle and others to the Dublin Weekly Journal, 1725,” and to two papers by M. A. Stewart, but the materials cited fail to clinch the case for saying that Hutcheson immodestly demanded adulation or discipleship.

46 On being informed in 1738 that La Chapelle was seriously ill, Smith wrote to Des Maizeaux: “Si je le [La Chapelle] perds, je perds la personne de tout le Clergé français dont je fais le plus de cas, en qualité d’Homme d’esprit, d’Homme Savant, & d’Homme d’honneur, habile Journaliste & excellent Traducteur” (“If I lose him I will lose the person I trust the most among the French clergy, in his quality as a man of spirit, a scholarly man, and a man of honour, a skilful journalist and excellent translator.” Letter of 2 December 1738, British Library Add MS 4288 fos. 150–1).

47 Le babillard, ou Le nouveliste philosophe, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Changuion, 1724, 1735).

48 La Religion chrétienne démontrée par la Résurrection de Notre Seigneur Jesus Christ (Amsterdam: Wetstein and Smith, 1728), 85, 164–5, 280, 282, 302, 304, 308, 309, and 325.


50 J. J. Wetstein, co-publisher of BR, attributed these reviews of Boullier to La Chapelle. In a letter to the abbé Jourdain, 30 September 1737, about vol. 19 of BR, Wetstein said: “Mr. La Chapelle, qui est l’auteur du premier article dans la Bibliothèque raisonnée [of the first article in issue 19.1] aussi bien que du premier extrait sur l’âme des Betes n’épargne pas son confrère Boullier” (Biblio. Nat. Paris, AR 63, fo 161r, cited by Lagarrigue, Temple de la culture européenne, 73n. In the same note, Lagarrigue also cites in evidence of La Chapelle’s authorship of these reviews MS. C13, pp. 9–10, Bibliothèque Wallonne, Amsterdam.

51 Among the regular and occasional reviewers of the BR, La Chapelle was the one most interested in, and most competent to discuss, the theory of belief found in vol. 1 of the Treatise. La Chapelle’s translation of Ditton’s Discourse concerning the Resurrection of Jesus Christ reveals his interest in theories of belief and moral certainty, and in the problems emerging from a probabilistic approach to non-demonstrative knowledge. His review of this second edition of Boullier’s Essai philosophique sur l’âme des bêtes confirms this interest, and finds him drawing a distinction between knowing and believing, between “savoir” and “croire,” where the former is said to be the result of “evidence that strikes us personally” (qui nous frappe nous-mêmes), and the latter is said to be the result of testimony. He then objects to Boullier’s attempt to ground the certainty of matters of fact on the principle of sufficient reason, favouring instead Ditton’s view that the certainty of belief is the product of an implicit obligation; see Ditton’s Discourse concerning the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, 2nd ed. (London, 1714), 72–3. Testimony, when
properly given, is generally reliable, and skepticism with respect to it would result in a total destruction of social institutions. See BR 19.1 (1737): 12, 22–3. La Chapelle was also interested in probability and statistical tables, as his article showing acquaintance with work on the rate of mortality in London shows. See his “Avis important sur les Calculs d’Arithmetique Politique, qui regardent la Ville de Londres,” BR 25.1 (1740): 164–70. La Chapelle likely had in mind the work by William and Charles Petty, *Several Essays in Political Arithmetick* (London, 1699).

52 These reviews are attributed to La Chapelle by Lagarrigue, *Temple de la culture européenne*, 297, 307, 354.

53 “Il faut donc que la Critique d’un Journal soit un peu raisonnée: il y faut de la discussion, & des preuves, & comment est-ce alors que l’on peut éviter la raillerie & le badinage si l’occasion s’en présente?” BR 3.2 (1729): 380.


55 “Ces façons de parler si peu naturelles, & cependant si fréquentes, font une peine extreme” BR 20.1 (1738): 269.

56 This remark comes at the end of a longer passage: “Peut-être ne serons-nous pas toujours assez heureux pour comprendre, & pour goûter toutes les pensées de ce grand Homme: mais comme nous ne lui imputerons point notre ignorance, nous attendons aussi qu’on ne nous fera pas un crime de l’avoir confessée. Il n’est pas toujours si facile de saisir la vérité, quand elle ne se laisse trouver que dans les Labyrinthes d’une longue chaine de Propositions compliquées” BR 20.1 (1738): 287.


58 BA 13 (1725): 281.

59 La Chapelle observes that it is “un peu sur prenant, que Mr. B[oullier] qui paroit aimer assez à citer, ne fasse mentions nulle part de l’excellent Traité de Mr. Ditton, sur la Résurrection de J.C. où il traite de l’Evidence morale avec beaucoup de netteté & de précision, & dans un ordre admirable. Mr. B[oullier] n’a pas pu ignorer qu’il y a un tel Livre: cependant il ne fait pas semblant de le connoître; sans doute afin de ne pas paroître contredire ce qu’il dit dans son Epitre Dédicatoire à Mr. De Fontenelle, que la matière de la Certitude morale est presque neuve.” BR 19.1 (1737): 45.


63 BR 26.2 (1741): 427. La Chapelle had earlier objected to Mandeville’s *Fable of the Bees* for much the same reason that he objects to Hume’s account of justice. See BA 13.1 (1725): 97–125.

64 La Chapelle’s reference is ambiguous; he may have had John’s more famous brother, Samuel Clarke, in mind.

65 “Je confesse, avec beaucoup d’ingénuité, que je n’ai pas assez de penetration pour découvrir la liaison de ce raisonnement.” BA 9.2 (1721): 441.

66 “Je le dirai même ingénument. Quelque cas que nous fassions des lumières & du discernement de Mr. Deslandes, nous ne saurions ni adopter toutes ses idées sur les différentes matières qui composent l’Histoire Critique de la Philosophie, ni dissimuler les raisons qui nous empêchent de les adopter” BR 20.2 (1738): 270.

67 BR 26.2 (1741): 415. La Chapelle is also fond of the term *l’Anonyme*, a term used four times to refer to the anonymous author of the *Treatise* in the review of vols. I and II of that work. The term is not used by Barbeyrac when referring to anonymous authors; see reviews 273, 376, 566, 591, 602, 606, 681, 1093, 1131–2, and 1144 in Lagarrigue’s list, 289–350.


71 BA 13.1 (1725): 110–12. M. A. Stewart has reminded us that La Chapelle’s view is in some respects similar to that expressed by John Milton in his *Areopagitica*.

72 “My Own Life,” in *Letters of David Hume*, 1: 2.

73 For details about these items, see the essay cited in note 2.

74 See above, at note 24.

75 This last possibility is one implication of M. A. Stewart’s suggestion that in *My Own Life* Hume was pushing “the line he wished to promote for posterity.” See “Two Species of Philosophy,” in *Reading Hume on Human Understanding*, ed. P. Millican (Oxford: The Clarendon Press), 67–95, 81.

76 For a comprehensive description of the physical features of the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, see Lagarrigue, *Temple de la culture européenne*, 167–83.

77 To locate the texts of the *Treatise* cited by the reviewer, see the relevant parallel notes in the translation below.
78 As the preceding transcription shows, the original gives the main title in English and then again in French.

79 Virgil had written, referring to an ideal age, “omnis feret omnia tellus” (“every land shall all things bear alike,” Eclogues 4.37). According to Erasmus (Adagiorum 4.4.20), in its negative form (“non omnis fert omnia tellus”) and used to refer to the intellectual talents of an individual, this proverb suggests that one should not expect everything from every person. We are indebted to Georges Leroux for advice regarding this proverb and its translation.

80 It has been suggested to us that “grounds of convenience” would be an appropriate translation of the reviewer’s phrase, *motifs de convenance*. We grant that this suggested translation could be an appropriate twenty-first-century rendition of the phrase in question, but we believe it inappropriate for the philosophical and historical context in which it is used. First, “grounds of convenience” does not square well with the philosophical point raised. The reviewer reminds us of Hume’s claim that obligations cannot be derived from necessary relations, and then alludes to his concession that necessary relations might, at most, produce “*motifs de convenance.*” In the passage the reviewer is discussing, the only concession Hume makes regarding the role of reason in morality is that a judgment (reason) may *obliquely* cause an action (Treatise 3.1.1.9–11; see also 2.3.3.6) in the sense that the passion prompting the action may be *about* some matter of fact that we *judge*, rightly or wrongly, to be thus and so. In these circumstances, necessary relations may give us, indirectly or obliquely, reasons for following a given course of action. Although it is not entirely clear what the reviewer intends, it does seem that the context of the discussion excludes “grounds of convenience” as an apt translation of his chosen phrase. Second, the 1762 Dictionnaire de l’Académie gives two possible meanings for a fundamentally synonymous phrase, *raisons de convenance*. One of these meanings is “des raisons de pure bienséance” (reasons of propriety). The other is “des raisons qui sont probables & plausibles, & qui ne sont point démonstratives” (reasons that are probable and plausible, but are not demonstrative ones). This second definition appears to catch the sense of the phrase, *motifs de convenance*, used here. In short, our translation, “motives of agreement,” is compatible with Hume’s talk of oblique causes, and is closer to a likely eighteenth-century sense of the phrase.

81 For an additional comparison of the same sort, see note 32.

82 The citations of the Treatise that follow are from the first-edition text available to the reviewer. This text may differ in minor ways from those of the critical text found in the Oxford Philosophical Texts and the Clarendon editions of the Treatise, or from that found in SBN.

83 The previously published translation (by Phillipe Maury, in Fieser, Early Responses to Hume, 1:2–10) fails to translate the line (“Elles sont . . . déraisonnables”) taken from 3.1.1.10.

84 Maury includes the following passage (from 3.1.1.24) that is not included in the review: “To put the affair, therefore, to this trial, let us chuse any inanimate object, such as an oak or elm; and.” It should be noted that Maury does not in fact *translate* the quotations of the Treatise found in the review. He instead inserts the text of the Selby-Bigge edition of the Treatise. As our comparisons show, there are important differences of sense between the reviewer’s translations and Hume’s original text.
85 Maury includes in his translation approximately 130 words that are not included in the translation of 3.1.1.25 found in the review. The mistakenly included passage begins, “According to this system” and continues through “distinguish’d from the reason” [page 301, lines 10–20, of the critical text; page 467, line 36 to page 468, line 10, of SBN].

86 This sentence is more properly understood as a gloss of the opening half of 3.1.1.26 than as a translation of any given part of the paragraph.