Hume and Hume's Connexions

Final Programme
(Meals are available only for those who have booked in advance)

Monday 21 August

3.00-5.15 p.m. Reception: Bowland College foyer

4.00 p.m. Hume Society executive committee: Bowland College B.54

5.15-6.45 p.m. Seminar: Chemistry colloquium room
   S. K. Wertz, Texas Christian University: 'Hume and the historiography of science'
   Commentator: P. B. Wood, Queen's University, Kingston
   Chair: John Brooke, Lancaster University

7.00 p.m. Dinner: Cartmel restaurant

8.15 p.m. Lecture: Chemistry colloquium room
   David Fate Norton, McGill University: 'Hume and the experimental method'
   Chair: Wade Robison, Kalamazoo College

Tuesday 22 August

8.00-8.30 a.m. Breakfast (self-service): Cartmel restaurant

9.00-10.30 a.m. Concurrent seminars

(A) Chemistry colloquium room
   Barry Gower, University of Durham: 'David Hume and the probability of miracles'
   Commentator: David Owen, University of Arizona
   Chair: Christopher Belshaw, Lancaster

(B) Physics colloquium room
   Tom L. Beauchamp, Georgetown University: 'Hume's acknowledged sources and their clues to his connexions'
   Commentator: David Raynor, University of Ottawa
   Chair: G. A. J. Rogers, University of Keele

10.30 a.m. Coffee: Faraday foyer

11.00 a.m.-12.30 p.m. Concurrent seminars

(A) Chemistry colloquium room
   Christopher Bernard, University of St Andrews: 'Religion and the imagination--historical and philosophical perspectives'
   Commentator: J. C. A. Gaskin, Trinity College, Dublin
   Chair: Nicholas Phillipson, University of Edinburgh

(B) Physics colloquium room
   James Somerville, University of Hull: 'Futures past and futures future'
   Commentator: Anne Jaap Jacobson, Rutgers University
   Chair: Roger Gallie, University of Nottingham
12.45 p.m. Lunch: Cartmel restaurant

12.45 p.m. BSHP Management Committee working lunch

2.00-4.15 p.m. Concurrent symposia

(A) Chemistry colloquium room
Symposium: Morality and the self
Charlotte BROWN, S. Martin's College, Lancaster: 'Disinterested pleasure: Hume against the selfish schools and the monkish virtues'
R. G. FREY, Bowling Green State University: 'Self-love, benevolence and rational egoism—one view of invisible-hand arguments'
Commentator: M. M. GODSMITH, University of Exeter
Chair: Preston KING, Lancaster University

(B) Physics colloquium room
Symposium: Hume on probability
David OWEN, University of Arizona: 'Hume and the Lockean background—induction and the uniformity principle'
P. J. R. MILLICAN, University of Leeds: 'Hume's inductive scepticism and his alleged deductivism'
Commentator: John P. WRIGHT, University of Windsor
Chair: A. E. PITSON, University of Stirling

4.15 p.m. Tea: Faraday foyer

5.15-6.45 p.m. Concurrent seminars

(A) Chemistry colloquium room
Christine KORSGAARD, University of California, Berkeley: 'Normativity as reflexivity: Hume's practical justification of morality'
Commentator: Annette BAIER, University of Pittsburgh
Chair: Stephen DARWALL, University of Michigan

(B) Physics colloquium room
Manfred KUEHN, Purdue University: 'Kant's response to Hume's critique of faith'
Commentator: John BIRO, University of Oklahoma
Chair: G. COLERIDGE-TAYLOR, University of Sierra Leone

7.00 p.m. Dinner: Cartmel restaurant

8.15 p.m. Lecture: Chemistry colloquium room
Michel MALHERBE, University of Nantes: 'Hume and the art of dialogue'
Chair: M. A. STEWART, Lancaster University

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WEDNESDAY 23 AUGUST

8.00-8.30 a.m. Breakfast (self-service): Cartmel restaurant

9.00-10.30 a.m. Concurrent seminars

(A) Chemistry colloquium room
Wim KLEVER, Erasmus University, Rotterdam: 'Hume contra Spinoza?'
Chair: William ABBOTT, University of Waterloo
(B) Physics colloquium room
Thomas M. OLSHEWSKY, University of Kentucky: 'Belief, appearance and inquiry in Sextus and Hume'
Commentator: Alan HOLLAND, Lancaster University
Chair: Alexander BROADIE, University of Glasgow

10.30 a.m. Coffee: Faraday foyer

11.00 a.m.-12.30 p.m. Concurrent seminars

(A) Chemistry colloquium room
Pauline WESTERMAN, University of Groningen: 'Hume's search for social order'
Commentator: Knud HAAKONSSSEN, Australian National University
Chair: Lynne TIRRELL, University of North Carolina

(B) Physics colloquium room
John P. WRIGHT, University of Windsor: 'Hume's criticism of Malebranche's theory of causation—a lesson in the historiography of the history of philosophy'
Commentator: Stuart BROWN, The Open University
Chair: Fay SAWYER, Indiana University Northwest

12.45 p.m. Lunch: Cartmel restaurant

2.00 p.m. Visitors wishing to take excursion meet drivers at Bowland College reception.

5.30 p.m. Hume Society Business Meeting: Physics colloquium room

7.00 p.m. Dinner: Cartmel restaurant

8.15 p.m. Symposium: Chemistry colloquium room
David WOOTTON, University of Victoria, and Nicholas PHILLIPSON, University of Edinburgh: 'The natural history of man and the civil history of England' — a symposium on Nicholas Phillipson's Hume
Chair: John ROBERTSON, St Hugh's College, Oxford

THURSDAY 24 AUGUST

8.00-8.30 a.m. Breakfast (self-servie): Cartmel restaurant

9.00-10.30 a.m. Concurrent seminars

(A) Chemistry colloquium room
David R. RAYNOR, University of Ottawa: 'Hume and the Chevalier Ramsay'
Commentator: David FATE NORTON, McGill University
Chair: Oliver STUTCHBURY, Woodbridge

(B) Physics colloquium room
Richard H. DREES, University of Michigan: 'Rules for revolution'
Commentator: J. C. LAURSEN, Wake Forest University
Chair: William GRIMES, SUNY at Albany

10.30 a.m. Coffee: Faraday foyer
11.00 a.m.-12.30 p.m. Concurrent seminars

(A) Chemistry colloquium room
P. B. WOOD, Queen's University, Kingston: 'Reid, Hume, and the science of the mind'
Commentator: Timothy SUTTON, H. M. Treasury
Chair: Bruce SILVER, University of South Florida

(B) Physics colloquium room
Andrew SKINNER, University of Glasgow: 'David Hume—predecessor of Adam Smith, precursor of Steuart—'
Commentator: John ROBERTSON, St Hugh's College, Oxford
Chair: Alasdair MacBEAN, Lancaster University

12.45 p.m. Lunch: Cartmel restaurant

2.00-4.15 p.m. Concurrent symposia

(A) Chemistry colloquium room
Symposium: Hume and consequentialism
Stephen L. DARWALL, University of Michigan: 'Hume in transition--approbation de-moralized en route to utilitarianism'
Geoffrey SAYRE McCORD, University of North Carolina: 'Hume and the Bauhaus theory of ethics'
Commentator: Simon BLACKBURN, Pembroke College, Oxford
Chair: John BENSON, Lancaster University

(B) Physics colloquium room
Symposium: Hume and the theologians
Alexander BROADIE, University of Glasgow: 'Hume's theologians'
William R. ABBOTT, University of Waterloo: 'Hume and Tillotson'
Commentator: R. M. BURNS, Goldsmiths' College, University of London
Chair: Patrick SHERRY, Lancaster University

4.15 p.m. Tea: Faraday foyer

5.15 p.m. Lecture: Physics colloquium room
M. A. STEWART, Lancaster University: 'Abstraction and representation'
Chair: George MACDONALD ROSS, University of Leeds

6.45 p.m. Sherry party: Cartmel SCR

7.30 p.m. Hume Society Dinner: Cartmel restaurant

FRIDAY 25 AUGUST

8.00-8.30 a.m. Breakfast (self-service): Cartmel restaurant
HUME AND HUME'S CONNEXIONS

AUTHORS' ABSTRACTS
HUME AND TILLOTSON

William Abbott

Hume cites Tillotson as inspiring his argument in 'Of miracles', but the relation of Hume's views to Tillotson's is not entirely clear. This paper examines Tillotson's account of miracles as well as the argument that Hume apparently had in mind. For Tillotson miracles were "supernatural effects evident to our senses, the great end and design whereof is to be a sensible proof and conviction to us of something that we do not see." The divine miracles are distinguished by "their quality and number, and the public manner of doing them," and also by their consistency with our natural notions of God.

In Tillotson's epistemic scheme, sense experience produces the greatest degree of credibility but what he calls matters of fact are based on testimony. Testimony is reliable if the testifying person has both ability and integrity. Since the Apostles had both ability and integrity, the New Testament is to be believed.

A sermon on the 'Hazard of being saved in the Church of Rome' contains the apparent source of the argument Hume claimed to find. Apart from evidential concerns, Hume's attack on miracles owes little to Tillotson's argument.

While Hume thinks of miracles as violations of the laws of nature, Tillotson's regards them as events not explainable in terms of the causal capacities of the objects that make up the world. Tillotson's conception of a miracle resists Hume's arguments.

Hume did not substantially misrepresent Tillotson on transubstantiation, but neither did he deal with Tillotson's account of rational belief in miracles. As a result we do not reject the customary view that Hume is not seriously building on Tillotson's theory. Further study can perhaps tell us why Hume ignored a vigorous tradition of which Tillotson was a spokesman.
Hume's Acknowledged Sources and Their Clues to His Connections

Tom L. Beauchamp

Hume acknowledges numerous sources of his work in his footnotes, endnotes, unreferenced direct quotations, allusions, and correspondence. This paper is a study both in how he used these sources and how his editors and commentators have abused them.

At least since Kemp Smith we have seen a parade of authors promoted as seminal influences on Hume, yet the evidence adduced for the claims of influence has generally, perhaps always, fallen far short of the conclusions reached. Commentators who see an architectural influence by Locke, Hutcheson, Pyrrho, or Cicero and editors who have annotated Hume's texts are reprimanded for their ignorance or mistreatment of Hume's sources.

Hume scholars have often been careless in stating the nature and scope of the influence on Hume that they attribute to other writers, at the same time forgetting that Hume cites a large body of additional sources. Worse still, Hume's editors have often misunderstood what the sources are, which editions Hume used, and what they contain.

Hume is the best authority on who influenced him, and he has provided much of what we need to know about his connexions; he has also supplied more reliable information than commentators who argue for a global influence on his philosophy.
RELIGION AND THE IMAGINATION: PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Chris Bernard

My chief concern in this paper is with Hume's writings on the causes and nature of religious belief.
I run through a number of areas in Hume's history of religion. As well as familiar matters taken from the Natural History of Religion, I examine some subjects in the History of England which are invariably ignored - for example, the Martyrdoms of Becket and Joan of Arc, and the Reformation. Finally I end by piecing together some of Hume's scattered remarks on Christianity. I have three conclusions. First, that Hume's writings on religious belief in the History can best be understood in the light of his earlier theoretical work on the imagination; second, that the History both illustrates and considerably extends Hume's account of religious belief, particularly in relation to what he says about religious hypocrisy; third, that he thinks that the lasting power of Christianity arises chiefly from its opposition to natural ideas of morality.
HUME'S THEOLOGIANS

Alexander Broadie

Hume held that (1) in general when a person says 'I promise to do X' he is obliged to keep the promise, and (2) the fact that when he made the promise he had no intention of keeping it does not imply that he was not after all obliged to do as he had promised. Hume contrasts this claim about the relation between promise and intention with the view of 'theologians' that the intention of the priest makes the sacrament and when the priest secretly withdraws his intention he destroys the baptism or communion or holy orders. I offer a suggestion about the identity of Hume's theologians, and perhaps shed light on the link between Hume and the priests he spoke to at the seminary at La Flèche during the composition of the Treatise.
DISINTERESTED PLEASURES: HUME AGAINST THE SELFISH SCHOOLS AND THE MONKISH VIRTUES

Charlotte Brown

Hume concludes his *Enquiry* account of the virtues by asking whether it is attractive. The attractiveness of a conception of virtue is, Hume insists, completely separate from the question of its philosophical truth. A conception of the virtues is attractive if the practical moralist (politicians, educators and so on) can make virtue appealing to us. Hume argues against the rival 'monkish' conception that his conception of the virtues is attractive. On the 'monkish' conception morality demands "useless austerities and rigours". In contrast, his conception of the virtues offers us a pleasant and enjoyable life - here and now in this world - and so, Hume argues, it is in our self-interest to have the Humean virtues.

These claims may be taken to suggest that Hume's conception of morality is a form of egoistic hedonism. In the *Enquiry*, however, Hume explicitly argues against the selfish schools. There are three stages to the argument. First, he argues that actions are not always self-interested. Second, he argues that moral judgments are not made from a self-interested view. Finally, Hume argues that although moral judgments are not made from a self-interested view, it is in our self-interest to be virtuous. Because Hume argues this last point it might be thought that he is backsliding, but I argue he is not.

In showing that it is in our interest to have the virtues Hume could be doing one of two things. First, he could be addressing an egoist, someone who has only one normative point of view available to her, that of self-interest. In that case Hume would be backsliding because he would be trying to justify the virtues solely on the ground that they are in our self-interest. But, second Hume could be addressing someone who has two distinct normative points of view available to her, that of morality and self-love. If morality and self-love constitute two distinct points of view, the normative judgments we make from these two standpoints are also distinct and they might not cohere. We would then be faced with incompatible normative demands each making claims on our allegiance. A question of their congruence thus arises.

I argue that Hume is not backsliding in attempting to show that it is in our self-interest to be virtuous because he is addressing someone who 'cares' about both morality and self-interest. The argument he offers in response is a congruence argument. If congruence between our moral judgments and the judgments made from a self-interested view can be achieved, Hume may claim against the monkish theorist that his conception of the virtues is attractive from distinct standpoints. We will not be sorry to have the virtues from either the moral or self-interest points of view, and so our allegiance to morality can be coherently sustained.
"When the act happens, in the particular instance in question, to be productive of effects which we approve of, much more if we happen to observe that the same motive may frequently be productive, in other instances, of the like effects, we are apt to transfer our approbation to the motive itself, and to assume, as the just ground for approbation we bestow on the act, the circumstance of its originating from that motive."  
(Bentham)

"When we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality ... When we require any action, or blame a person for not performing it, we always suppose, that one in that situation shou'd be influenc'd by the proper motive of that action, and we esteem it vicious in him to be regardless of it."
(Hume)

While Hume held that the moral quality of acts derives from that of motives, and also, following Hutcheson, that the moral quality of motives consists in their capacity to produce a moral sentiment, a "peculiar pleasure", when contemplated disinterestedly, he also held, in opposition to Hutcheson, that this sentiment arises indirectly through a sympathetic (Treatise) or benevolent (Enquiry) response to the pleasurable and painful consequences to which motives are believed to tend. Virtuous motives are precisely those we believe to have good consequences, and we approve them because of the pleasure we feel when we consider these consequences; led by an association of ideas from motive to consequences, we associate the pleasure felt on viewing pleasurable consequences back with the motive itself. There is in fact a deep tension between aspects of Hume's moral sentimentalism that derive from Hutcheson, and the associationistic psychological mechanisms that lead Hume to a picture very close to Bentham's. There are also subtleties of Hume's account that may seem downright nonconsequentialist. I explore both of these aspects and aim to show how they place Hume's ethics in a unique transitional position in the history of utilitarianism's development as a distinctive moral theory.

I am not claiming that Hume was a utilitarian. A calculus of the value of consequences is notably absent from his theory, and, as will become clear, he certainly was not a universal hedonist. Nor do I claim that Hume was a proto-utilitarian in the sense that this is where his view tends on the whole. What I do claim is that certain central aspects of the way Hume's sentimentalism departed from Hutcheson's led toward philosophical utilitarianism's characteristic idea that a moral ranking of acts and motives derives from the nonmoral value of their consequences.
RULES FOR REVOLUTION

Richard H. Dees

In his assessments of the revolutions he discusses in his historical writings, Hume demonstrates, I argue, why we should reject the standard accounts of political justification. The Whigs' consent theory, the Tories' doctrine of passive obedience, and the theories based on the rights of some person or group to rule are all simply mistaken; to each of these rules for revolution, he shows, we can find important exceptions. And the modern utilitarian and contractarian theories, I argue, are apt to suffer the same problem. They can only avoid it by proposing rules that are so broad that they contain little content and can no longer guide us.

The reasons Hume gives to reject these views, I argue, suggest a general argument: no rule can be both helpfully contentful and suitably general. The problem, I contend, is that no substantive rules can be sensitive to the contextual features of particular situations that are crucial to the judgments that we make.

Hume, I suggest, offers a different approach: he avoids any substantive rules by relying on the judgments of sensitive and knowledgeable critics, and he places contexts at the center of his view by basing it on the "established practice of the age." The judgments of the critics using the standards implicit in the "established practice" will, I think, more closely capture our actual judgments about particular revolutions.
This is an essay in the theory of practical reasoning and, accordingly, among other things, in the nature and possibility of reasons for action. It focuses upon the motivational component of reasons and upon the positions of Shaftesbury and Butler on the relations between self-love and benevolence. It suggests that Shaftesbury and Butler are rational, not psychological, egoists, in spite of their divergences from Hobbes and Mandeville on human nature. It then addresses a problem that arises for Shaftesbury and Butler through their use of an invisible-hand argument. The paper concludes by bringing the discussion to bear upon Hume and his rejection of psychological egoism but endorsement of (only) a limited benevolence.
DAVID HUME AND THE PROBABILITY OF MIRACLES
Barry Gower

Modern accounts of Hume's probabilistic argument against miracles commonly defend its cogency by representing it as a Bayesian argument. However, it is questionable whether such an interpretation is adequately supported by what is written in "Of Miracles". Moreover, probabilistic reasoning in the eighteenth century was not so regimented as to rule out alternative interpretations.

Consideration of the grounds for attributing Bayesianism to Hume shows that previous challenges to that attribution have depended on an ambiguity in the notion of a trustworthy witness. Depending on how we resolve this ambiguity we will either see Bayes's theorem as yielding support for Hume's conclusion, or will see it as irrelevant. There is, though, no evidence that Hume was conscious of this ambiguity and its implications.

The language in "Of Miracles", as well as that in the chapters on probability in the Treatise and Enquiry, seems to show, rather, that Hume understood probabilistic reasoning as involving the combination of arguments for and against a conclusion. This way of understanding the topic had been explored by Jakob Bernoulli in his Ars Conjectandi. Bernoulli's probabilities are non-standard and are incompatible with those needed for Bayesian calculations. And although Ars Conjectandi was almost certainly unknown to Hume and to his critics, not only does a Bernoulli-like interpretation fit Hume's texts well, but it also places criticisms of his argument by his contemporaries in a new and revealing light.

However, judged as an essay in probabilistic reasoning which uses the idea of combining conflicting arguments, "Of Miracles" is less than satisfactory. For although Hume made it clear that he intended to use principles of probabilistic reasoning in his discussion, and also made it clear that his understanding of probability is non-standard, in the end it was rhetoric that he relied on. Special pleading on behalf of the argument against miracles, at the expense of the argument for them, is all that the reader is finally given. For although a probabilistic argument against miracles can be constructed from materials Hume presented, we are offered, instead, an unsatisfactory proof of their non-occurrence which effectively ignores altogether one of the arguments to be combined.
HUME CONTRA SPINOZA?

Wim Klever

In Hume's *Treatise* Bk. I, Spinoza is the one major figure from the history of philosophy and science to be singled out and discussed at length by name. He is referred to as "that famous atheist" and characterized as "universally infamous". His doctrine contains "a true atheism". His theory about the thinking substance is an "hideous hypothesis". Hume does not want to enter "farther into these gloomy and obscure regions" - but he still spends 10 pages on them. Popkin says the introduction of Spinoza into a discussion of the immateriality of the soul was "common practice in his day". So was Hume being merely conventional, or was he also sincere? Compare the treatment accorded to Spinoza by Hobbes and Locke. Gilbert Boss has argued for the fundamental opposition of Hume’s and Spinoza’s systems. I wish to defend their overall agreement, focusing not on their thought on religion (Popkin has already explored this) but the theoretical, mainly epistemological, part of their work.

Hume's rejection of the "ancient philosophy", in which he criticizes the "fictions" concerning substances, substantial forms, accidents and occult qualities, and concerning sympathies, antipathies, and the horrors of a vacuum, can be paralleled in Spinoza. So can Hume's view on impressions and ideas. For both writers the human mind is nothing more than the set of its related ideas. According to both personal identity is illusory. The very sequence of chapters and topics in *Treatise* I and *Ethics* II suggests, at the very least, that Spinoza's work was open on Hume's desk while he was writing at La Flèche; at this time Spinoza's work was a secret obsession, never openly acknowledged, of many philosophers and scientists. Hume makes a comparatively safe acknowledgement to Bayle's article on Spinoza, but he shows a more detailed understanding of Spinoza's thought than can be derived from Bayle alone.

Turning over some pages we find in Hume's and Spinoza's work another complete parallel in their common denial of the existence of general ideas. Hume and Spinoza are both thorough nominalists. In Part II of *Treatise* I Hume does not move far away from Spinoza either. He makes a distinction between the restricted capacity of the imagination, which comes to a minimum or end, and on the other hand the power of mathematical reason, for which extension is infinitely divisible and time and space are without boundaries. It was Spinoza who first distinguished between the *infinitum imaginationis* (the infinite as it is in human imagination: with parts, with smallest parts, with parts of a certain quantity) and the *infinitum rationis sive intellectus*, in which neither parts nor boundaries are conceived.

I also trace parallels in the two thinkers' views on existence, belief, and the uniformity of nature, and conclude with some reflections of why Hume, in spite of this considerable agreement, was so savage in his public assessment of Spinoza's philosophy.
NORMATIVITY AS REFLEXIVITY:
HUME'S PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATION OF MORALITY

Christine M. Korsgaard

The pose Hume strikes in his moral philosophy is that of the scientist, whose business is to provide an explanation of the origin of moral ideas. He separates his task from that of the practical philosopher, who is supposed to persuade us to virtuous conduct by making virtue attractive. Although Hume believes his explanation of moral concepts is attractive and can be used by the practical philosopher, it could have turned out otherwise. For "the philosophical truth of any proposition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interests of society." If we suppose that the power of moral concepts to motivate us is essential to their normativity, Hume seems to deny that establishing the normativity of morality is part of his philosophical project.

I argue that, despite this appearance, Hume has a general theory of normativity, which I call "Normativity as Reflexivity." According to this view, a faculty of the mind is normative if it survives its own scrutiny—that is, if, when the faculty takes itself and its own operations for its object, it delivers a positive verdict.

In Part I, I show how Hume applies this theory to speculative reason and the moral sense. According to Hume, beliefs are feelings of convictions caused in us by the operations of the associative mechanisms. The faculty of belief is normative if reflection on these mechanisms sustains the vivacity of our feelings of conviction. Since it does not, Hume's conclusions about belief are skeptical. Moral approval is a feeling caused in us by the operation of the moral sense. Moral judgments are normative if reflection on this operation sustains our feelings of approval. Hume argues that it does. The moral sense approves of itself.

In Part II, I consider the merits of Normativity as Reflexivity, in general and from a Kantian perspective. A Kantian should accept Normativity as Reflexivity because critique is also a reflexive project. The categorical imperative may be seen as testing whether a maxim survives reflexivity: whether the will can will its own act.

In Part III, I consider the consequences of accepting the claim that the judgments of the moral sense are normative. Since the objects of moral approval are qualities inspiring love or pride, Hume has provided an account of what makes a person worthy of love or pride. But Hume's account does not yield normative principles of action. Normativity as Reflexivity demands that a faculty survive the test of being its own object. The test for the normativity of a principle of action is not whether the person who wills it is loveable, but whether it can be reflexively willed. Since moral philosophy should establish normative principles of action, Hume's account is inadequate.
KANT'S RESPONSE TO HUME'S CRITIQUE OF FAITH

Manfred Kuehn

It is rather common to view important parts of Kant's theoretical philosophy as his intended answer to Hume's skepticism. It is not so common to interpret Kant's views on religion and ethics as intimately related to Hume's criticisms. Many scholars believe that the differences between the two are too radical to allow for a fruitful comparison. I shall argue in this paper that this is a mistake, and that it is both historically correct and systematically proper for us to view Kant as trying to answer Hume in his practical philosophy. Kant's ultimate answer to Hume must form part of his theory of rational faith.

Kant knew very well Hume's arguments that religious faith is necessarily irrational. I shall argue that his arguments in "The Postulates of Pure Practical Reason" of the second Critique must be read as his attempt to show, against Hume, that faith is fully rational after all. It does not require a miracle. While it may be true that "mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity," it is false to say that it "subverts all the principles of (our) understanding." The most important articles of faith form presuppositions for rational conduct, and they must therefore be "believed by any reasonable person." Kant argues further that disbelief will lead to irrational behavior because it undermines reason itself.

In this paper I shall first exhibit the general outline of Kant's interpretation of Hume, calling special attention to what he calls "Hume's principle," namely the advice "not to carry the use of reason dogmatically beyond the field of all possible experience." Secondly, I shall try to show how the arguments in the second Critique are meant to restrict, or perhaps better: relax, this principle. We can meaningfully talk about God (and related subjects) because our moral discourse requires us to do so. (This way of looking at what Kant is attempting to do in his discussion of the "Postulates" also removes many of the traditional difficulties raised with regard to them.) Finally, I would like to make some suggestions as to how all this fits in with Kant's general view of Hume. I shall claim that even where Hume and Kant disagree most sharply, they are still part of a common tradition. The Kantian project remains more indebted to that of Hume than has been generally assumed.
HUME AND THE ART OF DIALOGUE

Michel Malherbe

The aim of this paper is historical, by alluding to the general debate in the eighteenth century about the art of dialogue-writing; philosophical, by dealing with the general question which literary form the search for truth requires; textual, by commenting on Pamphilus's address to Hermippus.

Mainly with the help of Shaftesbury's remarks on the dialogic form, four points will be established:

(1) The distinction between a rhetorical use and a philosophical use of dialogue has to be made. In the first, the form, extrinsic to the content, answers to a moral, pedagogical or therapeutic intention, which doubles the narrative and logical development of the dialogue itself, and is to be interpreted by the reader. In the second, the form is demanded by the matter itself; and then "the author is annihilated and the reader being noway apply'd to, stands for nothing" (Shaftesbury).

(2) Unlike Shaftesbury, who thinks that dialogue is the natural manner of moral philosophy, Hume claims that moral philosophy (conceived after natural philosophy) requires the systematic or, at least, the discursive form, and vindicates the forsaking of dialogue-writing by the Moderns.

(3) The Natural History of Religion distinguishes two questions: the one, curious and important, concerning the foundation of religion in reason; the other, more consonant to experimental method, concerning its origin in human nature. As for morals, the second Enquiry extracts the answer given to the foundation question from the solution given to the origin question. Therefore, the final dialogue is a literary artifact providing "la chute du texte".

But in the Dialogues, the question of the origin of religion having been treated by the Natural History of Religion according to the experimental method, the foundation question is indeed declared to be evident and important, but also obscure and uncertain (although curious); and it cannot be drawn from the origin question. So it becomes prey to endless controversy and irrepressible scepticism. And here the use of dialogue is appropriate to the philosophical matter itself.

(4) The debate is merely speculative and is actuated by the contradiction between Demea, who wants to prevent the philosophical dialogue in favour of a merely rhetorical dialogue; Cleanthes, who wants to prescribe the systematic, and truly scientific, method by giving an experimental proof and thus put an end to the dialogue; and Philo, whose scepticism entertains the tenseness between the practical value of religion (which can be studied in the experimental manner) and its simply speculative content (which gives way to an appropriate, but endless, dialogue).
Hume's argument for inductive scepticism is one of the most famous and influential arguments in the philosophical literature, and it has been discussed many times, but it is nevertheless subject to widespread misinterpretation. I begin by mentioning briefly some of the relatively minor errors that are frequently made by commentators (e.g. the claim that Hume's scepticism primarily concerns inductive inferences to universal laws; that his sceptical argument depends upon his analysis of causation; that he addresses and refutes the suggestion that induction can be grounded on probabilistic reasoning in the modern sense). I then proceed to deal with the most important misunderstanding of his argument - the claim that it presupposes a deductivist understanding of "reason", and that its central aim is thus to show that induction cannot be justified deductively.

The belief that Hume is a deductivist is almost an orthodoxy amongst Hume commentators, so much so that most of them take it for granted without seeing any need to defend their position. The notable exception here is D.C. Stove, whose detailed analysis of Hume's argument for inductive scepticism has been widely seen as the definitive statement of the case for Hume's deductivism. Stove's analysis, however, depends crucially on his interpretation of Hume's distinction between "demonstrative" and "probable" arguments - on Stove's reading of Hume, a good argument of either sort must be deductively valid, and the distinction between them is drawn according to the necessity or contingency of their premises. It is surprising that this interpretation has not yet been criticised in detail in the literature, since not only can it be refuted by consulting Hume's texts, but it is also in conflict with the distinction between demonstrative and probable reasoning which Hume can be presumed to have inherited from Locke (since Hume explicitly acknowledges Locke's influence in this respect).

If Stove's interpretation of the demonstrative/probable distinction fails, then the deductivist interpretation of Hume's argument for inductive scepticism fails too, since its logical structure is incomprehensible if we suppose both that Hume is a deductivist and that "probable" reasoning is non-deductive (e.g. why does Hume canvass a "probable" justification of the "uniformity principle"?). So far from supporting the claim that Hume is a deductivist, his argument for inductive scepticism shows quite the reverse!

The "deductivist" reading of Hume's argument is not confined to those who take Hume himself to be a deductivist - according to Beauchamp, Mappes and Rosenberg, for example, the argument is indeed intended to show that induction has no deductive warrant, but Hume uses this result as a reductio ad absurdum of a certain kind of rationalism, and does not himself draw a sceptical conclusion. This interpretation can be refuted in much the same way as Stove's: it simply fails to make sense of Hume's argument.

In the course of the paper I will discuss in passing the differences between Hume's three presentations of his argument, the nature and role of his "uniformity principle", his concept(s) of "reason", the extent to which he is a sceptic about induction (and the extent to which he is not!), and how these various issues relate to Hume's broader aim, especially in the first Enquiry and in the Dialogues, of vindicating science while condemning the "sophistry and illusion" of the metaphysicians and theologians - an aim which would be manifestly futile if he were indeed a deductivist.
HUME AND THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD

David Fate Norton

The truth is, the Science of Nature has been already too long made only a work of the Brain and the Fancy: It is now high time that it should return to the plainness and soundness of Observations on material and obvious things.

Hooke, Micrographia, Preface

An Observer should endeavour to look upon such Experiments and Observations that are more common, and to which he has been more accustom’d, as if they were the greatest Rarity, and to imagine himself a Person of some other Country or Calling, that he had never heard of, or seen any thing of the like before.

Hooke, Posthumous Works, p. 62

I pretend not to have here exhausted this subject. It is appropriate for my purpose, if I have made it appear, that, in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy.

Hume, A Dissertation on the Passions, Conclusion

Whereas Hume’s commentators once set out routinely from the assumption that Hume was a Lockean, many now begin with the assumption that he was, at least methodologically, a Newtonian. This paper suggests it is time to dispense with this Newtonian gloss--because it is neither accurate nor helpful--and begins a more detailed and nuanced discussion of Hume’s experimental method and practice. Starting from recent work by Michael Barfoot on Hume’s early scientific education, I discuss the traces of this in the Treatise of Human Nature; the experimental method developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke; and Hume’s own conception(s) of experiment as illustrated in the Treatise.
BELIEF, APPEARANCE AND INQUIRY IN SEXTUS AND HUME
Thomas M. Olshewsky

The contrasts made by Sextus and Hume between Academicean and Pyrrhonean skepticism are notoriously incommensurate. Hume does not attribute to the former, as Sextus does, that doubting involves denial; Hume attributes to neither the probability claims Sextus attributes to the former; they come closest to a match in attributing inclination to credence to the Academiceans; the contrast of principle and nature so basic to Hume is absent from Sextus; and Hume's notion of mitigation finds no place in Sextus' account at all. There are good grounds for supposing that Hume modeled his account of Academic skepticism on Cicero's in the Academica, for whom no contrast such as those of Hume and Sextus existed. Hume's model for Pyrrhonism is his own Treatise, from which he tried to make rhetorical distancing in varying ways, settling on the contrast of the Enquiries as one of kind of engagement rather than difference in doctrine.

The differences between Sextus and Hume on this contrast not only are thus traceable to different strands of history; they are traceable to differing conceptions of belief, appearance and inquiry. Sextus affirms belief without dogma that allows suspension of judgment without abandoning the four-fold guide to life. Hume takes belief as a sentiment, and suspension as disruption. Sextus treats appearances in a rich background sense foreign to the impressions and ideas of Hume. For Hume, skepticism is antecedent or consequent to inquiry; for Sextus, it is the heart of inquiry. The question of whether a skeptic can live his skepticism may turn, at least in part, on which views inform our understandings of belief, appearance and inquiry.
HUME AND THE LOCKEAN BACKGROUND: 
INDUCTION AND THE UNIFORMITY PRINCIPLE

David W.D. Owen

Hume's sceptical argument concerning induction is one of the best known in the history of philosophy. An historiography of how that problem has been conceived, presented and dealt with would be an extraordinarily interesting project. But a first step in such a task is to uncover what Hume himself was really up to, irrespective of modern concerns and presentations.

Until recently, modern commentators have concentrated on the distinction between between deductive and inductive reasoning (or logic or whatever), and seen Hume's argument in those terms. But Hume's argument is concerned with the distinction between demonstrative and probable reasoning, which is not coextensive with the modern distinction. More recently, commentators have treated both demonstrative and probable reasoning as having deductive structure. They argue that any piece of probable reasoning requires the principle of uniformity to function as a premise in order for the reasoning to be deductively valid. This, it is alleged, explains Hume's appeal to the principle of uniformity in the argument as presented in the TREATISE. Though appealing, this line of thought, I argue, misrepresents Hume's thought even more than did the old presentation in terms of the deductive/inductive contrast.

I argue that Hume's initial presentation of the demonstrative/probable contrast closely follows Locke's. Locke's theory of demonstrative knowledge is well known, but his theory of probable opinion is not. Nor is his well developed theory of demonstrative and probable reasoning. I briefly try to remedy this, making use of Locke's acknowledged rejection of formal logic (ie syllogism) in favour of a structured relation of ideas. It turns out that both demonstrative and probable reasoning require the use of intermediate ideas or "proofs". Hume's argument, I maintain, is best understood in this context, and his appeal to the uniformity principle is elucidated in terms of (the lack of) such relevant intermediate ideas. It is argued that any appeal to our, or the scholastic, concept of deductive validity misrepresents Hume's target in his sceptical account of probable reasoning, and the positive account he put in its place.
HUME AND THE CHEVALIER RAMSAY

David R. Raynor

One of Hume's most important contacts during his first visit to France from 1734 until 1737 was the Chevalier Andrew Michael Ramsay (1686-1743), a Roman Catholic Scotsman from Ayrshire who was on familiar terms with many French churchmen and intellectuals. It was Ramsay who introduced Hume to scholars in Rheims and LaFleche. When Hume left to return to England he felt "obliged" to put the manuscript of the Treatise into the Chevalier's hands and to discuss it with him. This paper first consolidates what is known about the personal relations between Hume and Ramsay. Then comparisons are made between the metaphysical views of both, drawing primarily on the Chevalier's contributions to periodicals and his posthumously published Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, Unfolded in a Geometrical Order (Glasgow, 1748 & 1749), a work which was well underway by the time that Hume met him. Throughout the focus is on the different roles which the writings of Malebranche, Berkeley, and Spinoza played in the development of the metaphysical views of Hume and Ramsay.
"HUME AND THE BAUHAUS THEORY OF ETHICS"

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord

The notion of utility permeates Hume's account of morality, so much so that he is often counted as one of the first in a long and distinguished line of British Utilitarians. Yet utilitarianism sits uncomfortably at best with Hume's ethical writings. According to many, Hume simply failed to work out the implications of his own view; lapses aside, they argue, Hume identified and defended the basic tenets of (at least some form of) utilitarianism. On the contrary, I argue, Hume developed a distinctive and decidedly non-utilitarian theory -- the Bauhaus Theory -- which gives a central place to utility, but does so without making either the actual or expected utility (of acts, rules, motives or character traits) either the measure or ground of virtue.
The main objective of this paper is to review the content of David Hume's *Economic Writings* as edited by Eugene Rotwein (1955).

In so doing it is suggested that the essays feature a number of themes which are interdependent. These include:

1. A review of Hume's treatment of the principles of human nature especially as they apply to our understanding of economic phenomena.
2. A consideration of Hume's use of the 'historical' or institutional method in the course of the discussion of economic relationships, with particular reference to the treatment of population, money and interest.
3. Hume's treatment of the dynamics of the process by reference primarily to the essay 'Of Refinement in the Arts' where it is argued that the rate of change will accelerate as increasing scope is given, in an institutional sense, to the pursuit of gain.
4. The analysis of international trade. This may be represented as having three distinct dimensions:
   (a) the analysis of the general benefits of free trade;
   (b) the technical discussion of the balance of trade treated as an extension of the quantity of theory of money and,
   (c) the analysis of the rich country/poor country relationship.

It is argued in this context that the presence of the thesis in Hume's work reflects his consciousness of the diversity of economic conditions and of performance. Further, that the prescriptions which follow suggest that the choice of policy must be related to the environment which prevails.

A subsidiary theme of the paper develops the argument that it was Sir James Steuart rather than Adam Smith who took Hume's measure as an economist.
FUTURES PAST AND FUTURES FUTURE

JAMES SOMERVILLE

The received view that Hume raised — indeed was the first expressly to raise — the problem of induction is defended against a recent objection that the problem of induction is not to be found in Hume's philosophy. The defence consists in pointing to the places in Hume's texts where he raises the problem.

It is argued that Hume must have seen that there is a problem for him to give a 'sceptical solution' to it. The sort of scepticism Hume is referring to here is not the Pyrrhonian scepticism, whose arguments are unanswerable, but the Academical scepticism, whose confinement of the understanding to the limits of common life and practice provides Hume with his solution to his doubts. His doubts about induction are philosophical, and do not affect his practice. Thus, in questioning the foundation of inductive reasoning he is not rejecting induction.

In the Treatise the problem is at first approached obliquely: it is denied that the principle that the course of nature continues uniformly the same — what I call for brevity the inductive principle — can be established either by demonstration or inductively from experience. This version of Hume's dilemma is followed by Kames and Reid. Further on in the section, however, Hume's attention turns to the justification of inductive inference itself: he questions the very basis of the appeal to experience.

In the Enquiry, which Beattie follows, the inductive principle is mentioned only in passing, the dilemma rather concerning inductive inference. Hume seems to introduce the inductive principle here only because he seems to think, wrongly, that it is required to support the second horn of the dilemma.

Finally, confirmation of the received view is sought by considering how some of Hume's contemporaries — namely, Reid, Priestley and Campbell — appear to understand Hume on the subject. The striking resemblances between points they make and those made on induction in general in the first half of the twentieth century suggest that the received view of Hume is soundly based on tradition.
ABSTRACTION AND REPRESENTATION

M. A. Stewart

Berkeley read Locke and Hume read Berkeley, but a study of their views on abstract and general ideas brings to light not only predictable divergences between them but also remarkable misunderstandings. The textbook tradition reads Locke-Berkeley-Hume, on this as on many other topics, through the eyes of Reid, but Reid on this occasion took his cues from Hume. Hume was mistaken in claiming a debt to Berkeley; and he invented the tradition of ascribing to Berkeley as a critic of Locke the doctrine of generality through representation, which was, on the contrary, the doctrine for which Berkeley castigated Locke. To see how the wires got crossed in the actual historical sequence it is necessary to look closely at Berkeley’s own concept of representation as copying. In pursuing this I start from recent work by Bertil Belfrage but arrive at diametrically opposite results.

Hume’s discussion of abstraction is accorded its own self-contained section in the Treatise but it is not clear whether it has the importance this appears to confer on it. He wants his remarks to apply principally as a block to certain moves about the external world (the distinction between primary and secondary qualities), and certain moves about space and time. On both subjects Hume is conscious of Berkeleyan precedents, and Hutcheson’s lost criticisms of Hume on abstraction may be connected with his surviving criticisms of Berkeley. But whereas Berkeley tried to derive positive (if negative) ontological dogma from what is possible and impossible among ideas, Hume on the other hand saw Berkeley’s manoeuvres as “lessons of scepticism”. For what is unintelligible lies necessarily beyond our knowledge, but may, nevertheless, be true.
HUME AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENCE

S. K. Wertz

In this essay I examine David Hume's historiographical category of Character (whenever I refer to this idea with the word, it is capitalized) and its application to important figures and institutions in the history of science who appear in his History of England. Its eight volumes were published between 1754 and 1762: a time when we first see the emergence of the history of science, and Hume played an important part in that beginning. From the over forty Characters in the History, we find ones such as Francis Bacon, the Royal Society, the French Academy of Science, Robert Boyle, William Harvey, and Isaac Newton. Hume intended his Characters to be adopted by future historians. By "Character" Hume means an account of eminent persons or groups wherein he reduces them to types associated with their profession (in this case science), their station in life, and their relation to the government or reign. Characters form an integral part of his historical narrative by supplying the needed periodization besides the usual, annual chronology. Conjoined to these brief intellectual biographies and narrative descriptions of the European scientific groups are numerous other historical references to science which nicely illustrate Hume "adorning the facts." Consequently, when these episodes are viewed together we may legitimately claim that Hume was one of the first cultural historians of science, and specifically that he had an interest in accounting for the growth or development of what we now call "science" in Great Britain. The remainder of the paper attempts to locate Hume in the historiography of science or the art of historical writing about science.

Auguste Comte (1798-1857) is usually considered by historians to be the first thinker to call for a synthetic history of science in which the emphasis is placed on the unity of science and its interplay with other parts of social, political, and cultural life. My general contention is that Hume, along with Voltaire, Colin MacLaurin, Joseph Glanvill, and Adam Smith, made the call before Comte. A set of new questions are asked about Hume's writings from a context previously not associated with him. What place, for Hume, does science occupy in history in general? What is Hume's overall picture of the history of science in England? What is Hume's general theory about this history of science, and how does it correspond to his theory of history? How do Hume's views arise from, and depart from, the views of earlier thinkers? The evolution of the historiography of science begins here.
HUME'S SEARCH FOR SOCIAL ORDER
Pauline Westerman

Central to this paper is the question to what extent Hume's moral philosophy can be regarded as a continuation of traditional Natural Law doctrine. In opposition to Haakonssen's interpretation, the claim is defended that Hume's philosophy can not be conceived of as a more adequate or more 'sociological' version of Natural Law, since Hume faced an entirely different problem. Whereas traditional Natural Law thinkers (Grotius, Pufendorf) tried to find a way to obtain knowledge of true morality, Hume tried to understand why people actually follow the rules of justice.

It is argued that this shift of emphasis has been brought about not by Hume's secularism, but by his removal of the so-called 'context of justification'. This level of analysis had enabled 17th century Natural Law thinkers to evaluate actual practices along rational guidelines and had provided at the same time for a kind of moral methodology. By removal of this level of analysis Hume had to face a two-fold problem: how to account for moral obligation, and how to explain social order?

It has been assumed that Hume dealt with these problems by accounting for laws of justice as unintended consequences of individual actions. In this paper it is argued however that although traces of this attempt can be found in the Treatise, Hume couldn't account for the way how individual actions and selfish motives lead to justice. In this sense he was hampered by the Hutchesonian legacy with its stress on personal sentiments rather than institutions. Therefore Hume introduced two different motives at two different stages of the development of justice. Hume must have felt this an unsatisfactory solution, for the theory doesn't recur in the Enquiry. Instead, an important place is assigned to the principle of fellow-feeling, which determines 'taste' in morals as well as in the arts, and is the key concept in Hume's moral philosophy.

The interpretation of Humean moral philosophy as a sociological version of Natural Law is consequently criticised on the grounds that a) Natural Law can no longer be called Natural Law when the context of justification has been removed and b) although Hume's problem can be said to be 'sociological', his Hutchesonian terminology was not suited to a 'sociological' approach of that problem.
It is an irony of history that although Thomas Reid is best known as David Hume's major Scottish critic of the eighteenth century, Reid also wrote to Hume in 1763 that 'I shall always avow my self your Disciple in Metaphysics'. This paper will explore some of the reasons why Reid should have made such a claim, and argue that both Reid and Hume saw themselves as 'anatomists of the mind' who dissected our mental powers using methods modelled on those deployed in the sciences of nature. While most commentators on Hume and Reid have made much of their methodological indebtedness to Newton, I shall point out that their understanding of the experimental method was not based solely on Newton's works, and that their notion of the 'anatomy of the mind' suggests that they self-consciously engaged in the natural historical task of classifying and describing the faculties of the mind, following the lead of John Locke. My discussion of their use of Locke will lead into a consideration of Reid's interpretation of the theory of ideas as it was advanced by Hume and other philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In his recent book *Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid*, John Yolton has contended that Reid misinterpreted this theory, but I shall argue that this issue is more complex than Yolton recognizes. I will attempt to show that Reid's reading of the theory of ideas cannot be disentangled from his interests in the physiology of perception, and that he saw philosophers such as Descartes as providing a unified philosophical and physiological account of human perception. Furthermore, I will suggest that there is ample textual evidence in the works of Descartes and others to support Reid's interpretation, and hence that Yolton has simply focused on one formulation of the theory of ideas to the exclusion of other contemporary readings, such as that found in Reid's published and unpublished writings.
Nicholas Phillipson's short, elegant, and intelligent book provides the first account of Hume as a historian which is both accessible and sophisticated. For many purposes it will replace Giarrizzo (1962), Forbes (1976), and Wexler (1979).

In this paper I will briefly praise Phillipson's book and then discuss what I take to be its defects. They may be summarised as follows:

1) Phillipson, like previous scholars, does not recognise an important link between Hume's History and the philosophy of the Treatise. This is to be found in Hume's analysis of probability, which was applied to the problem of testimony in 'Of Miracles', and guides his thinking throughout the History whenever he has to confront problems of evidence. It is also relevant to his analysis of political extremism, which is comparable to religious fanaticism.

2) Phillipson (perhaps misled by previous scholars) misunderstands the political position adopted in the History. Far from thinking that England ought to have established a civilized absolute monarchy, Hume writes in praise of mixed monarchy and its consequence, liberty. His view of the Civil War is Clarendon's, not Hobbes's, and if he disapproves of the Grand Remonstrance he approves of the Petition of Right.

3) This failure to understand the History as an account of the origins of an admirable constitution is accompanied by a failure to see that the Essays are not as straightforwardly hostile to political parties, nor as pessimistic about the present working of the constitution, as Phillipson takes them to be.

4) Phillipson's account of why Hume thought England failed to establish an absolute monarchy is deficient: he overemphasises the question of religion as a cause of the Civil War, paying insufficient attention to social change, the legal system, taxation, and the militia. This is related to his failure to understand that Hume thought that English absolutism was always different in character from French.

5) It follows that Phillipson had misread Hume's relationship to his predecessors and contemporaries, particularly those who had discussed absolutism and republicanism. His book contains no reference to Harrington or Montesquieu, both of whom helped form Hume's understanding of English history. Above all it fails to make sense of Hume's claim to be a 'sceptical whig', a claim that can easily be explained on the alternative view that I will propose.

6) Finally (time permitting): apart from brief references to Machiavelli and Tacitus, Phillipson looks at Hume only against the background of writing on English history, for which Hume had little respect (Rapin, Bolingbroke, Carte). He (like his predecessors) fails to note the important model provided by Sarpi, who, perhaps more than any other, was the historian Hume sought to imitate.
HUME’S CRITICISM OF MALEBRANCHE’S THEORY OF CAUSATION

John P. Wright

Malebranche’s influence on Hume has been well recognized by 20th-century scholars. It has been almost universally argued that Hume learned from Malebranche that there is no necessity or power in nature, and that he only opposed Malebranche’s attribution of all power to the Deity. I argue that, on the contrary, a careful attention to Hume’s actual criticism of Malebranche leads us to ascribe a radically different theory of causation to Hume from the one generally thought to hold.

In Sec. I, I argue that while Malebranche attributed moral relations to the Divine Intellect (or, to use non-theological language, to the nature of things themselves) and causality to the Divine Will (the order of existence) Hume reversed these provinces of Divine Intellect and Will.

In Sec. II, I show that, in criticizing the Malebranchist theory, Hume presupposes the existence of real power in the universe independent of the observers. Moreover, while he denies that we have any idea of power, he gives a criterion which shows just what it would be to apprehend this power.

In Sec. III, I argue that, in attempting to found our understanding on human nature, Hume was adapting a suggestion about the sceptical justification of natural judgments which Malebranche made in his criticism of Descartes’s claim to demonstrate the existence of material objects. In applying this justification to the case of our natural judgments of causal necessity, Hume was able to show why we ought to believe that there is real power in nature even though we can never apprehend it.