Hume Studies

Sasser review of Coventry's Treatise

2026-05-06T15:34:13-04:00

Olson review of Gill

2026-05-06T15:34:13-04:00

Hanvelt review of Zubia

2026-05-06T15:34:13-04:00

Hume on Characters, Virtues, and “Durable Principles of the Mind”

2026-05-06T15:34:13-04:00

Hume is widely understood to believe that all virtues and vices are “durable principles of the mind,” and that durable principles of the mind are character traits. However, I argue, Hume does not use ‘durable principles of the mind’ to refer to any character traits, virtues, or vices. Instead, a durable principle of the mind is a causally related succession of different perceptions within an actor’s mind, which may not exist for very long, but which will include the perception that causes the action. On this interpretation, Hume does not argue that all virtues or vices are character traits. He merely argues that, if a person’s action causes pain or pleasure, then this can only cause us to feel any love, hatred, approbation, or disapprobation for the person if we associate her action with a durable principle in her mind. I conclude by arguing that some Humean virtues and vices appear to be single perceptions, like a motivationally strong desire to help a stranger or to murder someone.

The Obligation and Value of Justice in Hume

2026-05-06T15:34:13-04:00

This paper develops an interpretation of Hume’s accounts of the obligation and value of justice. According to my interpretation, Hume takes the obligation of justice to depend (in part) on the conventions that define the rules of justice realizing a distinctive form of value, which I call functional value. Properly understanding Hume’s accounts, I argue, requires revisionary understandings of his accounts of both the set of things susceptible to fundamental moral evaluation and his view of the nature of utility.