In his *Enquiry* version of the conditions of justice, Hume adds a third modified Hobbesian condition to the two, moderate scarcity and moderate selfishness, which he had listed in the *Treatise*. The new condition is a certain measure of equality, or limit to inequality—justice is owed, he says, only if there is a society of more-or-less equals, and only to those who are members of it. The equality in question concerns the ability of candidate society-members to make us feel the effects of their resentment (E190). If such ability is lacking, then, Hume says, the relationships between "us" and "them" will be those of absolute command on the one side and servile obedience on the other. Whatever we covet, they must instantly resign: Our permission is the only tenure, by which they hold their possessions: Our compassion and kindness the only check, by which they curb our lawless will (*Ibid.*). This passage is interesting because Hume describes the position of such powerless creatures intermingled with men in terms which appear to be social—command, obedience, possession, tenure, the act of "resigning" coveted goods. But he says that our intercourse with them could not be called society, which supposes a degree of equality (*Ibid.*). True society is, then, restricted to those who are roughly equal, whose interests help to determine the conventions which give rise to duties of justice. But intermingled with the members of such a real society there might be, were or are, a *species* of creatures, who, though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment (*Ibid.*). They are "rational", so can obey, can resign possessions, and can resent their inferior status. They have quasi-social relations with their masters, but not fully social ones, since they are neither parties to nor bene-
ficiaries of the social conventions which create rights and duties. Hume seems to assume that because they are not parties to the artifice-creating conventions, those conventions will not cover relations with them, so that the conveners' "laws" are limited, and allow them a sphere of "lawless will" in their dealings with the inferior creatures. But children, for example, while not legislators, may be both right holders and beneficiaries of the laws which adults agree on. Hume is most charitably read here to mean that the conventions which serve the interests of the superior creatures might not, cannot be depended on, to regulate in any way the dealings of the superiors with the inferiors. They are left at the mercy of their superiors, resent that fact, and yet may be powerless to alter the situation.

It is very clear from what follows that Hume has in mind in this passage the relations of males to females, and that it is his thoughts about male-female relationships which led to his emendation of his Treatise account of the conditions of justice. The Treatise had not mentioned equality of power as a condition for justice, but had devoted a chapter to the extra obligations, of chastity and modesty, which social conventions imposed on the female sex. It was therefore a natural question to arise for Hume whether women really could be parties to conventions which imposed these obligations on them. Were their interests served, or did these obligations arise from "the voluntary conventions of men," (T510, emphasis added) who asked themselves what restraint, therefore, shall we impose upon women, in order to counter-balance so strong a temptation as they have to infidelity? (T571). Hume had argued that female fidelity was needed for male paternal obligations to be properly assigned, so that it was in the interests of children, of fathers, and of society in general, that fatherhood be determinable, and so that wives be chaste. Now, in the Enquiry, he considers the possibility of a class of slaves whose interests, like those of animals, need not be considered
in the conventions which generate duties of justice.

The great superiority of civilized Europeans above barbarous Indians, tempted us to imagine ourselves on the same footing (as to animals) with regard to them, and made us throw off all restraints of justice, and even of humanity, in our treatment of them. In many nations the female sex are reduced to like slavery... (E191).

Is it like it in being only imagined to obtain? Hume has been noncommittal on slavery--Europeans are "tempted" to imagine that Indians cannot make resentment felt, and males in some nations have the same temptation in their treatment of females. What Hume goes on to say makes it clear that he believes that the conditions for excluding women from considerations of justice could be met if males were united in a confederacy to maintain this severe tyranny. The chances of their remaining united, however, are slight, since women, Hume says, have such "insinuation, charm and address" that they are "commonly" able to break the male confederacy. This characterization of the power of women, as lying in their charm or refusal to charm, might not endear Hume to contemporary feminists, but he does see the issue clearly as one essentially concerning power, and what is more he relates the power of women to break male confederacy not merely to their insinuation, address and charm, but to what lies behind it--the fact no human is possessed within himself (of) every faculty, requisite both for his own preservation and for the propagation of his kind (Ibid.). Hume goes on to attribute to the natural attraction between the sexes, and the natural parental instincts, a fundamental role not merely in providing a base on which a more extensive artifice-secured society can be founded, but also in ensuring that in such a society women can qualify for membership--they can make the effects of their resentments felt.

I find Hume's treatment of the relation of resentment and power to make resentment felt to a sense of injustice interesting and provocative. If he is right, resentment may be felt by those to whom no injustice has been done,
as well as by victims of injustice. Resentment becomes resentment of injustice only when accompanied by some degree of social effect. If the resentful have this ability to make trouble, then there will be some sort of recognition of their interests and their claims, even if these are not met. A sense of injustice is a sense, not of hopeless resentment, but of forceful resentment.

Resentment, as an emotion, has had a bad press. Its most recent denigrator is Robert Solomon, who in his book The Passions characterizes it as a passion felt by those with "utter impotence," (354) by those whose status is "intolerable inferiority" (353). It thrives, he says "in the dark and moist shadows of the soul away from direct confrontations with superiors, bosses, members of the 'opposite' sex, bullies and authority figures" (Ibid.). This is fine rhetoric, but is it the truth? Must resentment be concealed, must it be impotent? Hume suggests that it can be effective, that it can break confederacies; perhaps even form them. Solomon's treatment of resentment as a nasty negative emotion felt only by emotionally crippled self-haters is in what might be called the Nietzschean tradition. Nietzsche contrasts the sense of justice of the free strong man, whose own word makes law, and for whom justice is being true to his word, with the slave's sense of injustice, his envy of the powerful. The latter feeling is reactive, passive, while the superman's conscience is awareness of his own sovereign active will. The chief contrast is between the doers and the sufferers, and resentment is, like envy and pity, a feeling reserved for the passive ones, the natural victims, those who react rather than act to establish their autonomy. For all Nietzsche's talk of transformation, he gives us more a typology of emotions than an account, like, say, Hegel's in the Phenomenology of Spirit of how they might, within one individual, transform themselves. (Transvaluation occurs across generations, not within one life.) In this respect Solomon
is more Nietzschean than Hegelian, but I find in Hume the beginning of an account of how passions change direction, and of what drives the change. In this Enquiry passage on resentment, the contrast between ineffective resentment and effective resentment, the suggestion that power is acquired by confederacy, lost by its break-up, and the linking of effective power with a role in a productive process, all foreshadow Hegelian and Marxist themes.

This Hegelian note in Hume is not confined to these pages of the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, but can also be detected in Books II and III of the Treatise. Hume gives little space to discussing resentment, but significantly he does include it in the list of basic passions, ones which produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections (T439). The root sense of resentment, that it is simply a second feeling about some matter, typically a feeling consequent upon an action prompted by the "first" sentiment, makes it an essentially reactive emotion. Samuel Johnson's first sense of "resent" is "to take well or ill" and he cites Bacon's use "well-resented" simply meaning reacted to favorably. It was only later that Johnson's second sense of "resent", and "resentment" as "a deep sense of injury", came to predominate. That is Hume's sense. His list of basic passions sometimes has "resentment", sometimes "desire to punish our enemies", which is a more active, or less "deep" sense of injury, one which has surfaced enough to take the form of a desire to inflict a retaliatory strike. In what sense can resentment, the deep sense of injury, "create good and evil", when it does seem to "proceed from them," if it is essentially reactive? Presumably Hume means that expressing resentment, making it felt, typically in revenge, is wanted in itself, not for its hedonic promise. Just as we eat to satisfy hunger, so we make resentment felt to satisfy resentment. The pleasure of such satisfaction need not be something we recall from previous successful punitive strikes. We know a priori that we
will find it good to satisfy resentment as we know that satisfying hunger is a good.

This basic desire to punish our enemies is possible only for creatures who see themselves as capable of suffering not merely pain and frustration, but injury or wrong, and who furthermore aspire to the moral role of punisher. Resentment is not simply anger, it is the form anger takes when it is provoked by what is seen as a wrong, and when the striking back which is desired is seen as punishment. (Johnson's first sense of "injury" is "hurt without justice".) This basic passion, more than any other in Hume's list, contains the seeds of the moral sentiment—a sense of oneself as one to whom wrong can be done, and an aspiration to an active proto-moral role, that of revenger.

Hume's list of basic or non-hedonic passions is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust and a few other bodily appetites (T439). Earlier, at T418, he equates resentment with the desire to punish an enemy for an injury, and at T417 he lists those instinctive passions which can be calm, and this list is benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children. The resulting list of basic passions is therefore: certain appetites, resentment, the love of life, benevolence to friends and kindness to children. It is an initially puzzling list, perhaps intended merely as a list of instincts we in fact discover in human persons, with no common factor whatever. But it is clear that Hume intends kindness to children to mean mainly kindness to one's own children, in some sense of one's "own", so this instinct, like benevolence, is an instinct which eventually gets recognized as a natural virtue, and together they may even be seen as containing the germs of that positive side to the moral sentiment, the encouragement and endorsement of good qualities in children and other loved ones. Resentment, love of offspring, and benevolence to loved persons would between them provide the seeds from which we
get moral recognition of both artificial and natural virtues. 2

Benevolence, Hume had told us, is naturally but contingently related to love, recognition of good in others. No such contingently related desire was found by Hume as the natural accompaniment to love's parallel passion, pride. It, Hume says, is unaccompanied by any desire, not immediately exciting us to any action (T367). I want to make the admittedly bold interpretative suggestion that resentment is negatively to pride as benevolence is to love. Pride does not immediately excite us to any action, but being prevented from having any chance of pride provokes resentment. Those masters whose permission is the only tenure which the slaves have on possessions effectively deprive them of the chance for normal forms of pride. Pride, for Hume, is essentially pride in possession, but if the slaves must instantly resign whatever the masters covet, they have no security of possession of any transferable goods. The only possessions in which they can take pride are inalienable ones. Their instinctive sense of injury, even if it begins only as resentment at cruelty or some other breach of "the law of humanity," because it is the desire to punish, to play an active role, to possess the status of punisher, will, when it becomes at all conscious of itself, become resentment at having no such status, nor any secure possessions, at being deprived of the chance of pride. As Hume sees benevolence's natural place to be as an accompaniment to love, and one which, by conferring benefits on the loved person, increases the goods he possesses and so feeds the love, so I suggest we can see resentment as the watchdog of pride, the natural response to those who injure by preventing pride. (Preventing secure possession will also be preventing humility, which for Hume is not simply feeling that one has no grounds for pride, but feeling that one's possessions are of poor quality. Humility's "subjects" are the same as pride's "subjects".)
Pride, like love, Hume says, has, as its "causes", the fine possessions of its "object". We are proud of what is ours, love another for what is hers. And what is possession? To possess something, Hume tells us in Book Three, is to be so situated with respect to it, as to have it in our power to use... move, alter, or destroy it, according to our present pleasure or advantage (T506). Pride is essentially in possession, and possession is power. I think that, when we take Book Three's treatment of pride and of possession into account, we can see why Hume in Book Two had cited us a great variety of things in which we take pride, but had singled out virtue, riches, and power as peculiarly apt causes of pride. Pride must be taken in power over something, the thing possessed, and pride in generalized forms of power, such as power over others, or in riches, is pride in its paradigm form. In discussing virtuous pride, Hume says that we must recognize properly moralized pride as a virtue, since tis requisite on all occasions to know our own force, and pride makes us sensible of our own merit, and gives us a confidence and assurance in all our projects and enterprises (T597). At least by the time pride is moralized, it is a sense of power, and if we take seriously Hume's definition of possession, all along it was, in all its forms, pride in what in fact is power, of less or more generalized sorts. The person proud of the climate of the country where he takes his vacations (T307) is a degenerate case, since his "possession" is no more than the ability to take such vacations, no power over climate or country.

If we accept this thesis that Humean pride is essentially pride in power, and that resentment is the natural watchdog of pride, then we get the conclusion that the most proper objects of resentment are the wrongs of dispossession, expropriation, oppression, humiliation. The slave class Hume discusses, who may or may not have the power to make their resentment felt, are then ones who, because of their insecurity of possession, have none of the usual forms
of limited power, who may have nothing in which to take pride except their possible power to make resentment felt, and whatever ability gives them that power.

Before looking at other essential features of pride, for Hume, and relating them to the power to make resentment felt, I want first to raise the question of the relation between this negative basic desire and the "irregular" passion of envy and the mixed passions of respect and contempt. For Hume, envy is a case of a passion dependent upon the principle of "comparison" whereby a passion in one person provokes an opposed passion in another. A passion may spread by sympathy, and produce a like passion in another, as when your grief occasions my pity, or it may spread by comparison, as when your grief occasions my malicious pleasure. The "irregular" passions are these comparison-generated passions which are opposed in hedonic quality to the generating passion in another. Comparison is involved, since the misery of another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness. Our own feelings are enhanced or enlivened by their contrast with another's feelings. In the case of envy, another's happiness downgrades our own, especially if the other has more than one has oneself; the enjoyment, which is the object of envy, is commonly superior to our own. So far Hume is proceeding with his rather mechanical classification of passions, asking if they are self or other directed, pleasant or unpleasant, reactions to pleasure or to pain, communicated, if at all, by sympathy or by comparison. Where the account becomes interesting is always the point where qualifications, "curious" features, difficulties, are introduced into the taxonomy. Hume, immediately after defining envy in a general way as displeasure at another's pleasure, goes on to observe that the principle of comparison may work in a rather peculiar manner. He notes two things--first, that one may envy someone inferior in the relevant respect to oneself, if that inferior is advancing, and secondly that
one does not envy those who are very far above oneself, but those who are close. A common soldier bears no such envy to his general as to his sergeant or corporal. A great disproportion, Hume says, cuts off the relation and...keeps us from comparing ourselves with what is remote from us (T377-8). Envy then is felt for either superiors or inferiors, who are within sight of one's hopes of rising or fears of failing. Of envy of inferiors who are advancing Hume says that it involves comparison twice repeated—we compare our present distance from the inferior unfavorably with an earlier greater distance. It is unclear from Hume's account whether this makes the object of such envy strictly oneself at a previous time, or whether, more naturally, the object of one's envy is the one who, unlike oneself, is advancing.

Hume brings the complicating factor of social distance not only into his account of envy, but also into his account of respect and contempt: The same man may cause either respect, love, or contempt by his condition and talents, according as the person, who considers him, from his inferior becomes his equal or superior (T390). The passion one feels depends upon one's "distance" from the person, and whether one is above or below. Above or below them in what? In whatever it is which is the "subject" of the passion, that which is deemed a pleasure or pain giver. Hume, in discussing envy, speaks as if it is the enjoyment itself which one covets, but surely the envied sergeant need not be actually enjoying his superior position in order to be envied. It is his position which the common soldier envies, perhaps assuming that it makes more pleasure possible. Respect for a superior is surely not reserved for those superior in attainment of hedonic bliss. If it were, one would respect only the expert and successful hedonists. Hume's philosophy is perhaps marred by his official hedonist line, but in many places he allows himself significant departures from it. He emphasizes that we esteem the rich and powerful
whether or not they "spend" their riches and power in enjoyment: riches and power alone, even tho' unemploy'd, naturally cause esteem and respect (T359). It is by sympathy with the sentiment of the proprietor, (T310) Hume says, that we come to esteem a person for his riches or power. We realize that whether he gets or does not get the pleasures his possessions make possible depends only on his own will. We respect his potent will.

Hume's recognition of power as a good is only intermittent. The official line of the Treatise is that the only ultimate good is pleasure, that power matters because it puts pleasure within the scope of one's will. But in the details of Hume's discussion of pride, respect, esteem for the rich and powerful, as in his discussion of recognition of others as full members of a moral community, it is power not pleasure which seems to count. The "superiority" which is respected is not hedonic expertise or greater contentment, but superiority of rank and power.

There is another interesting passage in the section on respect and contempt where Hume deviates from his official classification of passions. According to Hume's general theory, the qualities for which one loves another are the very qualities which, if possessed by oneself, occasion pride. It is, however, a "pretty curious phenomenon" that some qualities are more fitted to inspire love than pride. Good nature, "facility", generosity, beauty have a peculiar aptitude to produce love in others, but not so great a tendency to create pride in ourselves (T392). Hume does not say that these unenvied lovable qualities are ones which confer little or no power on their possessor, but it would fit very well with the other "curious phenomena" and "difficulties" he cites to construe them this way. Pride, then, would be taken mainly in power-conferring qualities, and the recognition of such qualities in others will occasion not so much the pure love (T392) which beauty or good nature inspires, but either that love tinged with hatred which is respect. (T390), or else envy or resentment.
Resentment, envy and respect all seem to depend upon the workings of the principle of comparison, and so to involve an evaluation of one's own position in relation to others. Envy, if Hume is right, is felt only of those whose position is not far removed from one's own, and may be felt because of another's possession of any good, whether that good makes the other proud or merely lovable. One may envy one's neighbour his car, his looks, or his influence with local government. Respect is reserved for those at a greater distance from oneself in possession of prideworthy qualities, that is to say, if my interpretation is correct, of power conferring ones. What of resentment? Is it directed at the very same people who are the proper objects of Humean respect? (Hume's concept of respect allows no room for self respect, unless one construes that as a sympathetic sharing of one's inferior's respect for one, a seeing of oneself from their lowly viewpoint.) Resentment is not merely respect gone sour, a predominance of hatred in the mixture. It is related to pride, I have claimed, in a more complex way. Respect, on Hume's account, includes humility. Resentment does not. On the contrary, it requires a certain pretension to moral status in those who feel it--it is the desire to punish (not just to strike back at) those who injure, or wrong one (not just hurt one)--it is provoked by humiliation, which is not the same as being made to feel humble. Resentment is felt not only at injustice, but at injury, at insult, at exclusion, at being ignored. But it is felt only by those who claim moral recognition, and suffer moral wrong. What all the causes of resentment-exploitation, oppression, injustice, exclusion, insult--have in common is their demeaning humiliating effect. They all are cases of refusing to treat another as someone who can have cause for pride, and resentment is felt only by those whose pretensions, (implicit or explicit) to be included in the community of proud ones are somehow rejected by another.
But need pride make a claim on others? Can one not feel pride whatever others think about one? Hume's answer to this is not straightforward. In Book Three he says that virtuous or due pride must be "duly concealed" (T597), not flaunted. But it is one thing to conceal one's pride, another to base it on a self evaluation in no way confirmed by anyone else's assessment of one. In Book Two, Hume discusses the "love of fame," and says that pride needs to be sustained and increased by the proud person's sharing, by sympathy, of others' favourable evaluation.

Our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches, have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others (T316).

This need to have one's own evaluation "seconded" by others, preferably by those whom we ourselves esteem and approve of (T321), makes pride vulnerable to the contempt of others, and also to their mere refusal to "second," to their indifference or ignoring of the proud person's implicit appeal for reassurance. Hume later puts this thesis in vivid (and mixed) metaphorical terms. The minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each other's emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated... (T365). Humean pride does require recognition from another for its own survival. Resentment, on my suggested reconstruction, will naturally be directed at those who refuse to mirror a person's favorable self evaluation, who will not second one's self evaluation.

I have elsewhere explored the instabilities in a situation where Humean persons need their pride to be "seconded" by an equal or superior, yet are prone to envy of such near-equals. Hume says that

'tis necessary to know our rank or station in the world, whether it be fix'd by our birth, fortune, employments, talents, or reputation.
This conservatism, this faith that within each "rank" a person will find a mirror for pride, is belied by other insights of Hume into the instability of such passions and the way they can correct themselves. He gives a long intricate account of avidity's self-transformation. He does not do the same for meekness and resentment, but he has given us all the needed elements. "It is requisite on all occasions to know our own force" (T597). If pride is, at base, a sense of one's own adequate power or force, and if resentment is felt at the refusal of others not merely to allow it, but to recognize it, to second it, then, if there really is power there to be recognized, there will be power to make resentment felt. If the resenter is, as they are in Hume's example of women, essential co-workers with those who refuse them recognition, a dynamic force for change is provided. Hume, when he discusses the pride of masters, says that there is a special satisfaction in the control of other persons. The vanity of power, or shame of slavery, are much augmented by the consideration of the persons, over whom we exercise authority, or who exercise it over us. (T315). And again there is a peculiar advantage in power, by the contrast, which is, in a manner, presented to us, betwixt ourselves and the person we command (T316). The master needs the "consideration" of the slave yet cannot return a like consideration. Resentment is thereby fomented. As Hegel pointed out, the need of the master for the slave's respect, for confirmation of his superiority, as well as his need to have his pride seconded by someone he respects, put the slave in a position of unrecognized but real power. The resentment which is the proper response to this situation is not impotent, and its emergence from Solomon's "dark shadows of the soul" into the light of recognized power can be blocked, as Hume recognized, only by a temporary and self-defeating confederacy of masters. Cooperation between
equals is the only stable solution to the problem facing vain and needy masters and competent resentful slaves. Hume's account of the moral sentiment describes such a cooperative equilibrium, but in his social and political philosophy he fails to finish the story of how the instabilities of unequal power can correct both reactive resentment and equally reactive "vanity of power," transforming both into active principles which are "common and universal," the principles of action of the *party* of humankind against vice and disorder (E275).

I have tried to show that the role Hume gives to resentment suggests an interesting relation between that passion and pride, one's perception of one's own power and one's claim to have that perception reinforced. I have claimed that Hume's emphasis on the difference made to various passions by perception of social power and status, along with his theory that persons need their self-assessments "seconded" by a non-inferior, imply instabilities which he only partially recognized. I believe, but cannot here show, that his account of the moral sentiment does give us a general sketch of the dynamic by which pride in individuals who are socially interdependent can produce equilibrium out of disequilibrium. It is one of the great interests of Hume's moral philosophy that he gives two accounts of this process, one leading to the recognition of the natural virtues, another to the creation of artifices and the concomitant recognition of justice. It is partly for this reason that he can distinguish true society, secured by artifices or conventions which involve a *sense of common interest*, (T490) from quasi-social relations governed only by the "law of humanity". His definition of the conventions which give rise to justice has two separable components—the requirement that the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are perform'd upon the supposition, that something is to be perform'd on the other *part* (Ibid.), and the requirement of "like interest" (Ibid.)
The first requirement guarantees cooperation, the second secures a fair cooperative scheme. Hume's "species of creatures intermingled with men" are cooperating with their masters, the actions of slave make reference to the actions of master, but what is lacking is a sense of like interest. The relations therefore are quasi-social but not justice-rules. Hume's correct perception of this possibility, in the Enquiry, amounts to a recognition that not all conventions are rules or justice, and his brief diagnosis of when resentment can be effective suggests a scenario whereby conventions can be changed so as to become rules of justice. Once those who are cooperating in the workings of a convention in which they do not have a "like interest" not merely feel resentment at the non-recognition of their interests, but realize that by withholding cooperation they can make their resentment effectively felt, then the conventions can be expected to change so as to serve their interests. Their resentment which may begin as resentment at, say, cruelty, can grow into resentment at lacking a remedy against cruel treatment, into an awareness that not merely do they lack this right to redress but that they lack any security of alienable possessions, and from that to both resentment at this exclusion from the group of those to whom the conventions give any security of possession, and so any chance of pride in such possessions, and also to a pretension to full moral status and an awareness of the dependence of the oppressive conventions on their own cooperation. They then have, and know they have, the power to make resentment felt, the power to get the conventions changed into ones serving the interests of all those whose cooperative activities the convention coordinates.

Even if Hume is correct in supposing that constraining artifices will always be needed, that we will never achieve a society where every man, ...being a second self to another, would trust all his interests to the discretion of every man; without jealousy, without partition, without
distinction (E185), nevertheless his definition of a truly social convention requires a sense of like interest and a willingness to trust that interest to another's cooperative action. Even if all one's interests will never be safely trusted to every "man", it may not be too much to expect that one vital interest we all have, the interest in "knowing our own force" (T597), in having due pride sustained, can be trusted to every person, without jealousy, partition or distinction. Unless it is a reasonable hope that resentment can achieve its own overcoming, its transformation into due pride in recognized power, then social conventions can never be backed by a sense of like interest, nor ever therefore be stedfast and immutable (T620), nor even as immutable as human nature (Ibid.).

Annette Baier
University of Pittsburgh

1. According to Nietzsche and Scheler, resentment is an essentially postponed desire to hit back, and various poisons set in due to the postponement. Hume treats it more straightforwardly as a desire to punish enemies, which may or may not be acted on by actually punishing them. Where for Scheler the resentful person may express resentment in lots of ways, but these ways do not include active revenge, Hume sees the natural expression of resentment as attempted revenge, or punishment.

2. I am grateful to reviewers for Hume Studies for prompting me to reconsider my original view that all the non-hedonic passions were directly power-related. I now think we can see them all as implicitly aimed at the continuation of human nature in some essential aspect of it--at the self-preservation of the individual (love of life and the appetites), at the protection of the next generation (kindness to children), at the continuance of love (benevolence) and at the protection of pride (resentment). Such a will to continue could be seen as a will to power, but the power in question is power to keep ourselves going, not the power to dominate nor the power to destroy.