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Philosophical Relations, Natural Relations, and Philosophic Decisionism in Belief in the External World: Comments on P. J. E. Kail, *Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy*

ERIC SCHLIESSER

My critical comments on Part I of P. J. E. Kail's *Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy* are divided into two parts. First, I challenge the exegetical details of Kail's take on Hume's important distinction between natural and philosophical relations. I show that Kail misreads Hume in a subtle fashion. If I am right, then much of the machinery that Kail puts into place for his main argument does different work in Hume than Kail thinks. Second, I offer a brief criticism of Kail's argument for reading Hume "as a realist about the external world" (Kail, 67). The two parts are (loosely) tied together because it turns out that Kail and I disagree about how Hume thinks of philosophers' activity generally.

One caveat: in what follows I do not offer a review of the highlights of Kail's terrific book. In particular, my arguments do not touch his analysis of the very helpful distinction between feature projection and explanatory projection that plays a crucial role in the two other parts of the book. There is much to admire in Kail's approach, which combines analytic rigor and exegetical care with wide historical learning. There are many illuminating excursions to Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley, and even Freud. Moreover, Kail is to be praised for

treating Hume's *Treatise* as a unified book and not as two distinct contributions to epistemology and moral philosophy. If I were to do justice to the book's many merits, it would far exceed the brief criticism that follows.

I: Natural and Philosophical Relations and Probable Reasoning

Much of the interest in Kail's book is in the nitty-gritty details. Here I focus on Kail's treatment of Humean reason and Hume's treatment of relations. Kail writes, "Hume will argue that our capacity to reason upon *philosophical* relation of causation presupposes that we have habits of inference—*natural* relations among ideas—drawn through experience of cause and effect." This is Hume's conclusion to the key section T 1.3.6, "Of the inference from the impression to the idea." Kail then quotes Hume's crucial sentence: "Tho' causation be a *philosophical* relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet 'tis only so far as it is a *natural* relation, and produces an union among our idea, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it" (T 1.3.6.16; SBN 94) (Kail, 42–43; emphases in Hume and Kail).

At first glance I very much liked Kail's emphasis on *Treatise* 1.3.6 and 1.3.6.16, in particular.¹ Kail then adds: "Part of the significance of this conclusion lies in the consequence that there is no faculty of probable reason that is independent of the mechanism of association. . . . Prior to Hume, associative inference was identified with animal inference and, while humans did share in that kind of associative inference, such inferences were sharply distinguished from reason. For Hume, the basis of probable reason is animal reason" (Kail, 43). Kail thinks the result so important that he repeats the claim a few pages later (Kail, 46).

So far, so good. But upon closer inspection it turns out that Kail and I disagree on some crucial matters. In treating of Hume's account of reason, Kail makes the following four-fold distinction: (1) reason_f is a psychological faculty, which, itself, comes in two "forms:" demonstrative and probable reason; (2) reason_N is a reason qua a normative consideration in favour of a judgment; it turns out that on Kail's account "reason_f is our means of detecting or being sensitive to reasons_N" (Kail, 36). (3) Reason_i is reasoning qua a form of inference or mental transition from one judgment to another; it turns out that this third type of reason is a species of, (4) reasoning_A, a mental activity of a certain kind in which ideas are compared (Kail, 36–37).

Let's accept temporarily for the sake of argument the utility of this fourfold distinction in thinking about the matters treated by Hume. But is it really Hume? According to Kail "there are two forms of reason_f that are demarcated by whatever kinds of relations to which they are sensitive. In the case of *demonstrative* reason, these are relations of necessitation. In the case of *probable* reason, we are sensitive to what Hume calls the philosophical relation of cause and effect. These relations are reasons_N and grasping reasons_N involves the activity of comparing ideas standing

in relations. Such a grasp produces a judgment of a kind and forces assent” (Kail, 37; emphases in Kail). I leave aside potential confusion here about the nature of demonstrative reason given the role of necessary connection in causal relations. Unfortunately, in context Kail offers no textual support from Hume for any of these claims. And none can be offered because I doubt that what Kail says can be found in Hume, who is, in fact, frustratingly silent about the relationship between probable reason and his theory of relations.

Before I get to core problems in Kail’s account, I need to prevent two potential misunderstandings: first, if “probable reason” (a form of reason,) is to be identified with the associative mechanism found in our animal nature, then probable reason would not be, in Hume’s terminology, a philosophical relation but rather what Hume calls a natural relation. There is evidence to support the claim that probable reason works by way of the associative mechanism because Hume writes: “[T]hus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another” (T 1.3.8.12; SBN 103; I return to this passage below). In context, it is quite clear that Hume is describing the workings of the associative mechanism (see also T 1.3.9.2; SBN 107). But, of course, Kail is not claiming that probable reason should be identified with a philosophical relation, but rather that it is *sensitive* to it.

Second, recall that when Hume introduces the notion of a “natural relation,” he claims that he is tracking the “common language” or “common” use of the word “relation” (T 1.1.5.1; SBN 13–14). Hume explains that he introduces “philosophical relations” to distinguish them from how they are used in “common language”; as Hume writes, “’tis only in philosophy, that we extend it to mean any particular subject of comparison” (T 1.1.5.1; SBN 13–14). Hume is distinguishing two kinds of relations to distinguish two kinds of (domains of) use of the word/concept “relation.”² But this linguistic distinction is grafted on a more fundamental distinction: the three natural relations are associative mechanisms “by which two ideas are connected in the imagination” (T 1.1.5.1 SBN 13–14). The seven philosophical relations, by contrast, do not involve “a connecting principle,” but can be “any particular subject of comparison” (T 1.1.5.1; SBN 13–14). The comparison forms a complex idea (T 1.1.4.7; SBN 13). Hume considers each of the seven philosophical relations in turn and concludes that of them, “there remain only four, which depending solely upon ideas, can be the objects of knowledge and certainty” (T 1.3.1.2; SBN 70). On the difference between those philosophical relations which can be *known* and those that cannot, Hume writes: “These relations may be divided into two classes; into such as depend entirely on the ideas, which we compare together, and such as may be chang’d without any change in the ideas” (T 1.3.1.1; SBN 69–70). The ones that are possible forms of knowledge rely entirely on the

relata within the relations themselves, and these include “resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and number” (T 3.1.1.19; SBN 463–64). According to Kail (appealing to T 1.3.2.2; SBN 73), these are the constant philosophical relations (Kail, 38). The ones that cannot be known (in this technical sense) include identity, relations of time and place, and causation (T 1.3.1.1–2; SBN 69–70). According to Kail (appealing to T 1.3.2.2; SBN 73) these are the inconstant philosophical relations (Kail, 38). The philosophical relation of causation involves a *comparison* of ideas (T 1.3.14.31; SBN 169–70); in Kail’s terminology it is a form of Reasoning_A. But crucially, it cannot produce secure knowledge—something that Kail only seems to acknowledge in a cryptic footnote (Kail, 37n15).³

Now I am in position to offer my three main criticisms. First, I see no evidence that according to Hume in *probable* reasoning, we are necessarily *sensitive to the philosophical* relation of cause and effect. I know of no text that supports this claim, and quite a few that suggest otherwise. For example, in an important passage Hume writes, “’Tis therefore necessary, that in all probable reasonings there be something present to the mind, either seen or remember’d; and that from this we infer something connected with it, which is not seen nor remember’d” (T 1.3.6.6; SBN 89). This passage does not suggest that in probable reasoning we are sensitive to the philosophical relation of cause and effect. There is no comparison of ideas here. In fact, in context it seems quite clear that Hume is discussing causation as a natural relation.

One might think the claim in the last sentence is not so obvious. Kail might respond that at *Treatise* 1.3.2 Hume treats of probability as a species of philosophical relation. In fact, I concede that from *Treatise* 1.3.1.1 through 1.3.5.8, Hume explicitly deals with philosophical relations.⁴ So, perhaps Kail’s claim about probable reason as it enters into Reason_F can be salvaged. But T 1.3.6 marks an important transition; Hume is explaining mental inference including (crucially!) probable inference. As he writes, “When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determin’d by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination” (T 1.3.6.12; SBN 92). And as the first sentence of the following paragraph makes clear (“The principles of union among ideas, I have reduc’d to three general ones, and have asserted, that the idea or impression of any object naturally introduces the idea of any other object, that is resembling, contiguous to, or connected with it”) he is treating natural relations here. So, the crucial passage at T 1.3.6.16 that is at the core of my criticism of Kail below, is the conclusion (“thus”) of a section that explains why despite having discussed the importance of philosophical relations before in *Treatise* 1.3.1–1.3.5, philosophical relations are rather impotent without the presence of the appropriate natural relations and, crucially, custom (T 1.3.6.14; SBN 93). Even if philosophical relations were present, it is misleading to suggest that we are “sensitive” (in the manner suggested by Kail) to them.

The claim that complex ideas such as philosophical relations are absent from probable reasoning is supported, for example, by Hume's footnote at T 1.3.7.5 (SBN 96): "we may exert our reason without employing more than two ideas, and without having recourse to a third to serve as a medium betwixt them. We infer a cause immediately from its effect; and this inference is not only a true species of reasoning, but the strongest of all others, and more convincing than when we interpose another idea to connect the two extremes."

Second, Kail treats Humean philosophical relations as what Kail calls reason_N. Recall that according to Kail, "Reason_N is a reason qua a normative consideration in favour of a judgment" (36). Now I fail to see how in Hume's science of human nature Humean relations are the right kind of thing to be a "reason qua a normative consideration in favour of a judgment." It is *prima facie* at odds with the idea that judgments just are vivacious ideas (for example, T 1.3.5.7). But rather than pursuing that line of argument here, I explore Kail's claim in the context of Humean relations. Recall that Humean relations come in two types: there are natural relations, which *just are* the associative mechanisms, and philosophical relations, which *just are* comparisons of ideas, that is, complex ideas. In particular, philosophical relations can be "without a connecting principle"—they can even involve "the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy" (T 1.1.5.1; SBN 13–14). Recall, especially, that the philosophical relation of causation is inconstant (as Kail had rightly claimed, 38). Moreover, all philosophical relations presuppose resemblance, but not all resemblances produce a "connection or association of ideas" in the imagination (T 1.1.5.3; SBN 14). That is to say, not *all* philosophic relations can enter into the mind's proper functioning (below I explain and partially justify my normative language). Some, that is, Kail's "constant philosophical relations," can, of course, but these exclude causal reasoning. I do not see how inconstant philosophic relations can function as a "reason qua a normative consideration in favour of a judgment." So, I fear that in this respect Kail's project has really become about Hume* rather than Hume.

This is not to deny there is a normative element to Hume's project. Humean reasoning is normative. I quote: "'Tis impossible to reason *justly*, without understanding perfectly the idea concerning which we reason; and 'tis impossible perfectly to understand any idea, without tracing it up to its origin, and examining that primary impression, from which it arises. The examination of the impression bestows a clearness on the idea; and the examination of the idea bestows a like clearness on all our reasoning" (T 1.3.2.4; SBN 74–75 [emphasis added]; see also the promissory note at the end of T 1.1.1.12; SBN 7). Hume offers this genetic method not merely as a means to ensure that one is in possession of clear ideas but also to bestow "clearness" on our ideas and reasoning. But such "clearness" is used (T 1.2.2.1–2; SBN 29–30) as a necessary condition for meeting a stricter demand. Our ideas must be "adequate." By this Hume means that the relations *within* an idea

capture what we would call the content of the relations of the object they aim to represent. For Hume one must reason with “adequate” ideas in order to be assured of “the foundation of all human knowledge.” This foundation is secure because, “[w]herever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects; and this we may in general observe to be the foundation of all human knowledge” (T 1.2.2.1; SBN 29; see also T 1.1.7.5; SBN 19; and T 1.3.3.11). So, while we can often have the appearance of reasoning, properly functioning reasoning is a constrained activity. In Kail’s language: when reasoning_i (a species of reasoning_A) by reason_F is “just” (or properly functioning) there is no further fact of the matter (and reason_N drops out of the picture).

According to Hume, the mind can “join two ideas” even without their being associated, “for nothing is more free than that faculty” (T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10–11). So, there is no doubt that philosophical relations come (shall we say) cheaply. But can one reason justly and adequately with philosophical relations qua philosophical relations according to Hume? I think not. The passage from T 1.3.6.16 that Kail cites twice supports my position! I quote: “’tis only so far as it is a *natural* relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it” (T 1.3.6.16; SBN 94; emphasis in original). I read this as meaning (approximately): even if causation as philosophical relation is understood to mean contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, it is only because a natural relation produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to draw any inference from it or reason about it. Hume calls attention to the fact that it is also the case “in philosophy. When I am convinc’d of any principle, ’tis only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence. Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another” (T 1.3.8.12; SBN 103). Hume is, thus, very deflationary about the role of philosophical relations and, by implication, the philosophers’ success in developing systems that deviate from common life. This is very different from Kail’s reading, who, in drawing on the same passage, seems to think that natural relations are merely a temporal presupposition to the use of philosophical relations (Kail, 46).⁵

However, as Don Baxter pointed out to me (private correspondence, August 16, 2010) one might object against my argument that Hume also mentions causal reasoning based on a single experiment. The principle of this reasoning is that we have millions of cases to convince us “*that like objects, plac’d in like circumstances, will always produce like effects*” (T 1.3.8.14; SBN 104–105). This clearly echoes the definition of causation as a philosophical relation. So, there seems to be causal reasoning based on a philosophical relation after all.

But note, first, that Hume recognizes this instance as something “rare and unusual.” Second, Hume explains the case as follows:

and as this principle has establish'd itself by a sufficient custom, it bestows an evidence and firmness on any opinion, to which it can be apply'd. The connexion of the ideas is not habitual after one experiment; but this connexion is comprehended under another principle, that is habitual; which brings us back to our hypothesis. In all cases we transfer our experience to instances, of which we have no experience, either *expressly* or *tacitly*, either *directly* or *indirectly*. (T 1.3.8.14; SBN 104–105)

Hume's remarks suggest that my way of understanding Hume's analysis of the relationship between philosophical and natural relations is the standard way Hume is thinking of the role of natural relations. For in the passage Hume is explaining that it is not the philosophical relation by itself that does the connecting work (of the sort I ascribe to natural relations). Rather, as Hume explains, it piggybacks on other mental mechanisms. So, rather than being a contradiction of my reading of T 1.3.6.16 (SBN 94), it supports it.

Finally, there is, of course, another normative aspect to the science of man in the *Treatise*. Curiously, it is completely ignored by Kail. This is my third main criticism. In *Treatise* 1.3.15, Hume states eight “rules by which to judge of causes and effects” because it is “possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each other.” Hume thinks it is “proper” to employ them in his “reasoning” (T 1.3.15.11; SBN 175; T 1.3.15.2; SBN 173). Earlier in the *Treatise*, he was even more adamant about the regulative character of these rules: “We shall afterwards take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to *regulate* our judgment concerning causes and effects; and these rules are form'd on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects” (T 1.3.13.11; SBN 149; emphasis added).⁶ So, these rules prescribe how *one* should ascribe causes to “objects” in the world, *especially* in “most of our philosophical reasonings.” So, it is not philosophic relations that are the proper candidates for being reason_N, but Hume's (inductive) “Logic,” that is, his rules of reasoning. While Hume's rules guide our search for reason(s)_N there can also be appeal to them in reason_N. There is no reason, if one were so tempted, to attribute to Hume a distinction between discovery and justification here.

II: On Belief in the External World

In my scholarship on Hume I have always tried to avoid the so-called New Hume debate; while my heart is with the “old” Hume, I have always felt that a) I have nothing to contribute to the debate and b) the debate detracts from understanding

Hume's aims. Even if skeptical realism were an accurate description of the *Weltanschauung* to be found in Hume's writings, I have always thought that according to Hume such theses are not "the turn to the speculations of philosophers" he wished to give; the whole debate does not point to "those subjects, where . . . they can expect assurance and conviction" (T 1.4.7.14; SBN 272–73). Yet, the part of Kail's book assigned to me has its crescendo with the claim that "realism is defensible for Hume on the external world . . . it is liable to a form of practical justification" (Kail, 72).⁷

Near the end of Part I of his book, Kail explains why, on his view of Hume, the philosophical belief in the external world is different from belief in God. Kail has an ingenious two-fold argument that relies on Hume's doctrine of natural belief (graciously acknowledging Kemp-Smith) and the so-called title principle (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270) made popular by Don Garrett. The natural belief in the external world is coherent, commonsensical, a necessary precondition of action, universally held, and non-rational (Kail, 68–69). Kail notes that it might seem strange to claim that qua being a philosopher, Hume's belief in the external world is universal. He deflates this worry by claiming, with reference to Hume's Letter to Elliott, that even the philosopher's belief is the result of a universal propensity. But Kail makes a funny move in the argument. He writes, the philosopher's belief "is an instance of a philosophical decision, and philosophical decisions are 'nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected' (EHU 12.25; SBN 162)." Rather than quoting the *Treatise*, Kail shifts to the first *Enquiry* here. Kail then goes on to explain that, according to Hume, "The philosophical view must 'derive all its authority from the vulgar system' (T.1.4.2.47; SBN 212)⁸ but it has authority nevertheless" (Kail, 69).

It should be clear that, given my treatment of Hume's views of philosophical relations, I take Hume to be rather deflationary of philosophical pretence. So, I doubt that Kail offers here a persuasive reading of Hume as the great advocate of philosophical decision. In fact, it is damning that here Kail had to switch to the first *Enquiry*. For in the concluding paragraphs of T 1.4.2 Hume "cannot forbear giving vent to a certain sentiment, which arises upon reviewing those systems" (T 1.4.2.56; SBN 217–18). This feeling turns out to be "the sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses," and it is a "malady which can never be radically cur'd, but must return upon us every moment, however we may chace it away, and sometimes may seem entirely free from it" (T 1.4.2.57; SBN 218). So, the point of the whole section is to undermine the authority of philosophical systems even when founded on natural belief.

Hume's feeling of "sceptical doubt" is only *seemingly* eradicated even when we act in accord with the title principle; that is, "where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to" (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270). We sometimes cannot avoid acting, of course, but at T 1.4.2.57 Hume warns the reader not to be deceived by appearances.

One might think that, because the title-principle comes later, it supersedes the warning of T 1.4.2.57. Yet, the very same paragraph of the oft-quoted title-principle also contains the claim that, “[i]f we believe, that fire warms, or water refreshes, ’tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise” (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270). There is nothing here to suggest that the presence of natural beliefs and activity can fully prevent Hume from occasionally *thinking* painful thoughts; as he admits such “spleen . . . and . . . indolence . . . *sometimes* prevail upon” him (T 1.4.7.14; SBN 272–73; emphasis added). When one attributes skeptical realism to Hume, one allows the appearance of Hume’s “careless manner” to turn a blind eye to how Hume’s ambition and intellectual philanthropy (T 1.4.7.12; SBN 270–71) and self-command (T 1.3.14.12; SBN 632–33) are hiding his suffering on our behalf from us.⁹ Why Hume would wish to undermine the authority of philosophic decisionism goes beyond the scope of my remit here.¹⁰

NOTES

I thank Angela Coventry for inviting me to comment on Peter Kail’s book, *Projection and Realism in Hume’s Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at an “Author Meets Critics” session, Central APA, 2010. In what follows, page-numbers refer to Kail’s book. I have benefitted greatly from the spirited discussion with Peter in Chicago. I am also grateful to Donald Ainslie, Donald Baxter, Peter Millican, Lewis Powell, Stefanie Rocknak, and Yoram Hazoney for extensive and very insightful comments on an earlier draft.

1 In fact, T 1.3.6.16 plays a crucial role in two of my papers, Eric Schliesser “Two Definitions of ‘Cause,’ Newton, and the Significance of the Humean Distinction between Natural and Philosophical Relations,” *The Journal of Scottish Philosophy* 5 (2007): 83–101, and Eric Schliesser, “Two Definitions of Causation, Normativity, and Hume’s Debate with Newton,” *Future Perspectives on Newton Scholarship and the Newtonian Legacy*, ed. Steffen Ducheyne (Brussels: KVAW, 2009) and their treatment of Hume’s definitions of causation. Before and after the Hume Society 2010, Antwerp, I had very useful exchanges over the nature of philosophical relations with Stef Rocknak (in the context of her terrific book manuscript) and Don Baxter (in context of my role as official critic of his book, Donald Baxter, *Hume’s Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise* (London: Routledge, 2007). They have improved my understanding of these difficult matters. But they should not be blamed for my remaining mistakes. Citations of the *Treatise* refer to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary Norton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), abbreviated “T” in the text and cited by Book, part, section, and paragraph number, followed by the page number in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), abbreviated “SBN” in the text.

2 Stefanie Rocknak, “The Construction of Relations in Hume and Quine,” PhD Dissertation, Boston University, 1998, 24–29, anticipates the point.

3 This is illustrated by Hume's definitions of causation. Hume's definition of a natural relation of causation is the following: "A Cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of another, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other" (T 1.3.14.31; SBN 169–70). It calls attention to the fact that the natural relation is an associative mechanism of the imagination. It is, thus, the kind of causal entity that makes our reasoning possible and allows it to function smoothly. The definition of cause as a philosophical relation, however, makes no mention at all of a role in causally connecting ideas. Recall, "We may define a CAUSE to be 'An Object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedence to those objects, that resemble the latter'" (T 1.3.14.31; SBN 218). Hume explicitly contrasts this "comparison of two ideas," which is a kind of reflection, from an "association betwixt them," which is instinctual (T 1.3.14.31; SBN 169–70).

4 For an analysis of the significance of the role of the distinction between philosophical and natural relations throughout Treatise 1.3, see chapter 2 of Stefanie Rocknak, (ms) *Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects*. Rocknak also has a very important defense of a form of reason distinct from philosophical probable reason and instinctive probable reason; where an idea is inferred from an impression via an exercise of thought. She labels this latter, third kind of probable reason, "transcendental"—here I cannot do justice to her threefold distinction.

5 In my 2007 article I added a footnote, "For a close cousin to my views, see Wayne Waxman, *Hume's Theory of Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 82: "Philosophical relations are wholly parasitic on natural [relations]: lacking any belief-engendering powers of their own, they must rely on that of natural relations from which they spring." Waxman's way of phrasing suggests that for him philosophical relations can have belief-engendering powers (through natural relations) even if they differ from underlying natural relations, so he ends up disagreeing with my reading of Hume's deflationary attitude toward causation as a philosophic relation (and Newton's science more generally). While there are differences between Kail's position and Waxman's, on Kail's reading of Hume philosophical relations are a version of reason_n and, as such, can have belief-engendering powers. His reading of Hume differs from Waxman's in that Kail does not seem to think philosophical relations are wholly parasitic on natural relations.

6 See Marie A. Martin, "The Rational Warrant for Hume's General Rules" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 31.2 (1993): 245–57; and Graciela de Pierris, "Hume's Pyrrhonian Skepticism and the belief in Causal Laws," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 39.3 (2001): 351–83.

7 This teaches me never to say "yes" automatically to requests originating with Angela Coventry again!

8 The passage should be cited as T 1.4.2.49 (SBN 213).

9 For the importance of Hume's self-command in the face of suffering, see Eric Schliesser, "The Obituary of a Vain Philosopher: Smith's Reflections on Hume's Life," *Hume Studies* 29.2 (2003): 327–62.

10 Eric Schliesser, "Hume's Attack on Newton," *Enlightenment & Dissent* 25 (2010): 167–203.