Hume After 300 Years

The 38th Annual Hume Society Conference

18 - 23 July, 2011

The Old College, The University of Edinburgh

Conference Programme

and

Abstracts

The Hume Society

Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities
The conference has received financial support from the following organizations:

The British Academy
The British Council
The Kolkata Heritage Trust
Manchester Metropolitan University
The Mind Association
Oxford University Press
The Scots Philosophical Association
The University of Edinburgh
The University of St. Andrews
Wiley Blackwell

The conference organizers would like to thank the following for their help:


In addition, thanks are due to all those who helped with the refereeing of submitted papers, to the conveners of the panels, to commentators, and to chairs.

Special thanks to Anthea Taylor, the Administrator at IASH, for three years of much-needed advice, assistance, and encouragement.

MONDAY 18 JULY

1530 - 1630 Registration in New College

1630 - 1800 RAINY HALL, NEW COLLEGE
Reception for all conference participants
Welcome and opening remarks:
James Harris (St Andrews) and Susan Manning (Edinburgh)

1800 - 1930 ASSEMBLY HALL, NEW COLLEGE
Amartya Sen (Harvard): 'David Hume and the Demands of Ethics'
Chair: David Fergusson (Edinburgh)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0830-1730</td>
<td>Registration in the Old College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0845-1000</td>
<td><strong>CONCURRENT SESSION 1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLAYFAIR LIBRARY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>David Landy (San Francisco State): 'Garrett's Defense of the Copy Principle'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentator: Karl Schaffer (Pittsburgh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: John Calhoun (York)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LECTURE THEATRE 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lewis Powell (USC): 'How to Avoid Mis-Reiding Hume's Maxim of Conceivability'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentator: Santos Castro (Alberta): 'On Hume on Happiness'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentator: Willem Lemmens (Antwerp)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Anik Waldow (Sydney)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1115</td>
<td><strong>CONCURRENT SESSION 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gianni Paganini (Piedmont): 'Hume's Empiricism and Bayle's Scepticism'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentator: Todd Ryan (Trinity College)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Stephen Gaukroger (Sydney)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rachel Cohon (SUNY Albany): 'Hume's Moral Sentiments as Motives'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentator: Michael Gill (Arizona)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Mike Ridge (Edinburgh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1115-1300</td>
<td><strong>CONCURRENT SESSION 4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Holden (UC Santa Barbara): 'Is Hume a Projectivist about Absolute Necessity?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentator: Jani Hakkaraainen (Tampere)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Thomas Olshewsky (New College of Florida)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1345</td>
<td>LUNCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard Hodgson (UBC): 'The Natural History of Religion in Hume and d'Holbach'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentator: Herman De Dijn (Leuven)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Mark Sinclair (MMU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1345-1500</td>
<td><strong>CONCURRENT SESSION 3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yoram Hazony (Shalem Institute): '4 Arguments Against Newton in <em>Treatise</em> 1.2.3'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentator: Karaan Durland (Austin College)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Saul Traiger (Occidental)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1615</td>
<td><strong>CONCURRENT SESSION 4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jennifer Welchman (Alberta): 'Hume on Self-Love in the <em>Treatise</em>'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentator: Christian Maurer (Fribourg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Alexander Brodie (Glasgow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1615-1630</td>
<td><strong>COFFEE/TEA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630-1800</td>
<td><strong>PLENARY 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karen O'Brien (Birmingham): 'Human Agency in Hume's Historical Thought'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Nicholas Phillipson (Edinburgh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815-2000</td>
<td>Civic Reception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Susan Manning (Edinburgh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330-1800</td>
<td><strong>PLENARY 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karen O'Brien (Birmingham): 'Human Agency in Hume's Historical Thought'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Nicholas Phillipson (Edinburgh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0945-1115</td>
<td>BOOK PANEL 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1115-1130</td>
<td>COFFEE/TEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1130-1300</td>
<td>PANEL 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1345</td>
<td>LUNCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1615</td>
<td>CONCURRENT SESSION 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1615-1630</td>
<td>COFFEE/TEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630-1800</td>
<td>PLENARY 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815-2000</td>
<td>Reception at the National Library of Scotland, George IV Bridge Talk on the Hume MSS by M. A. Stewart (Dalhousie) Chair: Lorraine Besser-Jones (Middlebury)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830-2000</td>
<td>PLENARY 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The schedule includes sessions with various speakers and topics, including discussions on philosophy, history, and literary analysis.
## THURSDAY 21 JULY
0830 - 1730
Registration in the Old College

### PLAYFAIR LIBRARY
0900 - 1000
- **Hume Society Executive Committee business meeting**

1000 - 1115
- **CONCURRENT SESSION 7**
  - Lisa Shapiro (Simon Fraser), "A Sense of Self: Hume and Condillac"
  - Roger Emerson (Western Ontario) and Mark Spencer (Brock), "A Bibliography for Hume's History of England"
  - Josh Wood (Boston), "Hume and the Metaphysics of Agency"
  - Commentator: Lorne Falkenstein (Western Ontario)
  - Commentator: Livia Guimaraes (Minas Gerais)
  - Chair: Max Grober (Austin College)
  - Chair: Kate Abramson (Indiana)

1115 - 1130
- **COFFEE/TEA**

1130 - 1300
- **PANEL 3**
  - **HUME IN FRANCE**
    - Participants: Jean-Pierre Cléro (Rouen), Éléonore Le Jallé (Lille 3), Edoardo Piccoli (Turin)
    - Chair: Robert Mankin (Paris-Diderot)
  - **Hume on the Liberty of the Press**
    - Commentator: Yumiko Inukai (UMass Boston)
    - Chair: Fred Schmitt (Indiana)

1300 - 1345
- **LUNCH**

1345 - 1500
- **CONCURRENT SESSION 8**
  - Dario Perinetti (UQAM): "Perceptions and Objects in Hume's Treatise"
  - Philip Reed (Canisius): "The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory"
  - Marc Hanvelt (Carleton): "Pluralism, Politeness, and the Public Sphere"
  - Roger Emerson (Western Ontario)
  - Commentator: Jane McIntyre (Cleveland State)
  - Chair: Katherine Paxman (Antwerp)

1500 - 1515
- **COFFEE/TEA**

1515 - 1615
- **PANEL 4**
  - **Hume in France**
    - Juan Pineros (Toronto), "The Place of Relations in Hume's Account of the Distinctions of Reason"
    - Commentator: Don Baxter (UConn)
    - Chair: Julia Annas (Arizona)
  - **The Absence of God and its Significance for Hume**
    - Commentator: David Raynor (Ottawa)
    - Chair: David Purdie (Edinburgh)

1615 - 1630
- **COFFEE/TEA**

1630 - 1800
- **PLENARY 4**
  - **The Absence of God and its Significance for Hume**
    - Commentator: Jane McIntyre (Cleveland State)
    - Chair: Fred Schmitt (Indiana)

2000 - 2100
- **Concert by Harmonious Sounds**
  - Canongate Kirk
### Friday 22 July

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0830 - 1030</td>
<td>Registration in the Old College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900 - 1030</td>
<td>PLENARY 5: Catherine Wilson (Aberdeen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Is Naturalism Bad for People?' Chair: Elizabeth Radcliffe (William and Mary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1030 - 1100</td>
<td>Coffee/Tea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100 - 1900</td>
<td>Daytrip to Paxton House and Chirnside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430 - 1630</td>
<td>Walking tour of Hume's Edinburgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800 - 1930</td>
<td>Carnegie reception, Old College</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Saturday 23 July

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0830 - 1730</td>
<td>Registration in the Old College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500 - 1730</td>
<td>Coffee/Tea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1530 - 1630</td>
<td>Hume Society AGM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Registrations**

- **Old College**
- **Playfair Library**
- **Lecture Theatre 175**
- **Raeburn Room**
- **Carnegie Centenary Lecture**

**Concurrent Session 10**

- Dan Kervick, "Hume's Perceptual Relationism" (Independent Scholar)
- Amyas Merivale, "Mixed Feelings, Mixed Metaphors: Hume on Tragic Pleasure" (Leeds)
- Spiros Tegos, "Hume and Smith on the Social Function of Fetishism" (Crete)

**Concurrent Session 1500**

- Amyas Merivale, "Hume's Sense of Probability" (Leeds)
- Spiros Tegos, "Hume and Smith on the Social Function of Fetishism" (Crete)
- Chair: Jeffrey A. Bell (Southeastern Louisiana)

**Discussants**

- Donald Ainslie (Toronto)
- Angela Coventry (Portland)
- Peter Milican (Oxford)
ABSTRACTS

Tuesday 19 July

SESSION 1: 0845 - 1000

1) PLAYFAIR LIBRARY
David Landy (San Francisco State): 'Garrett's Defense of the Copy Principle'
Don Garrett has defended Hume's use of the Copy Principle by casting it as not a mere empirical generalization, but a scientifically well-supported one. I here argue that while this move does extricate Hume from the above dilemma, it still leaves him vulnerable to a serious worry. Hume’s arguments in the Treatise require him to employ not only the Copy Principle, which is a thesis about the intrinsic properties of perceptions, but also a thesis concerning what determines the intentional content of a perception. I propose that Hume holds the Semantic Copy Principle, which states that a perception is of that of which it is a copy. I show that Hume employs this thesis in a number of his most important arguments, and that his doing so relieves the dialectical burden placed on the Copy Principle by the above objection because it is the Semantic Copy Principle that does most of the heavy lifting against Hume’s predecessors in those arguments. I further argue that the Semantic Copy Principle is not susceptible to an iteration of this dilemma because it does not assert the existence of any causal relations, and rather than violate Hume’s commitment to empiricism, it expresses that commitment. Thus, I claim that the Semantic Copy Principle is necessary, a priori, and discovered as a result of an analysis (via the procedure suggested by Hume’s account of general ideas) of our idea of intentional content.

2) LECTURE THEATRE 175
Lewis Powell (USC): 'How to Avoid Mis-Reiding Hume's Maxim of Conceivability'
In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Thomas Reid offers a barrage of objections to the view that conceivability implies possibility. Though Reid has many targets in mind when offering these objections, David Hume is a primary recipient of Reid’s assault. In this paper, I present Reid’s first two objections to the ‘maxim of conceivability’ and defend Hume from these concerns. The first objection maintains that Hume is unable to account for our ability to understand impossible claims, given the maxim of conceivability. The second objection maintains that Hume is unable to account for our thoughts about impossible claims (such as, for instance, the thought that they are impossible). I show how, on a naive reading, Reid’s objections appear to involve a misunderstanding of Hume’s notion of conception. In light of this, I develop a more sophisticated interpretation of Reid’s objections, which involve the relationship between the workings of language and Hume’s commitment to analyze all the operations of the understanding in terms of conception. Reid’s objections presuppose particular views about the relationship between language and mind. However, since Hume does not present a systematic account of linguistic meaning or understanding, I argue that these more sophisticated objections also fail, on the grounds that they require us to attribute substantive views about language to Hume without warrant. Reid’s objections, though ultimately unsuccessful, prove to be useful in drawing out a set of intertwined issues about the language-mind relationship in Hume.

3) RAEBURN ROOM
Juan Samuel Santos Castro (Alberta): 'On Hume on Happiness'
One can find two different approaches to the topic of happiness in Hume’s work: what I shall call the happiness of virtue approach and the happiness as such approach. My thesis is that Hume sees these approaches each related to different tasks for a moral philosopher, yet both required because one necessarily complements the other. The first approach examines why being virtuous fosters our happiness, whereas the other makes us to face the
troubles with the what-is-happiness’ question. I shall argue that Hume thinks that the first approach deserves serious philosophical treatment and that it is a moralist’s task making people to learn and to apply its conclusions, whereas he thinks that the second approach must aim only to those who have seriously asked the question of what happiness is and that the moral philosopher’s task is warning them precisely against the dangers of asking that question. The first approach is meant to encourage us to virtue, the second to discourage us to philosophical investigation on happiness. They are complementary because the discouraging of our philosophical curiosity for happiness is designed for Hume as a resource for encouraging us to virtuousness and thus to a safer path toward happiness.

SESSION 2: 1000 - 1115

1) PLAYFAIR LIBRARY
Gianni Paganini (Piedmont): 'Hume’s Empiricism and Bayle's Scepticism'
Next to the five major areas listed by Norman Kemp Smith in which Bayle had exercised greater influence on Hume’s work, and further to the more recent discoveries concerning the so-called Early Memoranda, we shall add here a new Baylean source. In particular, we shall show that it is not only the second part of section V (“Of the immateriality of the soul”) of Treatise I, IV that depends on Bayle (for the article Spinoza), but that also the first part owes a debt to the philosopher from Rotterdam. This part of the fifth section concerns the difficulty of finding a “relation” between “perceptions, which are simple, and exist no where”, on the one hand, and on the other hand some “conjunction in place with matter or body, which is extended and divisible”. In their extensive commentary to the text of Treatise David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton refer to a huge bulk of authors that are relevant for the understanding of this part. Among others, they list Descartes, Arnauld and Nicole, Malebranche, Glanvill, Locke, Berkeley, Spinoza, Rohault, Hobbes, Stillingfleet, Locke, Cudworth, King, Gassendi, Chambers, Voltaire and so on. In this connection, Bayle is very shortly recalled just for a couple of articles of his Dictionnaire historique et critique: ‘Leucippe’, rem. E and ‘Simonide’, rem. F. Instead, we think that another primary source for the first part of the section 1.4.5 is an extensive chapter in Bayle’s Réponse aux questions d’un provincial, where the problems concerning a possible ‘local conjunction’ of the spirit and the body are dealt with in considerable depth. This source is not quoted in Norton & Norton commentary, even though considering Hume’s arguments against this specific Baylean background can be very enlightening in order to follow the proper line of reasoning contained in the section ‘Of the immateriality of the soul’.

2) LECTURE THEATRE 175
Rachel Cohon (SUNY Albany): 'Hume's Moral Sentiments as Motives'
Do the moral sentiments move us to act, according to Hume? And if so, how? Hume famously deploys the claim that moral evaluations move us to act to show that they are not derived from reason alone. Presumably, moral evaluations move us because (as Hume sees it) they are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. So it would seem that moral approval and disapproval are or produce motives to action. This raises three interconnected interpretive questions. First, on Hume’s account, we are moved to do many virtuous actions not by the sentiments of approval and disapproval, but by other sentiments, such as gratitude and parental love; so when and how do the moral sentiments themselves provide motives to act morally? Furthermore, I argue here that the moral sentiments are best understood as Humean indirect affections. But Hume says that the four main indirect passions (pride, humility, love and hatred) do not directly move us to act. The second question is whether their indirect status nonetheless allows moral approval and disapproval to be or provide motives. The mechanisms for producing motives that most naturally come to mind, it turns out, are ones that are equally available to reason alone. This introduces the third question: given the constraints Hume imposes on the nature of the moral sentiments, is there a way in which they can move us to act that is not also a way in which reason alone does? For brevity, I only consider the answers that are possible if we adopt a particular construal of Hume’s position on how belief about future pleasure is connected to the desire to obtain it. I argue that, given this assumption, while Hume has
greatly constrained his options, his moral sentiments do have one very limited way of moving us to act that is not available to reason alone.

3) RAEBURN ROOM
Ryu Susato (Kansai): 'The Empire of the Imagination: The Association of Ideas in Hume's Social Philosophy'
It is well known that Hume prided himself upon his overall adoption of the theory of the association of ideas in the Treatise, while he allegedly lost his interest in the associationist theory in his later writings. This paper, however, claims that Hume maintained this interest throughout his work. Although his clear references to the theory of imagination (including the association of ideas) become less conspicuous on its appearance, the associationist theory still plays an essential part in his explanation of the psychological origin of property in his Second Enquiry and Dissertation on the Passions. Although his contemporaries and later generations frequently grouped Hume's associationism with David Hartley's, I will demonstrate important variations between them. I also argue here that Hume's criticism of physical causes in the essay “Of National Characters” can be considered a defense of his own version of associationism and a possible criticism of Hartley's physiological one.

SESSION 3: 1345 - 1500

1) PLAYFAIR LIBRARY
Yoram Hazony (Shalem Institute): '4 Arguments Against Newton in Treatise 1.2-3'
In this paper, I marshal new arguments and evidence in support of the contention that Hume's Treatise is written in part as a critique of Newton. I examine four aspects of Book I, Parts 2-3 that should be seen as part of a systematic attack on Newton's science, but which have not yet received sufficient attention: (i) Hume's attack on Newton's claim that the exactness of geometry makes mathematical physics an exact science; (ii) Hume's rejection of Newton's introduction of absolute space and time into physics; (iii) Rule VII of Hume's “Rules by which to judge of causes and effects,” which seeks to limit Newton's claims regarding the universal character of gravitation and other physical phenomena; and (iv) Hume's reduction of the category of force to psychological terms, amounting to the claim that the Newtonian physics describes entities that are not mind-independent. In the conclusion, I'll touch on the possibility that this critique of Newton's science in Parts 2-3 of Treatise I is preliminary to the attack, in Part 4, on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which Hume sees as the fundamental error common to the “modern philosophy” advanced by Descartes, Newton and Locke.

2) LECTURE THEATRE 175
Richard Hodgson (UBC): 'The Natural History of Religion in Hume and d'Holbach'
In this paper, I propose to study some of the major issues related to revealed religion that particularly interested Hume and at the same time intrigued a number of other major Enlightenment philosophers from Shaftesbury to Diderot. In order to demonstrate how closely many of Hume's ideas on religion show affinities with those put forth by some of his contemporaries, I compare Hume's approach to the question of revealed religion with that of his one-time acquaintance, the atheist Paul-Henry Thiry, baron d'Holbach. Both philosophers were avid readers of the works of Pierre Bayle and shared a passionate interest in a wide range of philosophical issues related to revealed religion, from the origins of religious belief, the history of polytheism and idolatry, and the relationship between revealed religion and superstition to the existence of prodigies and miracles, the causes of religious fanaticism and the political dimensions of religious persecution and intolerance. The examples I use in this study are taken from Hume's The Natural History of Religion; his essay “Of Miracles” and his History of England and from d'Holbach's The Sacred Contagion, or the Natural History of Superstition (1768); Of Religious Cruelty (1769) and Common Sense, or Natural Ideas as Opposed to Supernatural Ones (1772).

3) RAEBURN ROOM
Dejan Simkovic (Sydney): 'Criticism of Moral Relations in Treatise 3.1.1'
The aim of the paper is to offer a novel reading of Book 3, Part 1, Section 1 of Hume's Treatise. It is based on the idea that Hume is attacking a specific conception of moral facts as consisting in certain kinds of relations, with
the intention to show that the ontological status of moral properties prevents them from being epistemically accessible to reason alone. As such, it is in accordance with what Rachel Cohon and Peter Kail have recently argued on independent grounds, i.e., that in general Hume provides a criticism of ‘rationalism’ as a view of in what moral facts consist in. There is a gap in the Cohon-Kail debate, however, which is revealed upon careful inspection of what they have to say on the “is-ought” paragraph. Cohon and Kail can neither offer a complete account of Hume’s argument against rationalists, nor can they explain the purpose of the “is-ought” paragraph in it, due to a limited interpretation of Hume’s criticism of the rationalist use of concept of ‘relation’. I will show that Hume’s argument against rationalism contains additional premises that have not been accounted for so far, which, when revealed, enable us to give closure to the famous “is-ought” debate, and refute what I will call the traditional reading of 3.1.1.

SESSION 4: 1500 - 1615

1) PLAYFAIR LIBRARY
Thomas Holden (UC Santa Barbara): 'Is Hume a Projectivist about Absolute Necessity?'
Hume regards the “absolute” necessity attending demonstrable propositions as an expression of the limitations of human imagination. When we register our modal commitments in ordinary descriptive language, affirming that there are such-and-such absolute necessities, possibilities and impossibilities, we are projecting our sense of what the human mind can and cannot conceive. In some ways the account parallels Hume’s famous treatment of the necessity of causes, and in crucial respects it anticipates recent expressivist theories of absolute modality. In the current paper I marshal some of the evidence for the projectivist interpretation of Hume on absolute necessity, and show how this interpretation can explain a number of otherwise puzzling features of his modal epistemology and metaphysics.

2) LECTURE THEATRE 175
Jennifer Welchman (Alberta): 'Hume on Self-Love in the Treatise'
As Penelhum remarks, it is a challenge to resolve the “shock that arises from the apparent differences between what he says about the self in [Treatise] book 1 and ... book 2.” After learning that the ‘self’ is a mere bundle of impressions and ideas, it is a shock to find that the passions of pride and humility “are determin’d to have self for their object.” I discuss a second, less celebrated, shocking set of inconsistencies in what Hume says about the self in books 2-3. Hume says in book 2 that love is not a passion that has self as its object (“when we talk of self-love, ‘tis not in a proper sense,”) then says in book 3 that “each person loves himself better than any other single person.” One reason for examining this set of inconsistencies is that it raises problems for Hume’s moral psychology not yet fully explored. A second is to highlight the relationship between the two sets. Despite Hume’s remark that books 1-2 offer a “compleat chain of reasoning”, while books 1 and 2 exhibit Hume’s method for reconstructing our ideas of the self, that method is not fully corroborated until successfully applied to moral as well as practical experience. This is, in other words, not a respect in which book 3 can be considered “independent” of books 1-2.

3) RAEBURN ROOM
Tina Baceski (Rockhurst): 'Hume on the Virtues of Taste'
Hume believes that the perception of beauty is an internal impression. Hence, it is discerned not by reason, but by taste. Although Hume identifies beauty with an internal sentiment, he is not an aesthetic relativist. In “Of the Standard of Taste,” he establishes that tastes are unequal; there are good judges and bad judges of art. A good judge – an art critic – satisfies conditions that allow for the proper perception and evaluation of beauty; he makes himself into a person who is optimally receptive to beauty, a person of good taste. But the excellence of faculties characteristic of the art critic, I argue, are also those of the reasonable person, the “mitigated skeptic” who consistently “proportions his belief to the evidence.” Hume provides a model for such a person in the character of the “wise man” in Section X of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, “Of Miracles,” where he shows how a qualified observer properly evaluates the reliability of human testimony. The “wise man’s” acceptance of testimony navigates a middle course between credulity on the one hand, and a reluctance to accept anything he is told at face value, on the other; both attitudes indicate a
failure to proportion belief to the evidence. My purpose in this paper is to show that, for Hume, empirical judgments about the world and aesthetic judgments about works of art both depend on the virtues of taste. Good taste informs the “wise man’s” sense of what it is reasonable to believe just as it informs the art critic’s sense of what objects are truly beautiful.

Wednesday 20 July

SESSION 5: 1345 - 1500

1) PLAYFAIR LIBRARY
Jonathan Cottrell (NYU): 'Reading Treatise 1.2.5 in Light of Hobbe's De Corpore'
Hume denies that we can imagine a spatial vacuum: “[W]e can form no idea of a vacuum, or space, where there is nothing visible or tangible”. In Treatise 1.2.5 Hume defends this contention by answering three arguments for the contrary view. His counterargument is enigmatic; Marina Frasca-Spada has called Treatise 1.2.5 “one of the most difficult parts of the whole Treatise”. In this paper, I aim to resolve several puzzles about this Treatise section, by reading it in light of Hobbes's discussion of spatial representation in Concerning Body – a discussion to which, I suggest, Hume's own discussion 'Of the ideas of space and time' is indebted. I advance a reading of Hobbes's claim that “Place is feigned extension”, and propose that we read Hume's claim about “fictitious distance” in Treatise 1.2.5 in the same way. Drawing upon this reading, I give solutions to the puzzles posed by Treatise 1.2.5.

2) LECTURE THEATRE 175
Jonas Olson (Stockholm): 'Projectivism and Error in Hume's Ethics'
Commentators have attributed to Hume a wide variety of metaethical views. The main questions to be considered in this essay are whether Hume is a moral projectivist and whether he is a moral error theorist. The essay argues that Hume is a moral projectivist and it identifies two senses in which Hume might be labelled a moral error theorist. This involves distinguishing between Hume’s descriptive metaethics and his revisionary metaethics. The former is his account of actual or vulgar moral discourse, that is to say ordinary people's moral thought and talk; the latter is his account of how actual or vulgar moral discourse could be reformed so as to no longer involve error. We can then say that in descriptive metaethics, Hume is indeed a projectivist and an error theorist and in revisionary metaethics, Hume is a projectivist and a subjectivist but not an error theorist. This is significant since many have assumed that error theorist readings of Hume conflict with subjectivist readings. But they are in a sense compatible. Although error theorist readings of Hume have found some supporters over the years, they are currently rather unpopular. The essay considers why this is and responds to objections to error theorist readings. Finally, the moral error theories of Hume and J. L. Mackie are compared.

3) RAEBURN ROOM
Kiyoshi Shimokawa (Gakushuin): 'Hume's New Conventionalism'
This paper aims to take a fresh look at Hume's celebrated account of the origin of justice and property. It treats it as a conventionalist account of the origin of property, and compares it with the earlier conventionalism of Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf. By this comparative method, it seeks to show how Hume transforms the older versions of conventionalism which figured in the tradition of natural jurisprudence, while specifying the respects in which Hume's conventionalism may be said to be new. Through a careful comparison, this paper highlights some distinctive features of the way in which Hume transforms the old versions of conventionalism, indicating where he agrees or disagrees with his predecessors. Hume transforms the old conventionalism into a new utilitarian conventionalism which makes an explicit and extensive use of the sense of interest, while assigning a minimal role to reason. Hume also transforms the very concept of convention that was traditionally used in the early modern discourse. ‘Convention’ no longer means an agreement of wills; it comes to mean a convergence of senses of self-interest, which tends to public interest. Given Hume’s deep commitment to interest at several levels, and given his strategy of explaining the moral approbation of the virtue of justice in terms of pleasure, it is appropriate to describe Hume’s conventionalism as ‘utilitarian’.
SESSION 6: 1500 - 1615

1) PLAYFAIR LIBRARY
Jon Charles Miller (Ottawa): 'Can the New Humeans Account for Our Natural Belief in Dreams?'
The New Humeans argue that our natural belief in causation and an external world provides an ontological commitment to the objects of that world. But if this is so, then what about our natural belief in dreams? In this paper I analyze two anticipated objections that the New Humeans could make against the implication that since we also naturally believe in an external world of objects in causal relation while dreaming that this means we must also be realists about our dreams. In doing so I show that neither objection entirely removes this troubling implication for the New Humeans.

2) LECTURE THEATRE 175
Eric Schliesser (Ghent): 'The Science of Man and the Invention of Usable Traditions'
In this paper I scrutinize three sets of passages by David Hume. The first is from the Introduction to *A Treatise of Human Nature*; the second is from the “An Abstract of a Book lately Published, entitled, A Treatise of Human Nature,”; the third is really a collection of widely scattered vignettes from *The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688* (1754-1762). I argue that in these works Hume creates several distinct intellectual traditions leading up to him. I argue that the changes among them reflect, in part, tactical moves in response to changed circumstances and, in part, Hume’s changed understanding of his project’s relationship to the “system” of science. For example, I trace how high praise for Bacon and Locke gets replaced by praise for Galileo, Boyle, and Newton. While this little noticed aspect of Hume’s thought has independent interest, focusing on Hume’s historiographic strategy also helps illuminate Hume’s evolving understanding of the “science of man” within the system of sciences.

3) RAEBURN ROOM
Matt Kisner (UC San Diego): 'Why Take Up the General Point of View?'

Hume on Moral Motivation'
According to Hume, moral judgments are based on moral sentiments, which we experience by contemplating character from a particular perspective, what he calls the common point of view, henceforth CPV (3.3.1.15; E 9.6). This paper’s question is why, according to Hume, we would be motivated to judge people from this perspective, rather than from any other? This is equivalent to the question, why should we hold ourselves, and others to moral standards, or, more simply, why should we be moral? In answering this question, most commentators look to what I call the “stability argument,” which argues that we take up the CPV because it provides the most stable and consistent beliefs about character (3.3.1.15). This argument indicates that we take up the CPV for epistemic reasons, in other words, because its judgments provide the best beliefs, judged according to theoretical standards: the most stable, consistent and, consequently, reliable beliefs. This paper defends, first, the negative claim that this argument, although a central part of Hume’s explanation of the psychological causes for taking up the CPV, provides a problematic and misleading picture of his view on the motivation for moral judgments. Second, this paper defends the positive claim that Hume’s best answer to the question is found in what I call the “agreement argument”—we take up the CPV because it helps us to reach agreement about judgments of character.

Thursday 21 July

SESSION 7: 1000 - 1115

1) PLAYFAIR LIBRARY
Lisa Shapiro (Simon Fraser): 'A Sense of Self: Hume and Condillac on Consciousness, Selfhood, and the Nature of Thinking'
What resources does an empiricist have for explaining our sense of self? Can consciousness alone afford us knowledge of an independently existing self that persists over time? I argue that Hume and Condillac both see that Locke’s account of persons, with its rejection of a substance ontology, faces this problem, but they respond to it in different ways. Hume rejects the idea
that consciousness involves awareness of ourselves as owners of that thought, and offers an associationist explanation of our idea of self. Condillac, however, takes a different tack. He wants to preserve the idea that our conscious experience incorporates a sense of ownership and he locates this sense in the intrinsically affective – painful or pleasant – nature of our conscious experience. It is noteworthy that Condillac’s account of our idea of self is essentially developmental. We begin with an awareness that is not in itself intrinsically intentional, and this is enough to afford a first personal perspective constitutive of a thin sense of self. This awareness is not fixed but develops with experience, and ultimately allows, on the basis of experience alone, for representational thought and so for us to understand ourselves as independently existing, distinct from other things.

2) LECTURE THEATRE 175
Josh Wood (Boston): 'Hume and the Metaphysics of Agency'
In the first Enquiry Hume offers a variety of arguments against drawing the concept of causal power from human agency. These arguments can be largely divided into two kinds. The first kind, which defends the separability of willing and acting, is intended to prove that we lack grounds for claiming that causation is (actually or metaphysically) involved in human action. The second kind of argument, which defends the incomprehensibility of the mechanics of acting, is intended to prove that we have no reason to think, even if it were true that human action involves causation, that the experience of voluntary action acquaints us with the nature of causal power. Commentators rarely take issue with the central claim of Hume’s second argument, namely, that the relation between volition and action is incomprehensible. By contrast, several commentators suggest that the central claim of the first argument, namely, that volition is separable from action, shows that Hume holds a view of human agency that is implausible and at best theoretically convenient. In defending the integrity of Hume’s claim about the separability of volition and action, I draw attention to two significant (and heretofore overlooked) historical points. Hume’s paralysis example, rather than a mere theoretical convenience, is designed to challenge a position advanced by Charles Mayne. And Hume’s paralysis example is one among other examples of its kind in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Consideration of such examples brings out the plausibility of Hume’s claim that volition is separable from action.

3) RAEBURN ROOM
Roger Emerson (Western Ontario) and Mark Spencer (Brock): 'A Bibliography for Hume's History of England'
Hume’s History of England (1754-62) [hereafter HE] has received a good deal of attention over the years but no one has ever systematically studied his sources. Instead they have worried about his biases, his portraits of figures like Charles I, and his alleged scorn for mere antiquarianism which resulted in a readable but superficial history. The most exciting book dealing with his HE in recent years sees it as a step in the process which led to nineteenth-century historicism. Others have seen him in the context of narrativity but have paid little attention to the source of the facts worked into the narrative. Discussions of the relation of his HE to philosophy, to sentiments and to his essay on history overshadow his reading and use of books and manuscripts. For some it is sufficient that he spent little time in archives and had no reputation as an antiquary but a fine reputation as a writer dependent upon the accounts of others. It is surely time to look more closely at his sources.

SESSION 8: 1345 - 1500

1) PLAYFAIR LIBRARY
Dario Perinetti (UQAM): 'Perceptions and Objects in Hume's Treatise'
In this paper, I shall argue that though Hume is indeed a sceptic and not a realist about representation, his scepticism does not commit him to the view that perceptions and objects are identical and so, too, to the idealist thesis that the world is composed of nothing but perceptions. Hume sees the very possibility of perceiving a present object as dependent on inferences from past experience. The argument will involve two parts: a first negative part will be devoted sustain a thorough sceptical reading of Hume on representation. I will argue a) that neither impressions nor ideas, all by themselves, have the capacity to represent objects and b) that Hume thought that perceptions and objects are the same kind of thing or, to put it
otherwise, that the terms ‘perception’ and ‘object’ are coextensive. The positive part will involve explaining how, in spite of his claim that perceptions and objects are the same kind of thing, Hume can give an account of the ordinary distinction between perceptions and objects, the one that is necessary for our basic sense of reality.

2) LECTURE THEATRE 175
Philip Reed (Canisius): 'The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory'
In this paper I argue that vanity, the desire for and delight in the favorable opinion of others, plays a fundamental role in Hume’s account of moral motivation. Hume says that vanity and virtue are inseparable, though he does not explicitly say how or why this should be. I argue that Hume’s account of sympathy can account for this alliance. In resting moral sentiment on sympathy, Hume gives a fundamental role to vanity as it becomes either a mediating motive to virtue or else strengthens the otherwise weak motive of moral sentiment.

3) RAEBURN ROOM
Marc Hanvelt (Carleton): 'Pluralism, Politeness, and the Public Sphere: Hume on the Liberty of the Press'
Although “Of the Liberty of the Press” has tended to garner more attention for Hume’s decision to significantly edit the conclusion of the essay than for the argument it actually contains, the significance of the essay, and of Hume’s decision to edit it as he did, extends beyond a strict concern with freedom of the press, or for that matter, with the relationship between liberty and authority or a support for the establishment. “Of the Liberty of the Press” opens an important window into Hume’s thoughts on the public sphere and, in particular, on the importance and nature of political discourse. In addition, reading “Of the Liberty of the Press” in light of Hume’s greater concerns with public discourse raises some very important questions about the relationship between the written and the spoken word.

SESSION 9: 1500 - 1615

1) PLAYFAIR LIBRARY
Juan Pineros (Toronto): 'The Place of Relations in Hume's Account of the Distinctions of Reason'
Accounting for how we make ‘distinctions of reason’, that is, how we distinguish partial content in simple objects (like the whiteness of a white point from the point), seems problematic for Hume. He wants to deny that we are able to think of the partial content (e.g. the whiteness) separately, because this concession, together with two vital principles used throughout the Treatise, would lead him to conclude that properties, like whiteness, could exist by themselves and in isolation from any object, contrary to his nominalism. Hume’s solution is that when we make distinctions of reason, we really are thinking about the simple objects (like the white point), in terms of the “different aspects, according to the resemblances, of which they are susceptible” (Treatise 1.1.7.18, SB 25). However, Donald Baxter and others have recently argued that this purported solution is problematic, because it would commit Hume to a contradiction when accounting for cases of partial resemblance. The aim of this paper is to respond to these criticisms and defend the consistency of Hume’s account of the distinction of reason. Our central claim is that these problems are not due to Hume’s solution, but rather arise from a mistaken interpretation of Hume’s texts. Critics attribute to him what we call a ‘content-based view’ of relations, one in which the relation is fully accounted for in terms of the relata. We argue that a careful reading of the Treatise shows that, instead, Hume holds what we call a ‘conception-based view’ of relations, one where relations are partly accounted for by the manner in which the objects are related. We give a detailed analysis of this view and how it applies to the distinction of reason and show how, once Hume is interpreted as holding a conception-based view of resemblance, the problems pointed out by the critics disappear.

2) LECTURE THEATRE 175
Erin Frykholm (UC San Diego): 'Do We Lack Character? A Humean Response to the Situationist Challenge'
This paper analyzes John Doris’s challenge to Hume that the latter’s account of character as the source of moral responsibility leaves us making
too many excuses for “uncharacteristic” behavior in cases in which we want to assign responsibility. In response to this challenge, the paper shows that Hume’s view of traits as the source of responsibility, when properly understood, is qualitatively indistinguishable from Doris’s alternate account of responsibility, which is given in terms of narrative integration and identifying motives. Hume is no less able to assign responsibility than is Doris, and so Doris’s strongest challenge to character-based moral theories fails.

3) RAEBURN ROOM

Jackie Taylor (San Francisco): ‘Hume on Social Power’

When he turns to examine the powers of persons, Hume explicitly draws attention to the “frivolous” distinction between power and its exercise, noting that there is no such distinction according to a strict “philosophical way of thinking” (T 2.1.10.4). The philosophical way of thinking about this point refers back to 1.3.14, where one of the “corollaries” to the definitions of causation is that “the distinction, which we often make betwixt power and the exercise of it” is “without foundation” (1.3.14.34). But while the distinction has no foundation according to a “just and philosophical way of thinking,” this is not the case for “the philosophy of our passions.” For the passions can be affected “by means of the idea and supposition of power, independent of its actual exercise” (T 2.1.10.4). The power of persons generally, whether deriving from their wealth, authority or some other source, is an ability of persons to act in ways that are imbued with particular social meanings. Hume makes a deep point about our social recognition of one another as persons and about the relations of duty, interest or authority that characterize our encounters with one another that have a particular significance for us. Such power influences a number of passions, including pride, humility, fear, hope, respect and contempt. In reconstructing Hume’s account of social power, I argue that we should regard these passions as socially constituted, insofar as they reflect our grasp of the significance of social danger, power and authority.

Saturday 23 July

SESSION 10: 1345 - 1500

1) PLAYFAIR LIBRARY

Dan Kervick (independent scholar): ‘Hume’s Perceptual Relationism’

My topic in this paper is Hume’s claim that we have no idea of a vacuum, a claim which is the main contention of Treatise 1.2.5. My aim is to offer an interpretation of Hume’s general account of our ideas of extension that makes it clear why those ideas cannot include any ideas of vacuums. I distinguish my interpretation from some actual and possible misinterpretations of Hume’s account, and endeavor to explain how Hume sees his account as offering a contribution to a “compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new.” An upshot of Hume’s account, I will argue, is his commitment to a remarkable view I call perceptual relationism. Perceptual relationism is a fundamental characteristic of Hume’s “universe of the imagination”, and a manifestation of just how “loose and separate” the constituents of that inner universe are.

2) LECTURE THEATRE 175

Amyas Merivale (Leeds): ‘Mixed Feelings, Mixed Metaphors: Hume on Tragic Pleasure’

The principle with which Hume accounts for the seemingly unaccountable pleasure that we take in tragic drama is placed in its theoretical context, and the various metaphors that Hume uses in describing this principle are examined. These metaphors are then brought to bear on an interpretative controversy concerning the result of Hume’s principle for the subordinate passion. It is argued that, while Hume’s considered position should have been that this passion is destroyed at the end of the process, it is most likely that he did not consider the question carefully enough to form a definite answer in his own mind.
Spiros Tegos (Crete): 'Hume and Smith on the Social Function of Fetishism'

In this paper I focus on the fetishism of social power that is the affective stance of adulation towards social and political authority and its function in social life. Taking my cue from the *Natural History of Religion* I argue that Hume draws a parallel between the worship of anthropomorphic deities and powerful humans in primitive social life. This is telling for the origins of the sympathetic, disinterested identification with the socially powerful in civilised context insofar as the latter instantiates a clear progress in refinement over the former. Put differently, it severe the link between social subordination and rude admiration of the powerful in commercial context albeit in a nuanced manner; Yet Hume holds throughout his oeuvre that ignorance and rudeness apply to both savage and vulgar mentality thereby creating a potential of atavistic behaviour within the frame of modern manners. The question is whether rude, anthropomorphic worship of the deity as intimately linked with the adulation of powerful humans does not create an atavistic remnant built into vulgar mentality in commercial context. Is it possible for the sympathy with the rich and the great to be devoid of any atavistic, religious remnant? In a nutshell, my hypothesis is that rude religious practices can provide a key for the understanding of the atavism embedded into the social psychology of subordination in civilized, commercial context.